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This research explores the potential to create public value in the various governance 
mechanisms which have been established in the evolving landscape of local governance in 
Ireland. Public Value Management (PVM) is a public management approach which recognises 
the legitimacy of a wide range of stakeholders in a democratic process and in which managers 
play an active role in steering networks of deliberation and delivery to create public value. This 
study considers whether the current climate of local State – civil society collaboration indicates 
a shift towards a broader authorizing environment wherein public policy priorities are 
determined, and whether local State has enabled the appropriate operational capacity to devise 
and realise a public value informed strategy and practice of collaboration.  
The research focusses on three case studies in one single site where institutional restructuring  
has recently taken place. The study applies a qualitative research methodology comprising  
local governance actor interviews supplemented by elite interviews with former informants of 
local governance processes. The mechanisms studied are: Strategic Policy Committee (SPC) 
for Travel and Transportation; SPC for Economic Development, Enterprise and Planning; and 
the Local Community Development Committee. Due to the researcher’s extensive experience 
in local government management, the research also offers a unique perspective based on wide-
ranging access to key actors and their insights. 
The study makes conceptual and empirical contributions to knowledge by establishing the 
relevance of PVM to real world settings, linking the PVM, institutionalism and collaborative 
governance literatures. The research demonstrates that generating collaboratively established 
public value outcomes is evident in mechanisms characterized by devolved decision-making 
power, a visible commitment to dialogue and deliberation, and bespoke information supports. 
Moreover, a public value informed practice of collaboration is most likely to be achieved where 
adequate resources are provided together with integrative leadership and a mindset to steer and 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
In response to social and economic challenges, increased demand, and reduced resources, the 
Irish Public Service is undergoing a period of reform in the administration and delivery of 
public services; part of which is the rationalisation of public service organisations and agencies 
including local government structures. The local government reform proposals are underpinned 
by the 2012 blueprint for local government reform, Putting People First: Action Programme 
for Effective Local Government (Department of the Environment, Community and Local 
Government, 2012), and associated statutory requirements of the Local Government Reform 
Act, 2014. As a member of the change team which led the local government transformation 
programme in Limerick, the origin of this research is the reform of local government structures 
in Limerick; and more specifically, to test the relevance and applicability of a Public Value 
Management approach in an empirical setting in light of a pre-existing institutional 
configuration. 
This chapter therefore provides the rationale for this research and the research questions, briefly 
describes evolving approaches to public management, and situates the study in the wider 
context of local government reform in Ireland and the local site chosen for analysis. It 
concludes with an overview of the research methodology and a summary of the thesis structure.  
1.2 Rationale 
This research aims to evaluate the ability of public service organisations to create public value 
- particularly where new opportunities are offered by structural and functional change - and to 
examine the kind of institutional changes necessary to properly embed a Public Value 
Management (PVM) approach. As such, the research proposes to test the relevance and 
applicability of a Public Value Management approach in an empirical setting in the context of 
the prescribed institutional configuration. 
The local level is the level at which citizens most frequently interact with public service 
organisations. Local government is the level at which the interests of citizens and communities 
are most apparently promoted and is an appropriate arena in which to trace the quest for public 
value changes from rhetoric to reality. 
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Irish citizens interact with public service organisations most frequently through local 
government. Since the interests of citizens and communities are most tangibly delineated and 
promoted at this level, it is an appropriate arena to trace the quest for public value changes 
from rhetoric to reality. In Ireland, local authorities are the closest and most accessible form of 
government and deliver frontline services including housing, planning, roads, water supply, 
environmental protection, recreation and amenities, and community infrastructure. As local 
authorities also play a key role in supporting local economic development and enterprise by 
providing the social, economic, and physical services required for potential investors and 
visitors, they are well placed to deliver public value.  
The government outlined its policy for reform and development across the local government 
system in Putting People First in 2012 (Department of the Environment, Community and Local 
Government, 2012). As a clear articulation of local government reform underpinned by the 
Local Government Reform Act, 2014, this policy envisioned local government as the main 
vehicle of governance and public service at local level; “leading economic, social, and 
community development, delivering efficient and good value services, and representing 
citizens and local communities effectively and accountability” (Department of the 
Environment, Community and Local Government, 2012:1). Putting People First further 
commits to a reform programme which also positions “local government system to take on a 
potentially wider role in the longer term, particularly by virtue of the increased capacity, 
effectiveness and credibility that the reforms should achieve” (Department of the Environment, 
Community and Local Government, 2012:7). 
 
In June 2011, as part of its rationalisation programme, the government announced the creation 
of a single local authority to replace the two existing local authorities serving Limerick City 
and Limerick County. In announcing the single new authority for Limerick the Minister also 
established the Limerick Re-organisation Implementation Group whose implementation plan 
affirmed the need for the new authority to embrace change, modernise, transform and adapt to 
new financial circumstances and to identify and develop a target service delivery model 
(Limerick Re-organisation Implementation Group, 2012). Limerick, Tipperary and Waterford 
were the first three counties in the history of the State to merge local authorities in this way. 
With twenty-one years’ experience at a senior management level across both local authorities 
at the time of reorganisation, the researcher was reassigned to the Senior Change Management 
Team overseeing the merger of Limerick City and County Councils that was urged to seize the 
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opportunity to forge an organisation of renewed ambition and vision for Limerick. This vision 
became the catalyst of the author’s interest in the theory and practice of public value. Moreover, 
the author was also part of the Management Team which formulated the seven specific 
ambitions for a better Limerick as ultimately summarised in the Corporate Plan (2015-2019) 
as follows: 
 A single overarching objective to build a city and county with ambition for the people 
of Limerick. 
 Three explicit commitments to achieving economic, physical, and social development.  
 Three selected pathways to success, through democratic and community activation, 
public and private engagement, and new ways of delivering. 
In addition to a unified institution, the merger also consolidated certain governance 
mechanisms embedded in those institutions, such as the Strategic Policy Committees. As such 
the embryonic council, founded on the tenets of a public value approach, offered a unique 
opportunity for analysis. 
However, these aspirations were being tackled against the challenging backdrop of recession. 
While the new Limerick Authority served an overall population of 191,809, including a 
Metropolitan Area populace of 102,161, the combined staff volume had fallen by 25% since 
2008, the combined revenue budget had dropped by 16% to €179M in five years, and the 
combined capital account expenditure had plummeted by 68% from €275M in 2008 to €88M 
in 2012 (Adopted Budgets, Limerick City Council and Limerick County Council, 2008 and 
2012). As such, it was necessary to increase operational efficiencies in response to the stringent 
financial situation, despite the significant reduction in staffing and increased expectations from 
citizens.  
Hardiman (2010:28) pointed out that while reform usually is assisted with financial pay 
rewards, “adversity forces new opportunities”. Indeed, Limerick sought to create those 
opportunities, and in order to meet the daunting challenges involved, stakeholders adopted a 
modus operandi which facilitated positive physical, social, and economic outcomes through an 
organisation with the legitimacy and capacity to intervene and channel a diversity of available 
supports. Such an approach afforded an opportunity to apply a public value perspective to 
evaluate public service institutions response to change.  
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1.3 Research Questions 
The researcher’s awareness of these challenges and opportunities and emerging understanding 
of the appropriateness of a public value perspective in such situations culminated in the 
following research questions: 
Research Question 1: Does the nature of local State-civil society/non-State collaboration 
indicate a shift towards a broader authorising environment within which public policy 
priorities are determined? 
Research Question 2: Has the local State enabled the appropriate operational capacity to 
imagine and realise a public value informed strategy and practice of collaboration? 
Seeking to answer those questions involved theoretical, contextual, methodological and 
empirical research. The remainder of the thesis is concerned with finding those answers. 
1.4 Evolving Approaches to Public Management 
In order to explicate the relationship between public organisations and the public(s) they aim 
to serve, it is necessary to summarise the changing public management approaches which have 
evolved globally. 
Traditional public administration operates within a bureaucracy defined by hierarchy and 
departmental silos. Its primary functions are to enforce legislation, implement government 
policy, and deliver services. Since traditional configurations of public administration have been 
perceived to alienate citizens, recent researchers have shifted away from the concept of public 
administration in favour of public management. 
NPM (New Public Management), which emerged in the 1980s, applied private sector/market-
oriented approaches to the delivery of services with the aim of reducing bureaucracy and 
creating public service manager accountability for achieving efficiencies in service delivery. 
This approach treats the public as customers, with politicians approving performance targets 
and budgets. Advocates of NPM, such as Osborne and Brown (2005), maintain there are 
efficiencies to be gained from public service organisation reductions in financial inputs/outputs 
through the application of market principles. Indeed major reform was reported in countries 
which embraced NPM such as New Zealand, UK, Australia, and Canada: primarily in 
marketising services and devolved management systems.  
Public Reform Researchers such as Pollitt and Bouckaert (2000), Pedersen and Lofgren (2012) 
and Christensen (2012) reported that certain NPM reforms have worked well generally; in 
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particular, management changes. However, other changes, such as marketisation, did not 
always result in the savings expected due to the level of management oversight required for 
such contracts. Furthermore, some services lost their ‘publicness’ and/or were not necessarily 
delivered with the best interests of the public in mind.  
While public administration and NPM are not sufficient to optimise collective life, Benington 
and Moore (2011) contend that public service organisations who think in terms of public value 
may increase their capacity to analyse and understand the interconnections, interdependencies, 
and interactions between complex issues, and across multiple boundaries. They posed the 
question, “What does the public most value?” (Benington and Moore 2011:22). 
Public value means different things to different people depending on individual circumstances, 
experiences, age, role, and world view. However, people generally put a value on what they 
can afford or what they are willing to pay for. On this basis, they may be willing to exchange 
money, time, or effort, in return for valued services (Kelly et al 2002). 
People assign value to how services are provided and made available. In general, they believe 
in fairness and that services should be provided to those who need them most (Kelly et al. 2002; 
Try 2007). Citizens now also have a greater desire to influence the provisions offered by public 
service organisations. As such, public value is a means to enhance people’s lives and treats 
them as citizens and co-producers of services and outcomes. 
Research into public value originated with Moore’s 1995 concept of the Strategic Triangle.  
This framework aligns the three discrete but inter-dependent processes deemed necessary for 
the creation of public value (Benington and Moore 2011) as follows: 
1. Define Public Value 
Are the public interventions achieving positive social and economic outcomes? This 
can only be answered through an engagement and exchange between the relevant 
stakeholders and government officials. 
 
2. Legitimacy and Authorization 
For a decision to be legitimate or a judgement to be made, it is necessary to involve all 
the stakeholders from the public, private and third sectors.  
 
3. Building Operational Capacity 
Harnessing and mobilizing the operational resources (finance, staff, skills, technology), 
both inside and outside the organisation, which are necessary to achieve the desired 
public value outcomes. The enterprise should be adaptable to changing material and 
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social conditions, to changing needs and political aspirations, and be innovative and 
experimental. 
Traditional public administration assumes that the needs and problems to be addressed by 
governments are straightforward, and the solutions known and understood. On the other hand, 
NPM assumes that needs and wants are expressed and satisfied through the mechanisms of 
market choice. Public Value Management may be a more beneficial and appropriate approach 
for public managers in an era of austerity and systemic change. In fact, Benington and Moore 
(2011) purport public value thinking and action is now even more relevant in helping to make 
sense of the complexities and tough challenges facing governments and communities, public 
policy-makers, and managers.  
Following Benington and Moore’s original preposition (2011), many recent researchers have 
supported a public value approach, including Kelly et al. (2002), Prebble (2012), Bryson et al. 
(2017), Hartley et al. (2019a) and Krogh (2020). 
It is easier to theorise the application of Public Value Management than to implement it in 
practice. Turrell (2013) notes that despite much rhetoric about public value, there has been little 
practical application because the tools and resources associated with the operating capability 
to apply public value have not been put in place. Indeed, Williams and Shearer (2011) point to 
a lack of concrete evidence that public value can be operationalised at the intended level of 
local decision-maker and manager and recommended that research into the evaluation and 
applicability of public value be undertaken at the local strategic management level.  
This study will apply the Public Value Framework to examine such engagement in Limerick 
and assess the extent to which public value can be created in a particular setting. The changing 
approaches to public management are significant for public service organisation recognition 
that social, political, democratic, and administrative aspects must be considered when devising 
new models of service delivery. 
1.5 Situating the Study 
The context of Irish local government is changing. Recommendations for local government 
reform, further elaborated in Chapter Three, include repeated calls for the devolution of more 
functions from central to local government, greater coordination between public services at the 
local level to enable a more integrated approach to solving complex problems, and broadening 
the scope of local government to allow greater alignment between local government and local 
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development. These calls are particularly relevant in the current climate since local 
communities face multiple complex challenges in such matters as climate change, transport 
planning, remote working, and cultural diversity.  
Reforms in Ireland have reflected changing international trends such as NPM, including 
changes in organisational management, structural reorganisation, and performance 
measurement across the public service. Nonetheless, repeated national and international 
appeals for more participative structures and processes remain. In response, the Irish State has 
established formalised governance mechanisms which instantiate a more participative culture 
and enable greater collaboration between state and non-state sectors.  
Public management approaches have recently evolved and a wide range of concomitant 
theories for analysing local government have been developed. This study analyses a single site 
involving three cases where new opportunities are offered by structural and functional change 
within an embedded institutional setting.  
In order to conduct the analysis the study will draw on a number of theoretical approaches: 
institutionalist theories which advance understanding of the influence and persistence of 
institutional structures, processes, and norms; collaboration and collaborative governance 
theories which are appropriate for interpreting the multi-actor consensus-oriented approach 
arising from the ongoing reform of Irish local government; and public value theories which 
assist the analysis and understanding of the interconnections, interdependencies, and 
interactions between the complex issues and across the multiple boundaries comprising local 
government in Ireland today.  
1.6 Methodology 
As the purpose of the research is to gain deeper insights into the practices of local government, 
a qualitative research approach was chosen. This comprised three case studies of governance 
mechanisms embedded at the single site of Limerick City and County Council. 16 State and 
non-State participants of the governance mechanisms studied were eventually selected for 
interview and guided by the composition of the committees to ensure adequate sectoral, 
geographical, gender, and political party representation.  
The insider access of the researcher to the study participants justified this approach which 
would provide a rich account of the details of the public management within those collaborative 
mechanisms. Semi-structured interviewing was used for the data collection which, as well as 
17 
 
eliciting rich information on the three cases studied, further enhanced the opportunity to reveal 
genuine participant perspectives which may not otherwise have been forthcoming, and enabled 
more specific issues to be addressed as they arose. The semi-structured interview questions 
were guided by the operational framework drawn from the PVM, collaborative governance, 
and institutional theory. In addition, three further elite interviews were carried out with key 
informants of national policy: these latter interview schedules were informed by analysis of the 
prior research findings. Mechanisms were put in place to ensure best practice in conducting 
insider research and was carried out with ethical approval from the University of Limerick. 
1.7 Thesis Structure 
The focus and rationale of the research study and the two research questions are set out in 
Chapter One.  
Chapter Two reviews the theoretical literature on which the overall research is based, and 
identifies the key themes and characteristics which inform the operational framework in 
Chapter Four. 
Chapter Three elucidates the historical context, examines the evolution of local government 
since the foundation of the State, and reviews the two recent waves of local government reform. 
It also ringfences the structures and processes that emerged and evolved to promote 
collaboration. 
Chapter Four delineates the operational framework and the research design, the approach to 
/data collection and analysis, and ethical considerations.  
Chapter Five presents the findings from the anonymised data collected from 19 semi-structured 
interviews through the chosen operational framework.   
Chapter Six presents the analysis and discussion of the research findings through the chosen 
operational framework. 
Chapter Seven answers the two research questions, summarises the overall contribution of this 
study to knowledge, and suggests areas for future research. 
 
By operationalising the theoretical and empirical strands identified above and elaborated in 
later chapters, this study serves to both document and interrogate local governance reform as 
it evolves in Ireland and provides a real-life example of the benefits and challenges of adopting 
a PVM approach to strategies designed to enhance the interaction between the public and the 
organisations whose purpose it is to serve them.   
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Chapter Two: Literature Review  
2.1 Introduction 
The purpose of the research is to test the relevance and applicability of a Public Value 
Management approach in an empirical setting in light of a pre-existing institutional 
configuration. To this end, it is examined through the lens provided by the intersection of three 
literature sources: namely, PVM; institutionalism; and collaboration. The literature underpins 
the development of a conceptual base combining the three theoretical platforms to address the 
research questions:  
 Does the nature of local state-civil society/non-State collaboration indicate 
a shift towards a broader authorising environment within which public 
policy priorities are determined? 
 
 Has the local state enabled the appropriate operational capacity to imagine and 
realise a public value informed strategy and practice of collaboration? 
This literature review focuses on the theoretical and empirical literature relating to these 
research questions. As the research is situated within the realm of local government, a number 
of theoretical platforms could have been used. For instance, broad theories of Participatory 
Democracy could have been applied to gain an understanding of collaboration and/or 
participation in public management. Theories of governance, particularly collaborative 
governance, could also have provided a stand-alone but sound theoretical basis.  However, the 
aim of the present research is to interrogate the complexities of a changing local government 
and authorising environment to discern whether such changes represent or potentially represent 
a shift towards the type of collaboration envisaged in the PVM literature. This stance 
intrinsically scrutinises how institutions constrain or enable change, and how institutional 
norms, values and behaviour shape policy-making and implementation: in short, matters of  
institutionalism. The literature on collaborative governance resonates strongly with the PVM 
literature but allows closer interrogation of the concept that PVM alone offers. Therefore, the 
eclectic approach adopted for this study combines theoretical observations from the PVM, 
institutionalism, and collaborative governance literatures. The opening section further explains 
the rationale for selecting these literatures.  
The second section explores PVM as a democratic style of management which involves both 
State and non-State actors. It discusses three key aspects of PVM: namely, creating publicly 
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valuable outcomes; gaining support for public priorities from political and other stakeholders 
in the authorising environment; and developing the operational capacity required to facilitate 
and sustain a PVM approach. 
The third section explores a number of the institutional questions raised in the PVM literature, 
explores how institutional factors affect operational capacity, and identifies the need for 
institutional change to achieve public value. Such change involves facilitating multi-actor 
engagement in determining public priorities and guiding stakeholder behaviour towards public 
value outcomes.  
The final section unpicks the complexities of collaboration, considers the role of various actors 
and the importance of citizen participation, as well as the principles, processes, and design of 
effective collaboration. Moreover, it highlights the challenges of collaboration and 
demonstrates the importance of effective leadership in supporting collaboration and achieving 
public value. 
2.2 Rationale for Selecting the Literatures 
The evolving approaches to public management outlined in Section 1.4 draw attention to the 
bureaucracy of public administration and the perceived disregard of NPM for citizen 
participation despite its quest for a more responsive, more innovative and more effective 
governance (Benington and Moore 2011).  By contrast, both post-NPM and New Public 
Governance academic frameworks argue for restoring citizen-centered democratic values. For 
example, Alford and Hughes in their discussion on post-NPM argue that value is not public by 
virtue of being delivered by the public sector … “it is not who produces it that makes value 
public. Rather it is a matter of who consumes it” (2008:131). Post-NPM reforms involved 
strengthening both vertical and horizontal linkages and institutionalising collaboration and co-
ordination through networks and teams with an emphasis on boundary-spanning skills and 
stakeholder participation (Christensen 2012, Reiter and Klenk 2019). This is reflected in the 
terms used in post-NPM government reform programmes, for example, ‘Joined-up 
Government’ used by the British public sector in 1999, ‘Connecting Government’ by the New 
Zealand government in 2001, and ‘Whole-of-Government’ by the Australian Government in 
2004 (Alford and Hughes 2008). Post-NPM frameworks also emphasise collective values. As 
Christensen and Lægreid, argue, post-NPM as a “value-based management concept is meant 
to create a more common cultural understanding of collective goals and norms……..[and] 
enabling individual and organized private actors in civil society to be better informed about 
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public policy and to participate in making that policy more representative and in implementing 
it ”(2009:13).  
New Public Governance (NPG) also encourages a return to traditional public service values 
with an increased emphasis on collaboration and citizen-centred services. Osborne argued that 
“the logic of NPM has been to infuse the public sector with private-sector values, and therefore 
the decisions being made may not reflect as strong a sense of the public interest as might be 
desirable … to make these arrangements function in the public interest may require infusing 
them with values that go beyond the interests of the separate parties involved” (2010:41). 
Osborne argues that, while governance was an element within public administration and NPM, 
public governance has become a distinctive regime in its own right, with NPG requiring “local 
officials and politicians to work across organisational boundaries in ways that were not 
expected of them in the past” (Osborne 2010:337).  Post NPM therefore envisages a more 
collaborative approach and the mechanics of collaboration and the twin elements of authorising 
environment and operational capacity are discussed in NPG.  Thus, there are some similarities 
with PVM. However, these approaches do not specifically address the collective management 
approach needed to deal with the complexities of a broader authorising environment or the 
capacity to support such collaboration to solve wicked problems.   
In Ireland, operational developments reflect these theoretical trends.  Following recommendations in 
the OECD report, Ireland: Towards an Integrated Public Service (2008), the SPS (Senior Public 
Service) was established with the aim to strengthen public service management and leadership (DPER 
2011). It continues to address the needs of the SPS at individual, organisational and systemic levels. 
Echoing the PVM approach, SPS is aiming, among other objectives, to build individual and 
organisational leadership capacity to support the development of a collaborative culture needed to tackle 
cross-cutting challenges. The Senior Public Service Leadership Development Strategy 2017 - 2020 
highlighted the need for the SPS to be able to lead on a diverse and complex range of issues, to engage 
effectively with a broad range of stakeholders with diverse needs and priorities, and to work 
collaboratively and in innovative ways on whole-of-government projects (DPER 2017). Recent 
competency frameworks for public servants also encourage greater relationship building, leadership, 
and strategic direction. The continuum of competencies for civil servants at different grades moves, for 
example, from Customer Service and Communication Skills to Building Relationships and 
Communication and from Team Work to Leadership and Strategic Direction (PAS 2017). Competency 
frameworks have also been introduced for public procurement and auditing but with a more functional 





The post-NPM and NPG academic frameworks and operational tools such competency 
frameworks discussed above indicate the type of capacity that is required in public service 
organisations.  While emphasising leadership and collaboration, they provide little guidance as 
to how this collaboration can be achieved. PVM on the other hand is a strategy for public 
service organisations that emphasises operational capacity and a broader authorising 
environment as necessary conditions for creating public value. Moore presented the strategic 
triangle as a guide to help public managers make sense of and manage the dilemmas created 
by this complexity (1995). The concept has been developed and the approach has been applied 
in many settings since then. The approach was applied by Newcastle City Council in the UK 
to address austerity localism (Ferry 2019). In this case, Moore’s public value strategy was 
operationalised through variation to practices of democratic deliberation in order to meet the 
challenge of continuing the delivery of statutory services with shrinking budgets (ibid.). The 
case “clearly highlights for practitioners how a public value strategy embracing legitimation 
and operational capacity building (and accounting) can be operationalised, and illuminates how 
this can be part of a process of organisational, field and even institutional change” (ibid.:112). 
Moore’s strategic triangle was initially presented as a theory of strategic management. It has 
evolved to emphasise a ‘value-centred management’ underpinning decision-making by public 
managers and guiding more effective democratic governance, and has been applied in many 
contexts.  The added value of the PVM approach is how the legitimacy of decision making can 
be built/enhanced through greater democratic deliberation practices and increased 
collaboration and how the operational capacity can be built beyond the traditional organisation 
of the local authority with other public and private sector organisations, interest groups and 
citizens. In terms of its practical implementation, the components that focus on the authorising 
environment are very much about the collaborative space as evident in empirical studies. The 
procedural considerations which differentiate PVM are “enabling and facilitating rather than 
control over outcomes” (Shaw 2013: 486) and treating the citizen as a participant-collaborator 
rather than a consumer. The approach was applied in jurisdictions such as South Australia 
whose labour-led government (2002 – 2018) promoted public value across the whole of 
government in policy design and practice (Benington and Moore 2018). In their review of this 
effort, Benington and Moore emphasised the importance of the authorising environment and 
operational capacity for public sector leaders and managers (2018). The PVM approach also 
informed the methodology used by Yang (2016) to analyse 4 case studies in which there was 
consensus that public value was created. The case studies examined how community level 
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public value targets were successfully identified, authorised and implemented in New Mexico, 
Florida, Nevada and South Australia and the research findings stressed the importance of 
collaboration in order to create public value (ibid.). Conversely, Brown and Head drew on the 
strategic triangle in a case study that examined the on-going failure by public managers to work 
in partnership with indigenous communities in Australia (2019). This study concluded that 
there is potential for public managers to create public value if they undertake substantive 
engagement with stakeholders early in the policy design process when problems are being 
defined and solutions determined for addressing complex or wicked problems. Shaw argued 
that “Central to most accounts of PVM is a sense of an engaged public sector populated by 
institutionally porous agencies which are receptive to – indeed, actively seek out – dialogue 
with and input from citizens” (2013:486). The examples above emphasise the citizen 
involvement and democratic participation through networks which are integral to PVM.  This 
resonates with the collaborative governance approach.  The associated literature on 
collaborative governance illustrates where the fusion between collaboration and PVM is so 
strong. Therefore, collaboration and collaborative governance literature were selected for 
inclusion in the literature review alongside the primary lens of PVM. 
 
The literature also draws attention to the potential limitations to the application of PVM and 
tensions between public value and other demands. The collaborative approach underpinning 
PVM may not be either appropriate or essential for all public services. For example, Rhodes 
and Wanna, in their critique of PVM, stressed that public organisations do not exist solely to 
perform pleasant functions, and many exist to enforce state rules and achieve targets, a purpose 
which they argue is ignored in the public value vision (2007). Kelly et al., on the other hand, 
look at the totality of the impact of government and argue that public value is a way of capturing 
all the aspects of government performance which they describe as services, outcomes and trust 
(2002). Benington also argues that public value extends to ecological, political, economic, 
social and cultural values that add value to the public sphere by promoting sustainable 
development and community wellbeing, as well as stimulating economic activity and 
supporting citizen engagement (2009). There are instances where collaboration may be more 
difficult to achieve, for example dealing with contentious minority rights issues like direct 
provision, however engaging with the community in the first instance is worthwhile and 
collaboration should not be dismissed outright. For other essential services such as waste 
enforcement from which citizens derive public health and environmental benefits, it may not 
be appropriate to apply a collaborative approach but they are important from a public value 
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perspective. In Newcastle City Council, in the interest of fairness, legitimacy and buy-in a 
PVM approach was used to seek public opinion on budget cuts against a rising demand for 
public services (Ferry 2019). Therefore, in pursuing legitimacy and support for public 
expenditure in times of austerity, citizens could also be involved in decisions around the use of 
resources when public services are exposed to rationing in the interest of the broader 
community (ibid.). 
 
Moreover, other tensions and dilemmas are created for public managers who are tasked with 
implementing new publicly mandated governance networks in old institutions of government. 
For example, difficulties were experienced by the Australian government in following through 
on its commitment to work in partnership with indigenous communities to improve services 
and infrastructure, when in found that existing norms can crowd out new ways of working as 
new approaches may be in tension with existing systems (Brown and Head 2019). The study 
identified a need to invest in public leadership capacity and local community capacity to engage 
productively with these tensions (ibid.). Public managers of mandated networks must learn 
how to handle the new tensions and dilemmas created by the co-existence of old and new 
institutions of government and governance in order to effectively facilitate the cross-sector 
collaboration needed for developing innovative and robust solutions to the wicked problems of 
our time (Krogh 2020). The ultimate utility of PVM is solving wicked problems that cannot be 
resolved by single actors alone.  
These empirical studies also highlight the importance of institutional structures for enabling 
collaboration. Shaw held the view that what is needed are public institutions with the capacity 
to identify, build and maintain networks with relevant civil society actors (2013). Through case 
study analysis of eight local authority areas in England, Lowndes et al were able to show that 
“the rules governing managers’ behaviour and their interactions with citizens constituted an 
important and locally variable institutional factor” of participation (2006:552). That study also 
identified that it was clear that “participation was more likely in those local authorities where 
institutional arrangements were informed by the precepts of PVM” (ibid.:552). This highlights 
the importance of a PVM approach but also the need to understand institutionalism as an 
enabler of collaboration.  
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2.3 Public Value Management (PVM) 
As the approach to governing shifted from the traditional top-down model to more inclusive 
governance models, public management adapted continuously (Peters et al. 2005; Bryson et al. 
2017). PVM emerged in response to a need for a public management style that afforded greater 
recognition to the legitimacy of a wide range of stakeholders, including politicians, managers, 
and citizens, as opposed to the bureaucratic approach of traditional Public Administration and 
the market-oriented approach of New Public Management (NPM) with its overwhelming 
concern with cost efficiency. 
PVM originated at Harvard’s John F. Kennedy School of Government in the early 1980s and 
was developed through years of engagement with public managers from the USA and around 
the world who participated in the school’s executive programmes. Their focus was ‘working 
with a rudimentary concept of organisational strategy adapted for the public sector’ (Moore 
1995:70-71). Specifically, the aim was to build a conceptual framework for public sector 
managers to apprehend the complexities of strategic challenges they faced, that would be 
practical and useful in performing their roles, and that would encourage strategic thinking and 
entrepreneurial action to tackle societal problems.  
Presented by Mark Moore’s 1995 publication Creating Public Value: Strategic Management 
in Government, PVM specifically targeted managers of public service organisations and their 
role in creating public value. He demonstrated the concept using the Strategic Triangle 














Figure 1 The Strategic Triangle of Public Value  
(Benington and Moore 2011:5) 
 
The Strategic Triangle posits that ‘in developing a strategy for a public sector organisation, a 
manager must bring three elements into coherent alignment by meeting three broad tests as 
follows: 
1. The strategy must be substantively valuable in the sense that the organisation produces 
things of value to overseers, clients, and beneficiaries at low cost in terms of money 
and authority. 
2. It must be legitimate and politically sustainable. That is, the enterprise must be able to 
continually attract both authority and money from the political authorising environment 
to which it is ultimately accountable. 
3. It must be operationally and administratively feasible in that the authorised, valuable 
activities can actually be accomplished by the existing organisation with help from 
others who can be induced to contribute to the organisation’s goal’ (Moore 1995:71). 
Moore argued that ‘the tests are powerful because they identify the necessary conditions for 
the production of value in the public sector’ (1995:71). 
 
This public value framework has been widely adopted and taken as the basis for numerous 
theoretical and empirical studies (Stoker 2006a; Bryson et al. 2017). It illustrates the 
deliberative interaction between elected politicians, government officials, and key stakeholders 
from the private and community sectors, in the quest for outcomes identified and endorsed by 
the broad range of actors now involved in governance. However, recognition of the elements 
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of public value is not enough. The complex environment in which PVM is situated is 
highlighted by Benington and Moore (2011:15): 
Public value thinking and action includes the capacity to analyse and understand the 
interconnections, interdependencies and interactions between complex issues, and 
across multiple boundaries: between different sectors (public, private, voluntary and 
informal community), between different levels of government (local, regional, 
national, supranational), between different services (for example education, health, 
housing, policing, social security), between different professions involved in tackling 
a common problem, between political and managerial and civic leaderships and 
processes, between strategic management, operational management and frontline 
delivery, between producers and users of services (in new patterns of ‘co-creation’ 
between producers, users and other stakeholders outside the governmental system). 
This statement encapsulates the complex arena in which public management plays out and 
illuminates the context for the strategic challenges alluded to by Moore.  
While the strategic triangle was devised as a tool for public managers to make sense of this 
complex system, Stoker (2006a) further developed the concept of PVM as the management 
style most suited to networked governance and collective decision-making; particularly in its 
core objective of the achievement of public value. Thus, the judgement of what comprises 
public value is collectively built through networks of deliberation involving elected and 
appointed government officials and key stakeholders (Stoker 2006a). Significantly, this 
reinforces PVM as a democratic process built on interactive processes, with managers playing 
an active role in steering networks of deliberation and delivery. Importantly, PVM is aimed at 
forging successful relationships through collaborative governance in the pursuit of public value 
(Stoker 2006a; Alford and O’Flynn 2008).  
Alford and O’Flynn (2008) stress that since the strategic triangle is the foundational construct 
which drives PVM, failure to understand it underpins much of the misunderstanding around 
public value. The key strategy is to maximise the alignment between the three elements directed 
by the public manager (Bryson et al. 2017). The majority of the follow-on research examined 
the meaning and forms of PVM leading to discussions on public value, legitimacy and 
authorisation, and operational capacity. The remainder of this section discusses each of these 
concepts in turn. 
2.3.1 Public Value 
“This first point of the strategic triangle identifies the importance of pursuing aims that will 
bring measurable benefit to the public sphere and which address the expressed or revealed 
priorities of a given population” (Williams and Shearer 2011:6). Indeed, the challenge 
presented by the public value concept arises because it is a substantially different management 
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approach to deciding public priorities than its traditional public administration and NPM 
forerunners. In the bureaucratic approach of traditional public administration, for instance, 
public priorities were politically dictated, while in the private sector approach of NPM, they 
rested on consumerist information. Specifically, it is a fundamental requirement of PVM that 
public priorities are collectively defined between the State and non-State actors whose common 
purpose is to create public value. The aim of this section is to examine the concepts which 
emerged from the literature relating to public value by exploring the meaning of public value 
and how it is created through dialogue and deliberation, knowledge-building, and information 
sharing. 
2.3.1.1 Defining public value 
There are a range of definitions of public value throughout the public value literature. Moore 
describes PVM as a framework that helps us connect what we believe is valuable, and requires 
public resources, with improved ways of understanding what our ‘publics’ value and how we 
connect to them (Moore 1995), while Stoker insists it is “more than a summation of the 
individual preferences of the users or producers of public services, the judgment of what is 
public value is collectively built through deliberation involving elected and appointed 
government officials and key stakeholders” (2006a:42). Alternatively, Alford and O’Flynn 
purport PVM can be produced by a variety of entities including private firms, non-profit, and 
voluntary organisations, arguing that “it is not who produces it that makes value public, rather, 
it is a matter of who consumes it” (2008:9). While clearly diverse, these definitions nonetheless 
emphasise the connected nature of Public Value Management. 
Public value has been described as “the contribution made by the public sector to the economic, 
social and environmental well-being of a society or nation” (Try 2007:24). Indeed, since “What 
is valuable tends to take shape in response to the material and social problems that arise in an 
environment” (Alford and O’Flynn 2008:8), public value derives from government actions 
which impact the lives of people while taking account of the cost to the public in the form of 
resources or power used by the government (Prebble 2015). Kelly et al. (2002) argue that 
something is only of value when citizens, either individually or collectively, are willing to 
sacrifice something for it, such as money, disclosing personal information, or their personal 
time. Public resources, they argue, should be used to increase value which benefits and is 
valued by the citizenry. Hartley et al. draw attention to “the less tangible aspects of public value 
recognized in reassurance, confidence and the willingness of communities to co-produce” 
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(2019a: 265) These observations merely underline the importance of articulating and agreeing 
on the value propositions which underpin public management actions. 
Various dimensions of public value have been identified, with particular emphasis on services, 
outcomes, and public trust. In relation to services; while many of the improvements achieved 
in NPM related to greater efficiencies in the delivery of services, a public value perspective 
would argue that services should be affordable, open, accessible, and available to those in most 
need of them. As such, Shaw states that “services become the vehicles for delivering public 
value, both insofar as they embody values regarding redistribution, equity and fairness, and in 
that they lead to the public value results that citizens have articulated” (2013:485). Public value 
theorists (Bryson et al. 2017; Benington and Moore 2011) stress outcomes as well as outputs. 
These outcomes should ensure a better quality of life for citizens by incorporating a wide range 
of tangible and intangible social and economic issues, including housing, safety, environmental 
quality, education, transport, jobs, income, health, community, family life, and ageing well.  
In that regard, Benington and Moore contend that “the most valuable outcomes for the public 
can often best be achieved by harnessing the commitment and resources of all three spheres: 
state, market and civil society, jointly behind specific shared public value goals” (2011:14). 
Kelly et al. (2002) and Try (2007) concur that public values can be categorised into the 
physical, social, and economic outcomes delivered by the public sector in which the public is 
willing to make sacrifices of money and freedom to achieve it. Finally, public value theory 
argues that citizens’ trust in government will be improved through greater participation by 
citizen involvement in public life. 
The various definitions of public value outlined underscore a conceptual reliance on the societal 
purposes of public sector actions and how a public value perspective can increase the impact 
of public sector actions on society’s problems. For the purposes of this study, the definition of 
public value selected is that applied by Benington and Moore (2011); namely, that which the 
public values and which adds value to the public sphere. This definition is appropriate for the 
networked governance to which State and non-State actors aspire. 
2.3.1.2 Creating public value  
Central to public value theory is the belief that it is achieved through dialogue between State 
and non-State sectors and the establishment of deliberative/collaborative mechanisms. Shaw 
argues that public value theory places a dialogical emphasis on public engagement which is 
positively contrasted with the competitive and consumerist orientations characteristic of NPM. 
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For this reason, he advocated for the collective achievement of public value replacing “the 
grinding pursuit of efficiency as a core objective for public agencies” (2013:485).  
Alford and Hughes (2008) similarly highlight public value in facilitating the conditions for 
deliberation about these collective purposes similar to the constitutional arrangements, 
deliberative mechanisms, and educational processes that assist the unearthing of useful options 
for solving social problems and channels for discovering solutions to those problems. In a 
procedural sense, then, networks of deliberation and delivery are pivotal, and constitute the 
contexts within which collective deliberations take place regarding public value outcomes and 
the services required to achieve those objectives (Stoker 2006a).  
Civil society is a crucial and often neglected source of public value creation and should be 
treated as part of the solution alongside the State and the market to achieve outcomes 
(Benington and Moore 2011). In particular, the legitimacy of civil society in creating public 
value underlines the procedural dimensions of public value as well as the outcomes created by 
public value. In short: the central role of citizens in PVM has implications for creating an 
institutional environment which can mediate on-going interactions between public managers, 
politicians, and civil society actors (Shaw 2013). Moreover, such institutional mechanisms 
must allow for extensive on-going contributions from civil society; an issue which is further 
discussed in Section 2. 
Building knowledge and enabling information sharing are key to public value creation. Indeed, 
theories of public value suggest that the policies of public service organisations must be 
informed by public, private, voluntary, and community sectors in order to generate services 
and outcomes that reflect their views. In the same way, in order to create public value, it is 
necessary to combine the knowledge and expertise of public and private sector resources with 
the local knowledge and capabilities of the community and the legitimate role of the 
democratically elected public representatives.  
The importance of information-sharing is also highlighted across public value literature, with 
Page and colleagues extolling collaboration as “the linking or sharing of information, 
resources, activities, and capabilities by organizations to achieve jointly an outcome that could 
not be achieved by the organizations separately” (2013:3). O’Flynn concurs that “in 
collaborative forms of working, which may better fit with the pursuit of public value, longer-
term relationship management skills focused on conflict resolution, trust building, information 
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sharing, and goal clarity, are required” (2007:362).  The skills needed to support PVM are 
further discussed under operational capacity below. 
The public value created through collaborative approaches can achieve lasting and widespread 
benefits at reasonable cost which no single organisation could have achieved alone in a 
democratically accountable way. Stoker (2006a) argued in support of the PVM paradigm, 
noting that people are motivated by their involvement in networks and partnerships which 
support relationships of mutual respect and shared learning. Another theoretical view is that 
public value is not simply a matter of outputs and outcomes, but that procedurally, civic 
engagement is a form of public value, and is  “as much about building citizenship as it is about 
producing better decisions” (Page et al. 2017:642). In light of this, Gains and Stoker (2009) 
endorse the necessity for public managers to facilitate improved and more frequent citizen 
access to the policy-making authorising environment despite the complexities of capturing 
voice in public services.   
Moore also drew attention to “the role of public managers in orchestrating the processes of 
public policy development, often in partnership with other actors and stakeholders, in ways 
that try to ensure that good choices are made in the public interest” (Benington and Moore 2011 
:4). Indeed, while public managers may be unable to define what is valuable in any absolute 
sense, they can nonetheless determine whether a particular goal is more valuable than another 
in a given circumstance through discussion with the civil society actors affected (Alford and 
O’Flynn 2008; Hartley at al. 2019a). In like manner, Stoker (2006a) welcomed the ideals that 
deciding on public value end-points is a collective process, that public value managers seek out 
opportunities to enable dialogue between the governors and the governed, and that stakeholders 
collectively determine how commonly agreed-upon objectives are to be achieved.  
This section has identified a number of core issues relating to public value: 
 The connected nature of PVM is emphasised and highlights the importance of public 
priorities being collectively defined between state and non-State actors. 
 All the actors should be clear on their common purpose and the contribution being 
made to the economic, social and/or environmental well-being of society. 
 The procedural dimensions of public value are particularly important to ensure that 
conditions for dialogue and deliberation are established within the collaborative 
mechanisms. 
 Building knowledge and sharing information and expertise are key to public value 
creation and ensuring good choices are made in the public interest. 
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2.3.2 The Authorising Environment 
The second point of the strategic triangle relates to the authorising environment within which 
individuals and organisations operate. This is significant, since the pursuit of public value 
requires the support of key stakeholders, including government, citizens, and interest groups. 
Public value cannot be delivered without ongoing public engagement and dialogue (Lowndes 
et al. 2006; Williams and Shearer 2011). Geuijen asserts that “the legitimacy of any public 
value proposition increases when the process surrounding public deliberations is ‘appropriately 
inclusive, deliberative, imaginative and accurate in predicting the consequences of proposed 
actions” (2017:630). Similarly, Benington and Moore (2011) argue that in order to achieve 
goals it may also be necessary to win the support of other individuals, organizations, and 
stakeholders, and to forge a broader-based authorising environment. From an institutional 
design perspective, such engagement between the full-time professional and the part-time 
citizen-amateur might inevitably lead to bureaucratic dominance by the former due to better 
information access and expertise, and leave citizens at a relative disadvantage (Shaw 2013).  
Furthermore, well-organised communities are likely to be better at advocacy than those that 
are not; just as well-resourced lobby groups are more likely to have their needs heard and 
demands met (Lowndes et al. 2006).  
Moreover, Prebble (2012) suggests that any public service organisation working closely with 
one community group may appear to favour them and therefore undermine the legitimacy of 
the government in the eyes of the wider population. Also, individual citizens that choose not to 
participate in their local community group for whatever reasons, may have less means and 
opportunity to express their individual views, while community and lobby groups do not 
invariably represent the views of their communities at large. PVM tasks managers with opening 
up the governance system as far as possible while staying mindful of these pitfalls. While direct 
participation is not always necessary, and citizens may very well rely on representative 
democracy where further public participation is unnecessary, options for extending 
participation should remain available (Stoker 2006a; Hartley et al. 2019a). Ultimately, and 
discussed further below, meaningful community activation entails increased resources and 
commitment at the public service policy-making level and a skills-set which welcomes and 
enables citizen engagement. 
One of the four propositions made by Stoker (2006a) is the need to give more recognition to 
the legitimacy of a wide range of stakeholders. Moreover, the literature suggested broadening 
the authorising environment to include citizens, politicians, and government officials to 
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collectively determine which outcomes are of public value. Specifically, “politicians and 
officials have a particular legitimacy given that government is elected, but there are other valid 
claims to legitimacy from business partners, neighbourhood leaders, professionals etc 
comprising a diverse base of legitimacy” (Stoker 2006a:47). In addition, Hartley et al. (2016) 
suggested the broader authorising environment should also include policy-analysts and special 
advisers. In any event, the fundamental point is that “for a decision to be legitimate or for a 
judgement to be made, it is necessary to have all the stakeholders involved” (Stoker 2006a:47). 
Trust is a particularly important element of legitimacy and authorisation highlighted in the 
literature. Thus, it is important to note that the PVM requirement for managers to construct 
coalitions of public and political support for policy initiatives is central to securing legitimacy 
for and trust in innovation in public services (Shaw 2013). In fact, collaboration as the lynchpin 
of public value and inherent to trust-building is further discussed under Part 3. O’Flynn 
emphasised the importance of trust-building and the role of public managers in fostering it, 
stating:  
…in the public value paradigm multiple objectives are pursued by public managers including 
narrower service objectives, broader outcomes, and the creation and maintenance of trust and 
legitimacy...they must negotiate up into their authorising environment or the political realm and 
out toward clients...within the public value paradigm it is more readily accepted that 
government activity is interconnected and interdependent and as such may require more 
collaborative effort in the pursuit of public value. (2007:360-361) 
Shaw also maintained that strong public sector/civil society links are necessary to build trust 
and collectively exchange intellectual and other resources (2013:487). 
 
The literature assigns public managers an important role in achieving legitimacy and 
authorisation, with Moore (1995) asserting that they are not just ‘passive bystanders’. As 
highlighted earlier, public managers can play a role in managing policy development, 
negotiating purposes with politicians, and leading public deliberation, by bringing their 
authority and expertise to bear to enhance the decision-making process (Moore 1995; Alford 
and O’Flynn 2008).  
However, PVM’s innovative stance around legitimacy and authorisation has implications for 
the role of public managers as facilitators of public value. Specifically, politicians can 
legitimately make decisions about public policy priorities based on their electoral mandate: that 
is, public managers are answerable to political leaders rather than the public. As such, Alford 
and O’Flynn (2008) argue that while public managers are expected to put forward proposals 
about what is valuable, they are constrained by the political process. As such, their proposals 
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are tested in the authorising environment and modified against the views of elected politicians. 
Torfing and Sorensen call for a form of interactive political leadership which would involve 
politicians “initiating, orchestrating and engaging in the co-creation of public value outcomes” 
(2019:1).  
Even so, some critics have accused Moore (1995) of setting unrealistic expectations:  
suggesting that it is an “unduly political role” for public managers to decide what is best for 
the public (Alford and O’Flynn 2008:10).  Specifically, Rhodes and Wanna (2007) charged 
Moore with encouraging public managers into inappropriate roles and usurping the 
representative role of elected politicians. Conversely, PVM has been criticised as rhetoric 
which protects the interests of bureaucrats and their organisations and enables public managers 
to stray into the political domain and increase their bureaucratic power in pursuit of their 
mandate (Roberts 1995; Alford and O’Flynn 2008): a view which Alford and O’Flynn (2008) 
described as a misrepresentation of Moore’s position. On the contrary, they maintained Moore 
intended that managers “confine themselves to what might be called ‘program politics’, to the 
extent necessary to ensure they do not encroach on party politics” (Alford and Hughes 2008: 
134). Furthermore, “the significance of the authorising environment is precisely that it acts as 
a legitimate limit on the public manager’s autonomy to shape what is meant by public value” 
(Alford and O’Flynn 2008:11).  
Ultimately, the literature explicitly acknowledges that politics remains the final arbiter of 
public value and elected politicians have the most authoritative claim to ‘call the shots’ in a 
democratic system (Alford and O’Flynn 2008; Moore 1995).  
Gains and Stoker (2009) argue that PVM is easier to enact in localised decision-making due to 
the different traditions in local governance and constitutional codes of engagement at the local 
level. The nature of local service provision places managers closer to citizens than the centrally 
provided functions of central government. It is argued that local government offers both an 
easier arena for the adoption of the public value concepts of legitimacy and accountability.  
This is not to say that problems do not arise at the local level, however; and  the frequent grass-
roots conflicts between representative and participatory democracy approaches will be further 
examined in the section on collaboration.  
Owing to the complex PVM environment, decision-making and accountability were 
highlighted in the literature as crucial elements of legitimacy and authorisation. Gains and 
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Stoker propose a definition of accountability under PVM as “delivered managerially through 
performance and financial management objective setting and targets, through greater 
informatory accountability and transparency as well as through the formal conventions of 
parliamentary accountability via ministerial responsibility” (2009:441). Indeed, this 
emphasises the complex authorising environment within which public managers are 
accountable. Importantly, one key objective of PVM is opening up the governance system and 
extending participation in public policy and decision-making to the broadest range of 
stakeholders possible (Moore 1995; Gains and Stoker 2009; Bryson et al. 2017). From a public 
service delivery perspective in particular, the focus for public managers extends beyond 
following procedures as in the case of public administration, or meeting targets in the case of 
NPM; but rather weighs whether their actions bring a net benefit to society which is decided 
through negotiated goal-setting and oversight (Stoker 2006a; Gains and Stoker 2009).  
Ultimately, a PVM approach assumes an outward accountability towards users and citizens as 
much as upward to departments and inspectorates (Kelly et al. 2002; Williams and Shearer 
2011). At the same time, PVM creates an expectation that citizens will contribute to the internal 
decision-making and resource allocation processes, provide input into budgeting, and have a 
greater say in decisions regarding distribution of public resources.  This could blur traditional 
boundaries. Nevertheless, “stakeholders in the political authorizing environment (primarily, 
but not only, democratically elected representatives) are ultimately the ones who call public 
managers to account, by deciding whether or not to continue to support their efforts to produce 
a particular public service and/or conception of public value” (Benington and Moore 2011:10). 
PVM therefore creates a more demanding accountability hurdle precisely because of the direct 
involvement of users and stakeholders in service delivery and decision-making and 
determining priorities (Stoker 2006a; Strokosch and Osborne 2020). Shaw (2013) stressed that 
this could present considerable challenges to public service organisations. This section has 
identified a number of core issues in relation to legitimacy and authorisation: 
 Collaborating in a broad authorising environment is important for PVM so that 
propositions about what is valuable can be shaped by all the people affected before 
decisions are made. 
 Constructing coalitions of public and political support is particularly important for 
negotiating policy initiatives and is essential for building trust. 
 The environment in which public managers are operating is complex as they are 
accountable outwards to the public and upwards to government. 
 For a decision to be legitimate it is expected that State and non-State actors are 




2.3.3 Operational Capacity  
“It is acknowledged that public value aims must be practically achievable in terms of 
operational capacity” (Williams and Shearer 2011:6). As the third component of Moore’s PVM 
strategy, operational capacity is central to the second research question guiding this thesis. The 
literature sheds light on the many obstacles to improving operational capacity: namely, 
bureaucratic structures and traditions of public administration; motivation for collaboration; 
NPM initiatives focusing on marketisation and efficiencies; diverse management skills and 
motives; leadership skills; collaboration skills; executive focus on national policy and 
legislative implementation; lack of joined-up thinking at national level; private-sector profit 
motives; performance management focus on efficiencies; individuated objectives of local 
agencies such as local development companies; resources; lack of focus on customer service; 
and procurement constraints which obtain to third sector parties (Stoker 2006a; Williams and 
Shearer 2011; Hartley et al. 2016). Since such challenges directly impact the achievement of 
PVM, they must be considered when making recommendations regarding resources, 
procedural facilitation, management style, institutional change, collaboration, and leadership.   
Operational capacity relates to “harnessing and mobilizing the operational resources both 
inside and outside the organisation, which are necessary to achieve the desired public value 
outcomes” (Benington and Moore 2011:4).  
One of the most significant elements to be considered in this context is that of resources in 
terms of how the enterprise will be organised and operated to achieve the desired objectives 
(Moore 1995; Williams and Shearer 2011). The implications for both internal and external 
resources are far-ranging. To begin with, Gains and Stoker (2009) advise that the right structure 
and information management are critical to ensure the operational capacity of public value 
organisations and systems. Additionally, limited or fixed finance, personnel, skills, and 
technology resources, are intrinsic to the optimum operational capability of an organisation. 
Therefore, “the strategic manager must lobby to increase, reallocate and/or better deploy the 
resources at his/her disposal in the pursuit of substantive PVM aims” (Williams and Shearer 
2011:6). Furthermore, strategic managers must be “persuasive in making the case for 
mobilizing resources of partner agencies” (Williams and Shearer 2011:6). Specifically, “Public 
policymaker and manager may have to create a network of partners and stakeholders, and to 
negotiate a coalition of different interests and agencies (from across the public, private, 
voluntary and informal community sectors) to support them in achieving their goals” 
36 
 
(Benington and Moore 2011:6). Hartley et al. (2019a) and Krogh (2020) argue that a PVM 
regime may generate a sizeable increase in policy capability and capacity; access to which 
would be invaluable for State actors wishing to minimise implementation deficits.  
Further, better-resourced organisations, including local community organisations, are likely to 
exert more influence. PVM calls for greater citizen engagement in policy-making, resulting in 
greater resource interdependencies thus, finance, skills, and education resources are deemed 
essential to empower the capacity of citizens to participate in policy-making and negotiating 
public priorities (Page et al. 2013). The issue of resources not only affects fairness across 
communities then, but affords public service organisations a clear advantage in decision-
making over their voluntary counterparts. In particular, institutional change as discussed later 
in this chapter, can overcome the limits on participation created by lack of resources and skills 
in communities (Page et al. 2013). Importantly, core executive pre-dominance would likely 
apply in policy-making as it is more resourced in terms of financial and control authority. Thus, 
organisational, citizen/community, and staffing resources are significant in the creation or 
constraining of PVM (Williams and Shearer 2011, Strokosch and Osborne 2020).   
 
In matters of operational capacity we can also assume the importance of the following:  
 facilitation of a process for identifying outcomes through dialogue 
 capacity to measure and demonstrate accountability 
 design procedures to deliver outcomes  
 capacity to foster trust between public service and civil society actors  
Since these factors advance or constrain the achievement of public value (Benington and Moore 
2011; Shaw 2013), the concepts of continuous evaluation and learning are highlighted as 
important aspects of PVM.  
Moore’s original PVM strategy was intended to encourage strategic thinking and 
entrepreneurial action in order to tackle societal problems (Moore 1995).  
However, Benington and Moore (2011) conceded that the question of whether public value 
could be measured for any innovation or improvement can never be definitively answered, but 
necessitates  continuous review and commitment over time. Stoker (2006a) concurred that 
managers must engage in a process of continuous evaluation and learning in order to review 
whether their targets are being met and their actions bringing a net benefit to society. By the 
same token, Stoker (2006a) argued that, as a public official, you cannot be properly efficient 
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in the use of resources without exploring people’s needs and preferences to gauge public value. 
He suggests a learning exchange and mutual search for solutions as key, and that the search for 
efficiency requires public managers to continuously monitor that activities fit a purpose valued 
by the public. Nonetheless Williams and Shearer (2011:7) state that “the public value manager 
must endeavour to record achievement against the public value aims set, however challenging 
that may be in practice”. Indeed, the practice of continuous learning and innovation (Torfing 
and Sorensen 2019) is one of the key characteristics of collaborative governance discussed later 
in this chapter. 
The public manager plays a core role in Moore’s original strategic triangle formulation. Moore 
(1995) argued that managing for public value requires a different skillset from that of 
traditional public administration and NPM, and that managers who manage upwards, outwards, 
and downwards, with appropriate democratic and legal authority, can add to PVM (Prebble 
2012). This concept of public managers’ focussing their attention in three directions has been 
explored by several researchers; for instance: 
 Managing upward for appointed officials to interact with the authorising environment 
(Moore 1995; Bryson et al. 2017) and to the political level which authorises and funds 
programmes (Moore 2000; Try 2007; Prebble 2012.)  
 Managing downward for efficiency (Moore 1995; Prebble, 2012) to address internal 
management issues (Moore 2000; Try 2007) and ensure that the organization has the 
operational capacity to actually deliver public value (Bryson et al. 2017). 
 Managing outward for the desired impact and values to be created for society (Moore 
2000; Try 2007), for mobilising citizen responsiveness involving liaison with 
community groups (Moore 1995; Prebble 2012), and for mobilising the public and other 
stakeholders (Bryson et al. 2017). 
 
Moreover, the networking and relationships which form the basis of PVM and collaboration 
require public managers to cultivate the ‘softer’ skills of enabling, negotiation, and persuasion 
associated with coalition building, sense-making, and the cultivation of political acumen 
highlighted by Moore (Shaw 2013:480).  
However, it is equally important for managers to devote sufficient time and attention to 
understanding the political and community environments in which they are operating since 
these directly impact achievement of public value (Try 2007; Gains and Stoker 2009).  
This section has identified a number of core issues relating to operational capacity: 
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 Organisations need to be well resourced in terms of staffing, finance, skills, 
technology and research capacity to support PVM. 
 External resources are also likely to be called upon to enhance both policy and 
implementation capability. 
 Public managers who have a key role in the PVM strategy need to develop the 
procedural capacity to facilitate and oversee collaborative processes. 
 Public managers must have the capability for managing outwards to the public, 
upwards for government approval and downwards for internal organisational support.  
 Public managers need the softer skills associated with networking and negotiation. 
As the conceptual foundation selected for this research, PVM cannot develop independently of 
the institutional environment in which it occurs. The next section therefore examines the 
significance of institutions and their role in improving the operational capacity required for 
PVM. 
The next section therefore examines the significance of institutions. 
2.4 Institutionalism and Public Value Management 
The on-going interactions between State and non-State actors on which PVM is founded rely 
on having the appropriate institutional structures and arrangements in place. Indeed, at the 
outset, Moore acknowledged that he took it for granted “that institutional structures and 
processes shape what managers think and influence what they do” (1995:3). This section 
therefore enlarges on the relevant institutions and their role in enabling and supporting PVM, 
facilitating multi-actor engagement, and guiding behaviour towards public value outcomes. In 
the section, the main strands of New Institutionalism are briefly outlined and discussed and the 
specific factors which inform the institutional changes needed to embed a PVM approach are 
then identified and discussed. 
March and Olsen describe an institution as “a relatively stable collection of rules and practices, 
embedded in structures of resources that make action possible (organizational, financial and 
staff capabilities), and structures of meaning that explain and justify behaviour (roles, identities 
and belongings, common purposes, and causal and normative beliefs)” (2011:3). Institutions 
affect day-to-day decision-making and the custom, practice, and behaviour of organisations 




Moreover, “institutional frameworks within the state mediate and structure the implementation 
of political objectives” (Peters et al. 2005:1281). PVM rests on an institutional environment 
which integrates a broad range of actors, organisations, and processes to determine public 
policy priorities (Shaw 2013). In particular, the institutional base is essential to provide the 
State with the operational capacity to pro-actively engage with a wider authorising environment 
to decide public priorities and achieve public value.  
The literature (Ostrom 1986, Lowndes et al. 2006, Kroch 2020) distinguishes between 
organisations and institutions; describing institutions as the underlying rules that guide and 
constrain the behaviour of political actors (elected representatives, public officials, community 
leaders, activists, and citizens). For example, rules such as electoral arrangements, terms of 
reference, or the powers of an area committee, are deliberately designed to support or constrain 
local participation. Rules also define which actions are required, prohibited, or permitted, along 
with authorised sanctions. They also create positions such as committee, chair, voter, or 
partnership member, and determine how citizens participate in elections or appointments. 
Moreover, by standardising processes, rules order the operation of the institution for all 
members (Selznick 1948). Ultimately, rules regulate the action of members of the institution 
to prevent unsanctioned activities, and to map preferences into decisions within potentially 
contentious political environments (Ostrom 1986, Peters 2005, March and Olsen 2011).  
Old Institutionalism was concerned with law; particularly laws of governance, such as electoral 
laws on proportional representation (Peters 2005). Thus, government and politics were 
primarily understood in statutory institutional terms with an emphasis on formal government 
institutions, constitutional issues, and public law (March and Olsen 1984; Thoenig 2003). The 
emergence of New Institutionalism in the 1980s attempted to provide fresh answers to old 
questions about how social choices are shaped, mediated, and channelled, by institutional 
arrangement (Powell and DiMaggio 1991), and thus regards actors (people and groups) as 
embedded in larger structures and cultures (Jepperson 2001) with institutions perceived as a 
useful  explanatory framework for subsequent policy outcomes. Hall and Taylor (1996) argue 
that all the varieties of New Institutionalism advance our understanding of the political world 
and referred to three schools of thought around institutionalism namely Historical, Rational 
Choice and Sociological Institutionalism. Discursive Institutionalism is a more recent fourth 
theory of New Institutionalism labelled by Schmidt (2006). These four strands of New 
Institutionalism and its impact on PVM are briefly discussed below. 
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Historical Institutionalism is used to describe how institutions are rules that structure action 
and outcomes (Schmidt 2010), the persistence and resilience of institutions and their policies 
(Steinmo and Thelen 1992, Peters 2005) and how they shape the behaviour of individual actors. 
Two dominant themes emerge from Historical Institutionalism , namely ‘path dependency’ 
which explains how policy choices made when an institution is formed, influences policy far 
into the future (Steinmo and Thelen 1992, Hall and Taylor 1996, Pierre et al 2008, Lowndes 
and Roberts 2013), and ‘critical juncture’ which is used to describe critical historic moments 
that lead to new policies being established (Ikenberry 1994, Barrett et al 2008). Historical 
Institutionalism is considered useful for its ability to illuminate policy continuities and national 
variations but has been criticised by Peters (2005) , for example, because of its limited capacity 
to explain and predict the behaviours of institutions. With regard to PVM, Historical 
Institutionalism serves to help us understand the significance of the path dependency of 
organisations and collaborations. 
Rational Choice Institutionalism describes institutions as arrangements of rules and incentives 
that provide the political space for regulating actor behaviour, where members with self-
interested motives follow the rules of the institution in exchange for benefits (Olson 1965, Hall 
and Taylor 1996, Lowndes and Roberts 2013). In Rational Choice Institutionalism actors are 
rational, motivated by utility maximization and behaviour is presumed to be instrumental and 
based on a calculation of cost and benefit. It also leads to strategic interaction between actors 
in the determination of political outcomes (Ostrom 1996, Hall and Taylor 1996, Peters 2005). 
Rational Choice Institutionalism suggests that institutions are relatively easy to change but as 
Peters points out, over time, it  “has begun to add assumptions about learning and values to the 
strictly utilitarian conceptions of behavior that have been at its centre” (2016: 60). Because 
PVM is so focused on actors and outcomes, Rational Choice Institutionalism assists our 
understanding of actor behaviour  and their response to political pressure. 
The sociological stream of New Institutionalism, became particularly dominant in organization 
and management theory sharing the emphasis of the influence of structure but taking a more 
cultural view of institutions. Meyer and Rowan (1977) argue that organisations are driven to 
adopt practices or routines to achieve increased legitimacy. Sociological institutionalists refer 
to the term ‘institutionalism isomorphism’ that explains institutionalism as a constraining 
process that forces actors or organisations to “resemble other units that face the same set of 
environmental conditions” (DiMaggio and Powell 1991:66). It is also argued by DiMaggio and 
Powellthat this can be brought about through: Coercive action which occurs when external 
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constituents on which an organisation is dependent or cultural expectations in the society within 
which organisations function, cajole or force organisations to change in a certain way; 
Normative processes which arise primarily from professionalisation where members of an 
occupation establish a cognitive base and legitimation of their occupational autonomy; and 
Mimetic processes in which one organisation recognises the success of another and attempts to 
copy it (1991). Eventually, organizational actors construct around themselves an environment 
that constrains their ability to change further in later years. Therefore, as an innovation spreads, 
a threshold is reached beyond which adoption provides legitimacy rather than improves 
performance (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). It is the normative aspect of Sociological 
Institutionalism, which Guy Peters later labelled Normative Institutionalism , that  most 
influences this research (Peters 2005). Normative Institutionalism describes the relationship 
between an institution and the actions of its members, suggesting that the collection of values 
by which decisions and the behaviour of members are shaped is more important than the formal 
structures of the institution (March and Olsen 1989, Hall and Taylor 1996). In Normative 
Institutionalism, institutions affect the behaviour of political actors who are driven by 
institutional duties and roles and internalize the norms associated with their institutional roles 
(March and Olsen 1989, Hall and Taylor 1996, Peters 2005).  
Sociological/Normative Institutionalism therefore sees institutions in a more holistic way than 
Rational Choice or Historical Institutionalism, emphasizing not only the normative and 
cognitive aspects of institutions but also the broader cultural contexts within which social actors 
are socialized, identity is shaped, norms are reified and institutional arrangements are 
legitimated (DiMaggio & Powell 1991, Hall & Taylor 1996, Ogbazghi 2020). Thus, 
institutionalism helps us to understand the influence of organisational culture and the impact 
of organisational norms and values.  Rational Choice Institutionalism focuses on rational actors 
who pursue their preferences following a ‘logic of calculation’ within political institutions 
defined as structures of incentives, Historical Institutionalism details the development of 
political institutions where regular patterns and routine practices are subject to a ‘logic of path 
dependence’ and the social actors of Sociological Institutionalism act according to a ‘logic of 
appropriateness’ within political institutions defined as socially constituted and culturally 
framed rules and norms (Schmidt, 2010). Discursive Institutionalism proposes a more 
discursive approach by focusing on ideas more so than structure or agency/actors with Schmidt 
(2010) arguing for the coordination of ideas and the communication of ideas to the general 
public thereby legitimizing them via discourse. Rather than focusing on debating the 
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differences between the institutionalisms, Lowndes and Roberts (2013) and Schmidt (2010) 
focus on the contribution of each of them to our understanding of institutions and their impact 
on actor behaviour with Schmidt (2010) also advocating for a more dynamic explanation for 
institutional change. While Rational Choice and Normative Institutionalism are concerned with 
interests, values and performance, for Discursive Institutionalism, institutions are concerned 
with how ideas are generated among policy actors and communicated to the public by political 
actors through discourse. Schmidt (2010) argues that this dynamic approach, which is 
underpinned by interaction between actors, is the key to explaining institutional change (and 
continuity) compared to the more static, stable emphasis of the other three which are better at 
explaining continuity than change. Discursive Institutionalism follows a ‘logic of 
communication’ whereby the interactive process of conveying ideas gives dynamic to their 
explanation of institutional design (Zurnic 2014). Importantly, for this study Discursive 
Institutionalism “draws attention to the way agents can gain critical distance from the 
institutions in which they are situated, so as to encourage democratization in discourse and 
deliberation and/or to expose elite domination and power” (Schimdt, 2015:2). Awareness of 
the significance of discourse for democratisation and awareness of the potential for elite capture 
contributes to our understanding of how the structures under analysis for this study operate and 
understanding of the challenge of achieving what Schmidt describes as ‘communicative policy 
legitimation’ (ibid.). 
From a PVM perspective, it is important to draw on the varying dimensions of the four New 
Institutionalisms that contribute to our understanding of institutionalism. The theoretical 
insights of Rational Choice, Historical and Sociological Institutionalisms, indicate that 
institutional rules serve as constraints on actors by way of “rationalist incentives that structure 
action, historical paths that shape action and cultural norms that frame action” (Schmidt 
2010:14). These three New Institutionalisms have a stable, static emphasis that explain 
institutional continuity and the endurance of values and organizational culture with norms 
ingrained in institutional actors constraining their ability to change. At the same time, 
Discursive Institutionalism explains how and when the communication of ideas in discursive 
interactions enable actors to overcome interests, path dependence and culture constraints. The 
institutional context in which and through which ideas are communicated via discourse is 
important as well as the opportunity for members of the institution to present, deliberate and 
legitimize their ideas to the general public (Schmidt 2010). Therefore, all actors, irrespective 
of their power of position, can be empowered by the strength of their argument and the 
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convincing communication of their ideas (ibid.). This type of dynamic interactive institutional 
environment is important for enabling debates concerning fundamentally important issues in 
society that have the potential to significantly influence institutional change, while at the same 
time being aware of the impact of rules, practices, norms and culture on such debates. The 
PVM approach is also about facilitating the conditions for deliberation about these collective 
purposes. The PVM approach will be critical to enabling this shift from stable institutions to 
dynamic networks of public deliberation/collaboration and to understanding how to cater for 
the broader involvement of civil society in democratic deliberative process. The shift has 
implications for local government, particularly the tensions between old and new, and the PVM 
approach addresses how it can be done. The insights from the different institutionalisms help 
us to understand the challenges of PVM for institutional design. In particular, understanding 
the influence of path dependency, actor behaviour, organisational culture, norm and values on 
collaboration is essential for creating an institutional environment that will mediate the on-
going interactions between state and non-state/civil society actors consistent with the spirit of 
PVM. 
 
For New Institutionalism, the context in which institutions are formed and political activity 
takes place is highly significant and explains why actors make the choices that they do 
(Steinmo and Thelen 1992; Immergut 1998). Moreover, while institutions provide the 
structure and resources necessary for ideas to alter the course of policy, in and of themselves, 
ideas are not a sufficient condition for political change, but must inform the social and 
economic context and political debate (Peters 2005). At the formative period of a policy, a 
critical juncture of forces and processes produces a particular outcome (Peters et al. 
2005:1283).   
Therefore, context helps to explain the role critical junctures play in institutional change. 
Individual behaviour is also shaped by decisions made some years earlier; decisions which 
persist over time, creating path-dependency. New Institutionalism studies the contexts in which 
political behaviour is channelled and constrained and how that behaviour, in turn, maintains 
and alters contexts (Immergut 1998; Peters 2005; Shepsle 2005). Scholars of institutionalism 
are particularly interested in what happens in the interim between political demands and 
ultimate outcomes (Immergut 1998). Context also reveals the prevailing structures which 
create veto points and therefore provides information to understand the uneven distribution of 
power among interest groups.  
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Furthermore, institutions (formal political institutions, voluntary associations, firms) are a 
mechanism to order preferences; not by the summation of individual preferences, but by putting 
rules in place in order for decisions to be made, even where no consensus exists among the 
individuals (Immergut 1992). Institutionalist theory offers various hypotheses as to how actors 
and organisations pursue their individual preferences. Rational Choice Institutionalism, for 
instance, proposes that rational actors focus on which action will yield the highest utility for 
them, with actors behaving rationally to achieve self-interested motives (Olson 1965; Hall and 
Taylor 1996; Lowndes and Roberts 2013). In particular, when economic issues are at stake, 
individuals in groups act out of self-interest, while groups of individuals with common interests 
try to further those (Weingast 1996).  
The rational behaviour of actors in their quest to attain their preferences leads to strategic 
interaction with other actors in the institution. “In contrast to the idea of individual 
maximisation where institutional members try to advance their individual preferences, the logic 
of appropriateness describes the influence that the institution has on the development of these 
individual preferences” (Reich 2000). For example, while individual actors may not change 
their individual preferences, they may adjust their strategy to support the overall preferences 
of the institution (Reich 2000). As Immergut (1998:12) suggested, “there are diverse sources 
of individual and collective interests and that institutions influence their articulation and 
expression in politics”. The normative view is that political institutions shape political 
preferences and action (March and Olsen 1984, 1989; Pierre 2009). More specifically, citizen 
preferences are developed through “rolling processes of deliberation, dialogue and interaction 
with others” (Shaw 2013:487). New Institutionalism distinguishes between ‘aggregated’ and 
‘integrated’ interests: aggregation is the summation of preferences; integrated interests are 
qualitatively transformed through discussion (Immergut 1998).  
New Institutionalism argues against aggregation of preferences to reach a decision; rather 
proposing that collective action be attained through the integration of preferences. Institutions, 
therefore, provide a framework within which ideas and knowledge are generated. They shape 
how groups and individuals define their interests, and in so doing, influence how policy issues 
get defined. In combining and altering the preferences of individual groups, they shape 
objectives and structure outcomes, thereby facilitating the creation of public value.  
Shaw (2013) suggests that an institutional environment consistent with PVM would provide an 
environment of engagement between public managers and civil society which encourages 
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public value-seeking leadership, develops the softer skills associated with coalition building, 
sense-making, and political acumen, and where public value is co-produced by public 
managers and citizens. For example, “the complex nature of policy-making in PVM involving 
cross-sectoral networks, task forces, teams and coordinating committees are likely institutional 
features of processes designed to generate a public value outcome” (Shaw 2013:487). In 
addition, such interactions pull diverse groups and preferences together within the institutional 
framework through common interests and political alliances. Such alliances, supported by 
roles, rules, and leadership, may also lead to public value outcomes and trusting relationships 
in the pursuit of public value. 
Clearly, institutional design changes are necessary to facilitate interactions and collaboration 
between public managers and civil society actors and make action possible. For example, Shaw 
(2013:418) suggested that “institutional arrangements are a significant determinant of public 
participation in political deliberations”. As such, the enabling organisation and its leadership 
must be equipped with adequate resources as collaborative processes of this nature are resource 
intensive. Similarly, Gains and Stoker observed that “managers pursuing public value should 
be concerned with achieving the right structure, finances, staffing and information management 
in their organizations and systems since these are all key ingredients in ensuring their 
operational capacity” (2009:440).  
 
To create an environment where a PVM approach can be advanced, it is necessary to develop 
an institutional framework which facilitates trusting and open relationships between State and 
non-State actors who willingly exchange information and resources in the interest of creating 
public value through sustainable and fluid processes of engagement. Such an environment 
would inherently shift engagement towards collaboration supported by procedures which allow 
deliberation between State and non-State actors and processes for agreeing on collectively-
defined preferences as vehicles to achieving trust and fairness. Additionally, public agencies 
would assume a facilitative role and take less control over determining public priorities. Shaw 
maintained that what is needed is a “public sector/civil society nexus characterised by high 
level of trust and openness, and a collective willingness to exchange intellectual and other 
resources, and to engage (and sustain) processes of deliberation and dialogue” (2013:487). 
Furthermore, the aggregation of roles and responsibilities (as apportioned both between 
organisations and amongst social actors) within such alliances is important from the outset 
(Shaw 2013) to guide behaviour towards public value outcomes. This permits State and non-
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State actors to be more open to sharing information, knowledge, and resources, and to 
collectively shape policy objectives and decisions. Historically, State and non-State/civil 
society sectors have not been integrated in their approach to decision-making around public 
priorities. For example, in local government administration the public were treated “as subjects 
rather than active participants in the selection and creation of public services” (Peters et al. 
2005:1292). For this reason, formalised networks would legitimately enable actors to 
collectively deliberate on public priorities and sustain the level of civil society participation 
intrinsic to this shared approach. Importantly, it is not intended that such networks replace the 
vertical structures of authority empowered to provide legal and financial oversight. In fact, it 
is essential that these formal networks continue to be accountable to the vertical authorising 
environment since networks of deliberation can become confused and unwieldly as citizens are 
given a greater role in determining priorities and budgets (Page et al. 2013). It is evident that 
the multiple conflicts, demands, and restraints of the political domain, require a framework of 
rules, structures, relationships, and procedures to maintain political order and stability 
(Lowndes et al. 2006). The purpose of rules is to support the productive engagement of the 
various actors advocating for  individual or organisational values and preferences. Shaw (2013) 
proposes that PVM replace instrumentality, self-interest, and utility-maximisation with 
altruism, sociability, and cooperation. Rules also guide behaviour. While they make some 
actions more likely than others, they do not ordinarily dictate political behaviour or policy 
outcomes precisely, but provide parameters for action (March and Olsen 2011). 
Ultimately, institutionalism sheds light on how political institutions actually work. Despite  
this, the institutional dimension is seldom addressed in the PVM theory. For example, in Alford 
and O’Flynn’s (2009) review of the literature on public value, there was no mention of 
institutional design considerations. As Shaw (2013:485) observes: 
…little explicit attention has thus far been paid to the implications of PVM for the 
apportioning of public agencies’ roles, relationships and responsibilities; for the ways in 
which they set policy objectives, determine delivery priorities and negotiate contracts with 
third party providers; and for matters of accountability. PVM needs to address matters of 
institutional design in the public realm. 
Having reviewed key literature contributions on institutionalism, for the purpose of this 
research one can assert that: 
 Institutional arrangements are a significant determinant of public participation in 
political deliberations.  
 Institutions provide the rules that support actors to engage with each other. 
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 Where public policies persist, critical junctures play a role in overcoming resistance to 
change. 
 Actors tend to pursue their own interests and their behaviour is shaped by norms, 
routines and values. 
 Institutions provide a framework for expressing preferences and shaping ideas and 
objectives between actors. 
 While formal structures of authority are important, informal arrangements are also 
necessary to encourage openly sharing information, knowledge and resources with a 
reliance on rules to guide this behaviour. 
 For PVM it is necessary to develop an institutional framework that facilitates trusting 
and open relationships. 
 
2.4.1 Institutionalist Characteristics Relevant to PVM 
To address the institutional consequences arising from PVM this study identified the 
characteristics of institutionalism needed to enhance public value theory: namely, context; 
rules; preferences; norms; routines; and values. The discussion on context is important because 
it highlights the significant challenges that could be encountered by introducing institutional 
change to support PVM, particularly where practices of Public Administration and NPM may 
persist. Context is a key feature of Historical Institutionalism and provides the rationale behind 
the resilience of institutional structures and policies. The discussion on rules elucidates the 
types of institutional changes that may be required to accommodate the broader authorising 
environment necessary to mediate ongoing interactions between public managers and civil 
society actors in a PVM approach. Although rules are open to interpretation, they also serve as 
a guide to what a reasonable and responsible citizen, elected representative, or administrator, 
can be expected to do in various situations (March and Olsen 2011). People generally follow 
societally defined rules most of the time; even when doing so may not be in their immediate 
self-interest (Lowndes and Roberts 2013).  
One of the most fundamental differences between NPM and PVM is the central role of citizens 
in directly determining policy priorities (Shaw 2013). The discussion on preferences helps us 
to understand the necessity of procedural capacity for collaboration between State and non-
State actors to identify public priorities. This enhanced role of citizens promoted by PVM 
enables them to express their preferences regarding the distribution of public resources. In 
short; public preferences are at the heart of public value.  
“In a democracy only the public can determine what is truly of value to them” (Kelly et al. 
2002: 6). Furthermore, “public preferences are expressed by citizens through a variety of means 
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and shaped into social objectives, reflected in the decisions of elected politicians, and delivered 
through government policy using public resources” (Kelly et al. 2002). Strokosch and Osborne 
(2020) assert that such citizen participation means that positional roles are altered, with citizens 
becoming value creators and  professionals becoming value facilitators. The transmission of 
citizen preferences to political leaders is impacted by the political structure/process. Since the 
capacity of individuals and groups to pursue their preferences has the potential to be increased 
by joining institutions, they strategically identify institutions that will help them achieve their 
purpose (Steinmo and Thelen 1992; Hall and Taylor 1996). As discussed above, the 
institutional context has a huge bearing on expressed preferences, final outputs, and decision-
making. Heretofore, organisational boundaries often excluded citizen engagement.  
Inequitable accessibility to the political process drives the uneven distribution of power among 
social groups (Steinmo and Thelen 1992). In contrast, the procedural capacity provided by the 
institution enables actors and interest groups to pursue their preferences and share their ideas 
in more permeable institutions (Torfing and Sorensen 2019).  
Moreover, when it does open up to new actors and interest groups, the institution has the 
capacity to absorb new ideas and knowledge and respond to social problems more effectively.  
The discussion on norms, routines, and values, enlarges on how the introduction of a PVM 
approach may have to integrate with, compete with, and possibly overcome, pre-existing norms 
and practices. This challenge should not be underestimated. New Institutionalism studied how 
the norms and values embodied in political institutions shape the behaviour of individuals 
(Lowndes and Roberts 2013). In order for an institution to be effective in influencing the 
behaviour of its members, they must consider whether an action conforms to the norms of the 
organisation rather than prioritising personal consequences (Peters 2005). Norms and values 
are ingrained in institutional actors.  
As such, individuals tend to act from habituated obligation; making decisions and behaving 
according to what is appropriate for the institution despite any misgivings that such action or 
behaviour may ultimately lead to undesirable consequences.   
Normative Institutionalism proposes that the relationship between institutions and action is 
understood by associating institutions with roles to which norms of behaviour are attached 
(Hall and Taylor 1996). Specifically, the behaviour of members is defined by norms, 
appropriateness, routines, standard operating procedures, and symbols. Since members come 
49 
 
to rely on routines and rituals to cope with uncertainty, they must be cognisant of the norms of 
the organisation when making decisions in terms of whether an action conforms to these norms, 
and what the consequences may be. In this way, behaviour becomes routinised and individuals 
who have been socialised into particular institutional roles internalise the norms associated with 
these roles (Hall and Taylor 1996; Kroch 2020). 
A central tenet of Historical Institutionalism is that once a programme or policy is initiated, it 
persists until or unless a robust force for change is exerted (Peters 2005). Similarly, the 
endurance of values is significant in explaining resistance to change: it is very difficult to 
dismantle a set of ideas once they have been institutionalised (Peters 2005). While values such 
as corruption or good customer service are open to interpretation, once internalised by 
individuals they tend to persist. For this reason, they have a central place in the theory of 
institutions. Furthermore, members learn which values matter, how to build them into the 
organisational culture and social structure, and how they may be weakened or subverted 
(Selznick 1948, 1996).  Finally, since the logic of appropriateness varies from institution to 
institution, individuals must discern the dominant institutional values in order to conform to 
the given context (March and Olsen 2011). 
The Institutionalism perspective outlined in Part 2 sought to identify the institutional 
arrangements necessary to support the type of collaboration necessary for PVM. It drew 
attention to the important characteristics which will be used in the operational framework as 
tools to examine the potential for PVM to be embedded in an evolving institution. Firstly, 
context explains the potential resistance of institutions to changing structures, processes and 
ideas. Secondly, rules are needed to guide and manage the collaborative process. Thirdly, the 
preferences of a broad range of actors must be taken into consideration and shaped into public 
value outcomes.  
Finally norms, routines and values help us to understand how efforts to introduce a PVM 
approach may have to integrate with, compete with, and possibly overcome pre-existing norms, 
routines, and values. 
2.4.2 Implications for Public Value 
Moore’s strategic triangle is a framework which aligns value proposition, legitimacy and 
support (authorising environment), and operational capacity to achieve the overall objective of 
creating public value. The PVM framework is conceived as a collective process to reach 
commonly agreed objectives and enhance policy outcomes for citizens. To reiterate, PVM 
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emphasises a number of core elements: namely, collective deliberation between politicians; 
government officials and stakeholders to work jointly to create and achieve shared public value 
goals; the importance of fostering trust, legitimacy, and confidence, through enabling effective 
participation by citizens in public life; and the creation of interconnections, interdependencies, 
and interactions across the boundaries between the State and civil society, to facilitate people’s 
desire to collectively influence the determination of public priorities.  
Institutional environments are complex systems, as is the site of this study. In order to embed 
a PVM approach, rules must be adapted in order to guide the action of members towards public 
value outcomes. In fact, the strategic interaction between rational actors so critical to a PVM 
approach, requires the support of rules and incentives to regulate actor behaviour, promote 
public value choices, and realise collectively desirable outcomes. The resilience of institutions, 
as depicted in Historical Institutionalism, questions whether the institutional environment is 
sufficiently porous to embed PVM ideas and encourage equitable distribution of power among 
societal actors. Since this may require a critical juncture to enable a pathway of public value 
development, PVM must address matters of institutional design in the public realm and identify 
the institutional attributes which are consistent with public value (Shaw 2013). 
Ultimately, PVM highlights the need for dialogue, engagement, participation, and collective 
deliberation. The proposal, therefore, is to use an institutionalist analysis to determine the 
historical, rational choice, and normative enablers or constraints for achieving these ends. As 
such, the operational framework for this study will apply the characteristics of context, rules, 
preferences, norms, routines, and values, as tools to examine the potential for PVM to be 
embedded within an evolving institution. 
As discussed, PVM requires engagement between stakeholders to discuss and decide on 
policies and solutions to societal problems.  
The insights from institutionalist theories identified structural, processual, and behavioural 
factors, which necessitate collaboration if public value is to be achieved. Leadership is clearly 
required to enable collaboration in institutional mechanisms designed for PVM. Also necessary 
is a collaborative mind-set and the ability to reach out to a broad range of actors and facilitate 
the process in ways that maximise civil society participation and minimise top-down control 
by the authorising environment/political actors. 
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2.5 Collaboration as a Conduit for PVM 
This section established the relationship between PVM and concepts of collaboration. As 
previously outlined, there is little doubt that PVM requires engagement: for example, jointly 
deciding public priorities in the pursuit of public value requires collective deliberation. 
Drawing together the State and non-State sectors in the authorising environment to expand 
knowledge and share resources relies on integration, motivating and legitimising civil society 
to participate demands collaborative processes, and the operational capacity to facilitate 
collaborative processes rests on collaborative leadership. In short, collaboration is the lynchpin 
of PVM. This section presents a review of the collaboration literature. It initially defines the 
concept, the role of various actors, the importance of citizen participation, and the benefits and 
challenges of collaboration. The second section outlines the identification of effective 
collaboration principles and processes to respond to these challenges. The section concludes 
with a discussion on improving operational capacity through effective leadership and PVM. 
As a broad and multifaceted concept within the governance literature, collaboration often 
involves the creation of mechanisms to establish horizontal structures of authority that bring 
public, private, and civic actors together in an on-going process of engagement to solve public 
problems that cannot be resolved by a single organisation (Kapucu et al. 2009). More 
fundamentally, collaboration implies the enactment of collective decision-making processes 
which are consensus-oriented and deliberative (Ansell and Gash 2007).   
Crucially, the purpose of collaboration is not only to achieve individual organisational 
objectives, but to bring a variety of stakeholders together to solve public problems (Morse 
2007; Douglas et al. 2020). This implies the need to develop collaborative mind-sets, 
collaborative skills and, most especially, competencies in collaborative leadership. Since both 
State and non-State actors are involved in collaborations, they are all agents in producing value 
(Shaw 2013). Tang and Mazmanian (2010) describe the contribution of the various actors to 
collaboration as follows: 
1. State Actors bring public legitimacy, the authority, and power of the State, public 
transparency and accountability, and a public service mission.  The State also brings 
both human and financial resources. 
2. Private Sector brings funding, property, financial management skills, an 
entrepreneurial spirit, agility and timeliness, business-like management practices, and 
organisational and individual incentives. 
3. Non-profits bring their commitment to serve, willingness to perform as intermediaries 
in the provision of public goods and services, and social capital.  
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4. Civil Society brings agility, unique knowledge and understanding, and the capacity to 
respond quickly and with nuance.  
These qualities and resources facilitate the creation of public value. Collaboration enables the 
actors to work across organisational, jurisdictional, and sectoral boundaries (Morse 2007) and 
generates a bank of information, knowledge, experience, preferences, and capacity.  
As an intrinsic aspect of collaborative governance, citizen participation is essential for making 
good decisions and early citizen input into the process is important for effective decision-
making (King et al. 1998; Torfing and Sorensen 2019). With a shared base of knowledge, 
citizens can be involved in framing the issues that affect them from the beginning (Chrislip 
1994; Kroch 2020). It is also vital for the democracy, transparency, and accountability inherent 
in good governance, (Kapucu et al. 2009). In particular, participation affords disadvantaged 
communities effective representation in the collaboration (Innes and Booher 2005; Ansell and 
Gash 2007). Historically, the citizens most affected by an issue are those furthest from the 
problem-solving mechanisms (King et al. 1998). When citizens do not play a role in defining 
the problem for their community, they are prone to become reactive and judgemental and may 
deliberately obstruct the efforts of the administration.  Conversely, “When citizens succeed in 
working together to address common concerns, new networks and norms of civic engagement 
are established, and the primary focus of work shifts from parochial interests to the broader 
concerns of the community” (Chrislip 1994:28).  
Collaboration potentially provides a forum for all actors who are affected by an issue and who 
may not previously have had the power to participate. The benefit of empowering actors 
through public participation mechanisms is underscored by Innes and Booher (2005:428): 
…when an inclusive set of citizens engage in authentic dialogue where all are equally 
empowered and informed and where they listen and are heard respectfully and when they are 
working on a task of interest to all, following their own agendas, everyone is changed. They 
learn new ideas and they often come to recognise that others’ views are legitimate. They can 
work through issues and create shared meanings as well as the possibility of joint action. 
While empowering stakeholders to collaborate is clearly beneficial, it is not straightforward. 
The potential for collaboration to produce benefits has been identified across the literature (e.g., 
Ansell and Gash 2007, 2018; Fung and Wright 2001; Torfing and Sorensen 2019). These 
include: 
 increased capacity to solve complex problems 
 sharing of financial and human resources and enhanced knowledge  
 enhanced quality of decision-making arising from greater actor participation 
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 creation of closer engagement between the State and citizens which fosters trust- 
building  
 more holistic, shared, and authentic visions for community development  
However, certain challenges and barriers have also come to light, including: 
 the democratic legitimacy of the collaborative process  
 uncertain accountability relationships caused by a broader authorising environment 
 heavy time commitments required for effective collaboration  
 the potential of pseudo-collaboration to undermine trust  
 poorly executed techniques of participation  
 overcoming ‘non-collaboration’ mindsets which limit the creation of vision 
 potential delays caused by the involvement of a wider range of actors 
 public managers being too busy to effectively facilitate collaboration  
 
Such benefits, challenges, and barriers must be borne in mind when designing and 
implementing collaborative processes. 
 
Having reviewed the literature on collaboration, the key points that are relevant to this research 
are: 
 Collaboration involves creating mechanisms that bring public, private and civic actors 
together to solve public problems. 
 It implies working across organisations, jurisdictional and sectoral boundaries. 
 Civil society members affected by the issues should be involved in collaboration from 
the beginning. 
 Collaboration implies collective decision-making processes. 
 The need for collaborative mindsets and leadership. 
2.5.1 Effective Collaboration: Principles and Processes 
The extensive literature on collaboration suggests that the structures and processes of 
collaboration should be non-hierarchical, comprise horizontal structures of authority, 
incorporate mechanisms of citizen participation (Kapucu et al. 2009; Bao et al. 2012), and  
encompass formal and informal systems of relationships and networks (Kapucu et al. 2009). 
The next section therefore examines theories of collaborative governance and Ansell and 
Gash’s (2007) widely acclaimed prototype. 
The ideal paradigm of collaboration is a value-based (Bao et al. 2012), citizen-oriented 
(Skelcher and Sullivan 2008), and proactive framework wherein various actors interact and 
influence each other (Innes and Booher 2005; Sorensen 2017). This could take the form of 
networks, clusters of linked stakeholders, formal or informal relationships (Innes and Booher 
2005), or forums which provide constructive ways for citizens to work with governments on 
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common problems (Chrislip 1994; Strokosch and Osborne 2020). Governance literature draws 
particular attention to the rules and protocols which guide collective decision-making (Stoker 
2006a; Peters et al. 2005). The focus of governance theorists on collective decision-making is 
summarised by Fung and Wright’s outline of three institutional design features which stabilize 
and deepen the practice of empowered deliberative democracy: 
(1) the devolution of public decision authority to empowered local units, (2) the creation of 
formal linkages of responsibility, resource distribution, and communication that connect these 
units to each other and to super-ordinate, more centralized authorities, (3) the use and 
generation of new state institutions to support and guide these decentred problem-solving 
efforts rather than leaving them as informal or voluntary affairs (2001:22). 
It is widely accepted that effective governance is the product of collaboration (Morse 2007; 
Klijn and Koppenjan 2016 ). Unlike other forms of consensus decision-making such as dispute 
resolution or mediation, collaborative governance focuses on public policies and issues. 
Specifically, collaborative governance is a strategy of governing that brings public and private 
stakeholders together with public agencies in a collective forum to engage in consensus-
oriented decision-making (Ansell and Gash 2007).  
The institutionalisation of a collective decision-making process is central to the definition of 
collaborative governance and distinguishing it from other networks or partnerships (Ansell and 
Gash 2007). From this perspective, collaborative governance is “a governing arrangement 
where one or more public agencies directly engage non-State stakeholders in a collective 
decision-making process that is formal, consensus-oriented, and deliberative and that aims to 
make or implement public policy or manage public programs or assets” (Ansell and Gash 
2007:2). With this in mind, Ansell and Gash identify key structural characteristics of 
collaborative governance as:  
(1) the forum is initiated by public agencies or institutions, (2) participants in the forum 
include non-State actors, (3) participants engage directly in decision making and are not 
merely ‘‘consulted’’ by public agencies, (4) the forum is formally organized and meets 
collectively, (5) the forum aims to make decisions by consensus (even if consensus is not 
achieved in practice), and (6) the focus of collaboration is on public policy or public 
management’ (2007:2-3). 
Building on these structural characteristics, Ansell and Gash (2007) devised a model of how 
collaborative governance might proceed. Built on an analysis of 137 cases of collaborative 
governance, their model comprises “four broad variables – starting conditions, institutional 
design, facilitative leadership and collaborative process” (Ansell and Gash 2007:7-8). These 




Figure 2 A Model of Collaborative Governance 




The starting conditions present at the outset of the collaboration either facilitate or discourage 
cooperation. Ansell and Gash (2007) streamlined the critical starting conditions into three 
broad variables: imbalances between the power and resources of different stakeholders; 
incentives that stakeholders have to collaborate; and the previous history of conflict or 
cooperation among stakeholders. Power and resource issues are especially problematic for 
successful collaboration. In particular, certain stakeholders may be disadvantaged by not 
having structures to access participation, the expertise needed to engage on particular technical 
issues, or the time and/or energy that collaboration requires.  
Emerson et al. (2011) further observe that capacity for joint action can be driven by collective 
uncertainty and a lack of shared knowledge on how to manage and solve societal problems. As 
collaborative processes are also resource-intensive, Emerson et al. (2011) also highlight the 
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high transaction costs of initiating a collaborative effort and the need to provide staffing, 
technologies, and other resources to support the collaborative endeavour. Clearly then, 
potential power and resource imbalances require that weaker or disadvantaged stakeholders be 
properly empowered to participate or be represented (Ansell et al, 2020).  
Since much participation is largely voluntary in nature, citizens are incentivised to participate 
when there is a realistic expectation that the collaboration will yield meaningful results or if 
they are dependent on the other stakeholders to achieve their goal (Ansell and Gash 2007). A 
pre-history of conflict is likely to manifest in low levels of trust, whereas one of cooperation 
can lead to high levels of trust. Conversely, high-conflict situations can lead to positive 
collaborative efforts due to the need for all stakeholders to be involved for a successful 
collaborative outcome, while high trust levels between some stakeholders can arouse suspicion 
among others (Ansell and Gash 2007). Page et al. (2013:26-28) maintain that “problem-solving 
capacity in early phases of collaboration depends heavily on strong prior relationships among 
collaborators, positive (and negative) collaborative effects accumulate across attributes of 
public value, and positive effects accumulate across phases of collaboration in a virtuous 
cycle”. By the same token, Vangen and Huxham (2003) purport that issues concerned with 
power relationships such as stakeholder glory-seeking or claiming credit for achievements, can 
often lead to mistrust. Thus, for successful collaboration, trust needs to be actively fostered and 
interdependence acknowledged. 
Institutional design is key to effective collaboration. The collaborative process needs to be 
underpinned by design features incorporating clear ground rules, a transparent process, and 
ensuring the collaboration is broadly inclusive of all stakeholders who are affected by or care 
about an issue (Chrislip 1994; Ansell and Gash 2007; Hartley et al. 2019a). Thus, the 
institutional design ensures the legitimacy of both the process and the collaborative outcomes 
and, as Bryson et al. (2017) contend, the design and conduct of collaboration shapes inclusion.  
Facilitative leadership is critical to bring interested parties to the table and steer them through 
the collaborative process (Ansell and Gash 2007; Torfing and Sorensen 2019). Leadership is 
particularly important to empower stakeholders whose incentives to participate are weak or in 
cases where power or resources are asymmetrically distributed.  
Moreover, by focusing on the ‘process’ of bringing people with good information together in 
constructive ways, leaders enable problems to be solved rather than trapped in the ‘content’ of 
the problem itself (Chrislip 1994; Hartley et al. 2019a). In summary therefore, leadership is 
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important in order to embed a process for maintaining ground rules, building trust, facilitating 
dialogue, and exploring mutual gain. In fact, successful collaborations often rely on multiple 
formal and/or informal leaders. Leadership is specifically dealt with in the next section. 
The collaborative process at the core of the Ansell and Gash Model, is a continuous cycle of 
communication, trust, commitment, and understanding, which aspires to a flexible and on-
going outcome (Ansell and Gash 2007).  It is represented as cyclical rather than linear since 
feedback from early collaboration can positively or negatively influence further collaboration. 
Since it is not a one-off event, but a fluid and iterative process, Ansell and Gash propose that:  
‘…the goal of collaboration is typically to achieve some degree of consensus among 
stakeholders. We use the term consensus oriented because collaborative forums often do not 
succeed in reaching consensus. However, the premise of meeting together in a deliberative, 
multilateral, and formal forum is to strive toward consensus or, at least, to strive to discover 
areas of agreement’(2007:5). 
The first building block of the collaborative process is face-to-face dialogue. Ansell and Gash 
(2007) maintain that the literature on collaboration provides examples of how stereotypes are 
broken down by face-to-face communication.  Kapucu et al. (2009) contend the transformative 
power of effective dialogue is central to good collaboration, while Roberts (2004) argues that 
social learning is nurtured through dialogue which enables participants to respect and listen to 
another’s opinions. Drawing on a range of cases, Ansell et al. (2020) posit that face-to-face 
dialogue is one of the three key relationship-building variables. 
Both interpersonal and inter-organisational trust is important, and  the majority of practitioners 
argue that trust is an essential ingredient for successful collaboration (Vangen and Huxham, 
2003; Douglas et al. 2020). Thus, investing in a process of trust-building wherein stakeholders 
get to know each other over time is pivotal. Both Vangen and Huxham (2003) and Ansell and 
Gash (2007) underline the incremental development of trust as parties repeatedly interact; and 
particularly how an inclusive, constructive, and well-informed process builds trust among 
collaborative leaders (Chrislip 1994). Indeed, a key requirement of collaboration is that actors 
be allowed sufficient time to deliberate on the information provided to them in order to frame 
the issues (King et al. 1998).  
The necessary commitment to process may entail a psychological shift towards mutual respect 
for others’ perspectives and interests, as well as sharing responsibility for decisions (Ansell 
and Gash 2007). Structures of collaboration must therefore be underpinned by processes which 
involve more than just consultation, talk, and discussion. For example, deliberative democracy 
which aligns with collaborative governance, gives increasing opportunities for communities to 
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influence local decision-making and, as Maginn (2007) argues, manifests the government 
realisation that resolving social problems is a shared endeavour, incorporating private, 
voluntary, and community sectors. Clearly, the horizontal leadership between organisations 
enabled by the collaborative process, can create collaborative advantage/mutual benefit 
(Vangen and Huxam 2003; Brookes and Grint 2010). As such, reciprocity is a key objective of 
collaboration; creating a mutual dependency between actors who are in need of resources 
possessed by others (Maginn 2007; Kapucu et al. 2009; Strokosch and Osborne 2020). 
Collaboration offers the means of bringing different stakeholders together, and combining their 
knowledge and perspectives into a unified whole to improve the quality of decision-making 
and satisfy the public interest (Innes and Booher 2005; Morse 2010). However, the actual 
collaboration process must be well organised with appropriate steering, coordination, 
leadership, and management strategies in situ. 
A shared understanding of what stakeholders can collectively achieve together in terms of 
common purpose, common objectives, clear goals, or clear strategic direction, is also required 
(Ansell and Gash 2007), while interventions to solve complex problems often require more 
than one hierarchical organisation (Agranoff and McGuire 2003; Kapucu et al. 2009; Douglas 
et al. 2020). As such, actors are encouraged to work across boundaries and integrate differences 
into shared understandings and common purpose to create new possibilities (Morse 2010). 
Overall, collaboration engenders a more intelligent society (Innes and Booher 2005) and 
increases the potential for generating authentic visions and strategies which address the shared 
concerns of the community (Chrislip 1994; Sorensen 2017). Expectations also need to be 
managed, both among the actors, their parent organisations, and the public.  
Finally, performance and outcomes are significant elements of effective collaboration. 
Intermediate outcomes or ‘small wins’ such as joint fact-finding can build momentum for 
greater collaboration (Ansell and Gash 2007). “Knowledge is the currency of collaboration... 
collaboration requires the aggregation, separation and reassembly of data and information 
which informs, but knowledge guides action and the collaboration generates new shared 
knowledge” (Emerson et al. 2011:16). Through this cyclical process, collaborations aim for 
modest but achievable outcomes or small wins in the first instance; and with each positive 
outcome trust builds on itself incrementally over time (Vangen and Huxham 2003) and 
increases collaborative advantage. Emerson et al. (2011) identify three connected levels of 
collaborative performance which require examination in order to assess the performance of 
collaborative entities: namely, actions; outcomes; and adaptation. 
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Having reviewed the principles and processes of effective collaboration, it is clear that 
collaborative mechanisms: 
 are initiated by public agencies 
 are formally organised with clear ground rules 
 are empowered to make consensus-oriented decisions 
 necessitate deliberation and dialogue with non-state actors. 
 are resource-intensive 
 build trust by developing a shared understanding/common purpose  
 require collaborative leadership 
 
2.5.2 Improving Operational Capacity through Effective Leadership and PVM 
The literature clearly suggests that collaboration is less about tools and techniques and more 
about people and their underlying collaborative roles. PVM is a management approach which 
has a strategic focus on what and how outcomes can be achieved for citizens, seeks out 
opportunities for dialogue between co-producers and authorisers, and focuses on managing 
stakeholders in the external environment as well as internal organisational management.  
This section emphasises the need for effective public leadership to steer collaboration between 
State and non-State actors. It highlights the collaborative and entrepreneurial characteristics 
underpinning PVM and presents the concept of integrative public leadership as a catalyst for 
collaboration to achieve public value. Finally, six attributes of collaborative leadership are 
proposed to augment public leadership development. 
Collaborative governance, as described in the previous section, “brings multiple stakeholders 
together in common forums with public agencies to engage in consensus-oriented decision 
making” (Ansell and Gash 2007:1). With this in mind, leadership for public value would move 
away from the bureaucratic compliance agenda of traditional public administration and the 
efficiency agenda of NPM, to gathering support from the external environment to augment the 
operational capacity needed to deliver outcomes. In that regard, Hartley et al. (2019b) describe 
leadership as a set of relational processes of influence, mobilisation, and direction among 
different actors, groups, and organisations. “The research on collaboration, particularly 
collaboration for public purposes, is very consistent in recognizing the significant role of 
leadership in the success or failure of collaborative endeavours” (Morse 2007:3). Public 
leadership is not leadership solely from within public organisations then, but leadership which 
impacts on the public, and can be displayed by any of the actors in the collaborative process.  
It is not only about personal skills but involves influence between actors and groups (Morse 
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2007; Hartley et al. 2019b). Indeed, leadership capable of fostering collaboration is particularly 
important for constructive engagement with citizens (Chrislip 1994; Krogh 2020). Effective 
public leadership considers public value outcomes that add benefit to users, citizens, and 
communities and examines financial inputs and operational outputs (Brookes and Grint 2010). 
“More effective leadership across the whole public service system is increasingly seen as one 
of the most powerful ways of reducing transaction costs between stand-alone organisations, 
and improving efficiency, performance and productivity, through collaboration across the 
whole public sector” (Benington and Moore 2011:12). Therefore, the most valuable outcomes 
for the public can often be best achieved by harnessing the commitment and resources of the 
three spheres of State, market, and civil society, jointly behind specific shared public value 
goals. 
Ansell and Gash (2007) contend that public agencies play a distinctive leadership role in 
collaborative governance. In particular, public managers play a key role in collaborative 
mechanisms by assisting and managing the multi-sector, multi-actor and multi-organisational 
relationships that are intended to emerge from the collaboration (Kapucu et al. 2009; Krogh 
2020). Moreover, Benington and Moore (2011:3) view the role of managers not merely as 
inward-looking bureaucratic clerks and passive servants to their political masters, but as 
stewards of public assets with “restless value-seeking imaginations”,  important roles to play 
in helping governments to discover what could be done with the assets entrusted to their offices, 
and ensuring responsive services for users and citizens. In Creating Public Value (Moore 1995) 
drew specific attention to the role of public managers in orchestrating processes of public 
policy development, often in partnership with other actors and stakeholders, in ways which aim 
to ensure that good choices are made in the public interest, and which legitimate, animate, and 
guide the subsequent implementation, in order to improve outcomes for the public. PVM also 
has an entrepreneurial function in discerning or imagining solutions to problems in our natural 
or social environment which are politically acceptable and administratively feasible. In this 
context the manager’s role is less to define public value on behalf of society than to put forward 
value propositions for consideration by the citizenry and their various political representatives 
(Alford and Hughes, 2008).  
Moore (1995) initially formulated the PVM framework to imbue public sector managers with 
a greater appreciation of the constraints and responsibilities within which they work. 
Subsequently, however, the PVM framework was developed as a basis for a more proactive 
and entrepreneurial approach to value creation (Williams and Shearer 2011) in which public 
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managers would be enabled to be innovative, entrepreneurial, creative, and responsive: 
attributes valued by State and non-State actors alike (Gains and Stoker 2009; Brown and Head 
2019). 
Mainstream leadership theories do not translate well in a context of collaboration, while the 
leader-follower dynamic tends to break down in such cases (Vangen and Huxham 2003; 
Hartley 2018). The same cannot be said for PVM which has collaboration at its core. Evidently, 
“the process of integration lies at the heart of successful cross-sector collaboration” (Morse 
2010: 231). Throughout this literature review on collaboration, the need to integrate people and 
their knowledge, perspectives and resources is discussed. But why does integration occur in 
some cases and not in others? In his assessment of integrative public leadership Morse (2010) 
used the analogy of a chemical reaction which is dependent on a catalyst. In the case of 
integrative public leadership, he suggests that structural catalysts, process catalysts, and 
individual catalysts, can trigger integration that can solve public problems and create lasting 
public value. Examples of boundary organisations (structural catalyst) and trust and 
entrepreneurship (individual catalysts) were given. Some formal and informal instruments such 
as committees are intentionally designed as process catalysts for enabling integration and 
collaborative action to take place.  For Douglas et al. (2020), the steward and catalyst leadership 
roles are also proposed as integral for realising collaborative innovation outcomes. 
Since trust is an individual catalyst that creates lasting public value built on information-sharing 
and relationship development, it is impacted by how people are treated and can sustain 
relationships during conflicts and setbacks (Morse 2010). The ability to build and nurture trust 
is a crucial component of leadership in collaborative governance. Integrative leaders are 
entrepreneurs who define success in terms of public value created (Morse 2010). A key 
characteristic of such leaders is their identification of a shared purpose by forging a common 
understanding and vision for the future that unites the actors and enables them to work through 
setbacks, so that the common purpose eventually becomes the leader (Morse 2010; Krogh 
2020). Collaborative mechanisms established to create public value often rely on public 
managers to facilitate the collaborative process, to seek out the relevant stakeholders, and to 
lead and steer the process.  
As such, public managers are often challenged to play the role of integrative leaders who 
convene, catalyse, and facilitate the work of others, and act as promoters of collaboration 
(Chrislip 1994; Douglas et al. 2020).  
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In that regard, “there are additional competencies required for effective leadership across 
organisations” (Morse 2007:3). Drawing from the collaboration literature it is clear that public 
managers in their role to effectively lead, facilitate, and steer collaboration are expected to 
promote partnership, mutual learning, and shared power; inspire people to act and attract broad 
involvement by State and non-State actors; analyse and understand the challenges of leadership 
and develop change strategies to overcome resistance and inertia; design constructive processes 
to collaboratively solve problems and create shared visions; manage multi-agency 
arrangements and the inter-dependencies between public, private, and semi-private actors; and 
empower actors and enable and sustain participation. Recognising the shift in emphasis away 
from the management and leadership of public organisations to management across 
organisations, Morse unsurprisingly argued that “leadership development in the public sector 
needs more of an emphasis on collaboration” (2007:1). Similarly, Brown and Head observed 
“a lack of capacity on the part of public leaders, and a lack of investment in further developing 
that capacity, as key factors in the failure to establish new ways of working” (2019: 250). 
Consideration should therefore be given to augment public leadership development efforts with 
a focus on these attributes in order to reflect the reality of collaborative governance and enhance 
public value. 
The insights from the literature lead to the belief that Collaborative Leadership: 
 Requires a strategic focus on what and how public value outcomes can be achieved 
for citizens. 
 Is displayed by all the actors by developing a shared understanding and common 
purpose to foster collaboration. 
 Relies on the ability to build and sustain trust. 
 Requires public managers to lead, facilitate, and steer the process, attract broad. 
involvement and manage multi-sector, multi-actor and multi-organisational 
relationships. 
2.6 Conclusion 
This chapter focused on three theoretical perspectives relevant to the practice of collaboration 
in a local government setting: namely, Public Value Management; Institutionalism; and 
Collaboration.  
Each of the three perspectives reviewed relates to a set of well-developed concepts which were 
summarised at the end of each section. Combining the insights from the three theoretical 
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perspectives informs the development of the operational framework for use in gathering and 
analysing the data to answer the research questions. Chapter Four will outline that framework. 
The literature reviewed recognised that complex problems require the attention of multiple 
organisations from different sectors and across different jurisdictions to define, legitimise, and 
resolve such problems in order to create public value. Furthermore, an increasing demand for 
public participation in public policy and decision-making together with increasing 
requirements for greater accountability and transparency, reinforces the decreasing dominance 
of the State in public administration and a shift towards a more collaborative approach to public 
management. Meanwhile, public service organisations remain responsible for the 
implementation of public policy and are accountable to citizens and citizen representatives for 
same. In addition, they now need to collaborate with public, private, and civil society actors to 
address the complex challenges they face. Consequently, public managers are required to 
convene, catalyse, and facilitate multi-actor collaboration in the interest of creating public 
value.  
The literature review indicated that collaboration is central to creating public value. It 
demonstrated that effective collaboration requires deliberation, mutual understanding, and 
capacity for joint action among the actors involved. Consequently, collaboration has clear 
implications for the norms and values public institutions embody. 
Research into public management confirms an emerging shift from traditional public 
administration to PVM due to the interconnected and interdependent nature of government 
activity which requires more collaborative effort in the pursuit of public value. Irish local 
government reform also indicates a trend towards public service organisations and citizens 
jointly creating public value through collaboration. In responding to the needs of citizens and 
their elected representatives, public managers need capacity for joint action which utilises new 
and existing procedural and institutional arrangements and resources. This research applies 
public value, institutionalist, and collaborative governance insights to the empirical setting in 
which the researcher is situated. PVM is the particular focus of this study as it encapsulates the 
type of network governance envisaged by the recent Irish public service reforms. Data from 
the case study is linked to public value theory in order to confirm or disprove the 
appropriateness of the PVM framework in the Irish local government context and identify 
modifications to the approach. The methodology chapter develops an operational framework 
to enable this exploration.  
64 
 
Chapter Three: Context  
3.1 Introduction  
From the emergence of towns in the Middle Ages, through the differing manifestations of local 
administration under British rule, to the reform trends of recent decades, local government in 
Ireland has continuously evolved, heralding changes to structures, roles and responsibilities. 
Local government reforms frequently reflected changes in philosophy or priorities at the 
national level; particularly in recent times, when the global move from government towards 
governance influenced developments in Ireland. This chapter therefore situates the evolution 
of local collaborative processes within the specific evolution of local government and local 
governance in Ireland and the broader context of general public sector reform. For the purposes 
of this study, local government refers to the structures and functions of local authorities, while 
local governance refers to the whole range of institutions and relationships involved in the 
process of governing. 
The chapter first examines the evolution of local government since the foundation of the State; 
including roles and functions, centralisation, and the influence of Europe. This is followed by 
an overview of the development of participative/collaborative structures and processes across 
the local governance landscape and a review of two recent waves of local government reform. 
The first of these comprises the Devlin Report (1969), the Barrington Report (1991) the 
Strategic Management Initiative (1994) and Better Local Government (1996). The second is 
associated with the local government modernisation programme 2012-2014. Thereafter, the 
structures and processes which emerged and evolved to promote collaboration such as the 
Strategic Policy Committees (SPC), the City and County Development Boards (CDB) and the 
Local Community Development Committees (LCDC) are reviewed. The chapter concludes by 
reviewing the main changes arising from the various reforms of local government; particularly 
how they impact on the evolution of local collaborative processes.    
3.2 The Evolution of Local Government 
The original basis for local government in Ireland was the Local Government (Ireland) Act, 
1898, which established the county as the principal administrative unit and an elected county 
council as the means of administering local government (Forde 2005; Quinn 2017). Despite 
the fact that local authorities were designated as the primary instruments of local administering, 
central government controls continue to persist (Finn 2017). 
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On achieving independence in 1922, Ireland largely retained the local government system 
which had been developed under British rule. Thus, a Ministry of Local Government was 
established in 1922, was reformulated as the Department of Local Government and Public 
Health in 1924,  and ultimately reverted to the Department of Local Government in 1947. Since 
the post-1922 Irish government largely adhered to the Westminster politico-administrative 
templates, local government systems, along with many other public services, continued to be 
delivered under the direction of nationally organised state agencies (Quinn 2015). Interestingly, 
the Irish Constitution of 1937 made no direct reference to local government. In addition, and 
until as recently as 1991, Irish local authorities were constrained by an ‘ultra-vires’ rule which 
limited them to perform only functions outlined in law. As a result, local authorities could not 
take any action which was not specifically authorised by law, or had the sanction and approval 
of the appropriate Minister. Barrington identified this lack of legislative authority as a major 
barrier to innovation which deterred local authorities from using their initiative to act in the 
interests of their local area (Barrington, 1991). 
By 1946, the machinery of government was very complex. Traditionally Irish rural policy was 
sectoral and was designed at a national level; primarily by state departments such as  
Agriculture and Fisheries (Cawley 2016). At local level, local authorities and a variety of local 
elected bodies including Vocational Education Committees and Committees of Agriculture, 
carried out the functions assigned to them by law and each had relationships with a variety of 
central government departments which involved limited collaboration. Health services were 
largely consolidated at county level within the local government system in 1947, giving the 
system a greater, if still constrained, role (Callanan 2018).  
The expanding economy of the 1950s and 1960s increased pressure on such services as housing 
and infrastructure. To combat this, national agencies and central government departments were 
given greater authority and a direct role in housing construction and roads which had formerly 
fallen under the remit of local authorities. This led to greater centralisation (Callanan 2018). 
However, in 1963 under the Local Government (Planning and Development) Act, all spatial 
and land-use planning were made mandatory functions of local government, while the Health 
Act, 1970 transferred responsibility for healthcare from local government to regional health 
boards (Callanan 2018).  
Ireland’s admission to the EU in 1973 implicated local government in limited engagement in 
another layer of policy and law-making, and “the impact of EU legislation can be felt in various 
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local government activities, and affects local authorities in their role as service providers; 
employers; property owners; monitoring, enforcing, and licensing bodies; and as promoters of 
the economic and social development of their area” (Callanan 2018:292).  
1978 saw the abolition of rates on domestic property in Ireland and rates on agricultural 
property ended in 1982: reforms which deprived local authorities of relatively important 
income streams. This period of relative limitation and reduction in mandate was followed by a 
quarter century of significant reforms. Greater formal recognition of local government emerged 
through the enshrining of subsidiarity in the Treaty on European Union in 1991 and the Local 
Government Act, 1991, gave local authorities the power of general competence, thereby 
removing previous legal constraints on local authority initiatives. Further, under the County 
Management Act 1940 (and earlier legislation applying to cities), the key role in policy 
formation and implementation was vested in the City/County Manager of the local authority; a 
role later denominated as ‘Chief Executive’ under the reforms of 2014. EU Structural and 
Cohesion Funds were a major source of funding for local authorities in the 1990s following 
Ireland’s designation as an Objective 1 disadvantaged region by the European Commission. 
While this enabled both large scale infrastructure development and smaller scale urban and 
village renewal (Callanan 2018), it also gave rise to a highly centralised approach to the 
management of EU funds and required devising National Development Plans which 
necessitated the establishment of regional structures to advise on regional and local capital 
needs to be addressed by those plans (Callanan 2018).  
In signing The European Charter of Local Self Government in 1997, the Irish Government 
committed to the following core basic principles: the right of citizens to participate in managing 
public affairs; and the rights of communities to enjoy autonomy and self-government, elect 
their local bodies, and to have their own structures and financial resources (Council of Europe 
Portal: A Charter for Local Democracy). An amendment to the Irish Constitution in 1999 
declared that  “the State recognises the role of local government in providing a forum for the 
democratic representation of local communities, in exercising and performing at local level 
powers and functions conferred by law and in promoting by its initiatives the interests of such 
communities” (Bunreacht na hEireann, Article 28A). The European Charter of Local Self 
Government was finally ratified by Ireland and given effect in 2002. 
67 
 
This brief outline demonstrates that while certain additional legal powers were given to local 
authorities, the functions delegated to the local authority were not significantly expanded.  
Central government still retained broad control and oversight of those functions.  
However, a legal framework to empower local authorities to play a greater role in responding 
to the needs of local communities did evolve.  
3.3 The Evolution of the Local Governance Landscape 
Prior to the 1970s, physical services such as roads, housing, and so on, were delivered by local 
authorities, while local community needs such as social inclusion were mainly met by the third 
sector. At that time local authorities had a limited remit relating to local enterprise which 
consisted of providing modest funding and other supports to enterprises which employed less 
than 10 people through a County Enterprise Board (Cawley, 2016). From the 1960s, 
partnerships and community groups emerged outside the local government system who were 
interested in reaching and targeting marginalised groups. The community and voluntary sector 
continued to respond to local economic and social needs during the economic recession of the 
1980s when the State was forced to reduce its services. They were seen to have the relevant 
expertise to assess and interpret, individual and local needs, and to develop and deliver 
innovative responses to those needs (Hasse and McKeown 2003). In addition, such partnerships 
were perceived to empower local people through closer engagement in developments which 
directly impinged on their social and economic welfare (Cawley 2016; Harvey 2015). 
Joining the European Economic Community in 1973 was a critical juncture, leading to major 
European influence on Irish politics and requiring the country to adapt to European norms and 
governance structures, practices, and procedures. Europeanisation reinforced the role of the 
various local development bodies which emerged in Ireland, giving legitimacy and recognition 
to non-governmental actors in local development.  
More formal partnership structures evolved at a national level in response to the recession of 
the 1980s, following which multiple three-year national partnership agreements ensued. Under 
its Programme for National Recovery, 1988-1990, the Irish government formed a national 
social partnership agreement to chart a way out of the recession which espoused a commitment 
to build a fair, inclusive society with improved public services. This strategy rested on a 
consensus approach with the social partners which enabled pay and taxation agreements, and 
ensuring that national social partnerships involving government, employers, trade unions, and 
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farming bodies, became a key element of the policy-making process. This spirit of partnership 
at national level facilitated greater collaboration at the local level and social partnerships 
continued to have implications for local government reform during the ‘Celtic Tiger’ boom of 
the 1990s. A variety of governance mechanisms were established by the State to enable the 
creation of localised responses to unemployment and other social issues; some embedded 
within local government, and others implemented by independent entities, many of which 
received EU funding. As Callanan explains, “the perceived success of social partnership at the 
national level meant that the Irish government decided it would be worthwhile to seek to 
replicate this success at local level” 2005:917).  
Many local development organisations had emerged to provide innovative solutions to local 
problems, promote social and economic inclusion, and combat inequality and relative poverty 
(Hasse and McKeown 2003). These were hailed by Europe for their innovation (Sabel, 1996) 
but were not formally integrated in decision-making structures. Hasse and McKeown requested 
a government statement underlining “their importance in influencing policy-making rather than 
being delivery agents alone” (2003: 38). Apart from some significant formal collaboration with 
local authorities in the sphere of social inclusion then, for many years, there were few formal 
mechanisms to link local government and local development (Quinn 2017).  
Joining the EU also gave Ireland access to European funding. Through the formal and informal 
processes which gave recognition and legitimacy to non-governmental actors in local 
development, Europeanisation reinforced the role of the various local development bodies 
which emerged in Ireland. The 1988 European Structural and Cohesion Funds Regulations 
required member countries to create partnership structures at the local level involving civil 
society. Quinn argues that “it was the EU’s regional development policy which embedded 
partnership as the default option at local level for the promotion of development and the 
delivery of some services” (2014: 41). The obligations of EU processes fostered 
professionalisation, efficiency, and effectiveness among those organisations, thereby 
increasing their impact on the Irish politico-administrative landscape. They also established 
links to local government actors throughout Europe. The Area Based Partnerships (ABPs), 
LEADER (Liaisons entre actions de developement de l’economie rurale) and City and County 
Enterprise Boards (CEBs), established by central government in the early 1990s, share a strong 
EU influence to address local economic and social development. The EU originally provided 
most of the financing for these organisations at local level in Ireland (Callanan 2018:302) using 
partnership models. The State gradually established formalised mechanisms external to, but 
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linked to, the local government system. These included the CDBs, RAPID (Revitalising Areas 
through Planning, Investment and Development), Sports Partnerships, and County and City 
Childcare Committees, established to promote co-operation and co-ordination amongst a range 
of social, cultural, and economic arenas. These mechanisms were independent entities but 
closely linked to the local authorities. Indeed, “Greater efforts to avoid duplication of effort 
and ensure coordination between local government and local development groups were initially 
facilitated through the CDB structure” (Callanan 2018:302).  
The Area Development Management (ADM) was originally formed by the Irish Government 
in agreement with the European Commission to manage an EU Grant for local development. 
From 1992, ADM was an intermediary company working on behalf of Government to support 
social and economic development within Ireland: it was re-named Pobal in 2005. By 2018 
Pobal provided management and support services to 25 programmes for four Government 
Departments, the EU and other bodies (Pobal, 2020). The extent of this partnership at the local 
level in Ireland was described as a “new form of governance in a manner and on a scale that is 
unique in Europe’ (Powell and Geoghegan 2006:137), while Sabel (1996) hailed community 
sector engagement in partnership governance as “democratic experimentalism”.  However, 
there was some dissension. The evolution of partnership companies delivering local services 
was perceived by local elected representatives as lacking democratic legitimacy and creating a 
democratic deficit (Cawley 2016). Elected representatives felt undermined by the development 
of partnerships and were often unaware of activities pursued in their local electoral areas by 
the Partnerships (Cawley 2016). They were also concerned that citizens would turn to 
community groups rather than political partners. The LEADER partnerships, which took over 
the economic remit of the area-based partnerships, enjoyed considerable independence from 
the local authorities (Cawley 2016) and were delivering services, enabling citizen/community 
participation and dispensing public money, functions associated elsewhere with local 
government. While the local authority executive were involved in LEADER Boards, elected 
representatives had no automatic right to be represented until 2001 (Cawley 2016). This 
generated some resentment from local government personnel and elected representatives as the 
partnership mechanisms were established outside the control of local government. As a result, 
collaboration between local public services and relevant actors became more institutionalised 
from the mid-1990s.  
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3.4 The Paths to Reform  
The 2014 reforms are the culmination of decades of incremental transformation. Review 
Groups relating to local government reorganisation and reform were appointed by governments 
in 1969 and 1990 respectively.  
The Minister for Finance in 1969 established the first, (and only whole of government reform 
process attempted in Ireland) group which published the Devlin Report (1969). The remit of 
the Devlin group was to examine and report on the organisation of the Departments of the State 
at the higher levels.  However, the Group advised that the higher levels could not be reformed 
in isolation and that government efficiency was tied to the structure, organisation and operation 
of the entire public service system. The Minister for the Environment established an Expert 
Advisory Committee in 1990 to advise a Cabinet Sub-Committee on local government 
reorganisation. This group was tasked to examine local government reorganisation and reform 
as it obtained to the then Government’s stated aim “to strengthen local democracy in Ireland 
and to devolve additional functions to local authorities where practical” (Barrington 1991). 
The reform discourse continued, and two other modernisation programmes relevant to this 
research ensued.  The Strategic Management Initiative, published by the Taoiseach in 1994, 
was influenced by international developments, particularly New Public Management, and 
focused on the internal structures, processes, and staffing of public service organisations. The 
Better Local Government, A Programme for Change programme was published by the Minister 
for the Environment in 1996 “to chart the course for local government into the new 
millennium” (BLG 1996). These four reports framed the reform of local government. Their 
impact, as it relates to local government and local governance respectively, is therefore 
presented in the following sections.  
3.4.1 First Wave of Reform: Reform of Local Government 
The Devlin Report (1969) made reference to the power and persistence of central government 
and found that the Irish system of government remained under more central control than its 
European counterparts, stating that “a substantial degree of central control still exists, which 
results in delay and duplication, frustration of initiative and complication in long-range 
planning” (Devlin Report 1969: 273). In light of this, the group recommended a fundamental 
restructuring and reorganisation of the public services to delegate day-to-day executive 
functions to local government and thereby free central government to concentrate on their 
policy-making function. It recommended that local authorities be required to devise 
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Departmental Planning Forecasts to be incorporated in their own local plan for the services 
concerned and that associated expenditure should be managed within regional and national 
priorities. It further suggested that the role of the Department should change from one of control 
to the provision of technical advice.  
Regarding the powers of local government, the Barrington Report (1991) recommended 
“statutory recognition of local authorities as local democratic fora and of their general 
representational role” (1991:17) and that local government be given constitutional recognition. 
The group further recommended a major programme devolving functions to local government,  
an easing of central government controls on local authorities, and advocated for an increased 
role for councillors in policy determination.  
The Strategic Management Initiative (SMI 1994) introduced reform in the area of public 
service management; focusing on the provision of quality and effectively delivered services 
and introducing private sector criteria into the public service. At central government level it 
led to the reform of the civil service and the health sector. In 1996, as part of the wider change 
programme driven by SMI, local authorities were asked to develop Strategy Statements 
(Corporate Plans) setting out their goals and objectives. This mirrored the strategic approach 
being adopted by government and conformed to the Operational Strategy produced by the 
Department of Environment and Local Government. This, in turn, published Better Local 
Government which introduced a major programme of reform which rested on the four 
principles of: 
 enhancing local democracy and widening participation   
 serving the customer better  
 developing efficiency in local government  
 providing proper resources (BLG, 1996) 
The document cautioned that changes were required to ensure both elected representatives and 
senior management could give sufficient attention to future planning. It found that day-to-day 
pressures arising from the wide range of essential public services for which they are responsible 
could divert councillors and senior management from the broader, longer-term strategic and 
policy issues and structural changes required to address this issue. In September 1997, 
Guidelines for the Establishment and Operation of SPCs concluded that the policy role 
envisaged for elected representatives (Devlin 1969; Barrington 1991) had not been fully 
realised due to the absence of appropriate systems to support them in their part-time capacity. 
It identified  “curtailment of the policy-making role of elected representatives and over-reliance 
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on non-elected officials in this area, and dependence on central government for funding” as 
weaknesses of the Irish system of local government (Forde 2005:139). Better Local 
Government (1996) therefore recommended the insertion of a new management tier within 
local government with clear responsibility for the adoption of a more strategic approach to the 
delivery of local authority programmes and ‘New Director of Services’ positions were duly 
created in local authorities. Unusually, many of the initial Directors for Community and 
Enterprise were recruited from outside local authorities, bringing new expertise to the 
organisations. At present, each Director is responsible for a specific function, such as housing, 
and/or an area-based responsibility. Since the City/County Manager effectively delegates these 
responsibilities to a management team of Directors, the role of council officials has been 
strengthened. 
Uniquely, the Department of An Taoiseach established a Devolution Commission in 1995. In 
its two ensuing reports (1996 and 1997) it identified functions which could be devolved to local 
government such as tourism and economic development. Paragraph 13 of the latter report also 
set out clear recommendations for devolution of functions; but again they were not 
implemented. A report from the Local Government Reorganisation Commission (established 
by the Local Government Act, 1994) also urged changes in town governance but its terms of 
reference precluded it from making actual recommendations of fundamental rationalisation or 
changes with financial implications. The Reports of the Constitutional Review Group (1996 
and 1997) which also advocated a wider role for local government, did not result in any 
changes.  
Local government finances were also reformed. The Local Government (Financial Provisions) 
Act, 1997, enshrined the revised financing system proposed in Better Local Government. It 
assigned the proceeds of motor tax to local authorities and introduced equalisation measures 
between councils. A Local Government Fund (LGF) was introduced in 1999, combining an 
Exchequer contribution and the net proceeds of motor tax. Significantly, the Exchequer 
contribution was ring-fenced and index-linked, and was required to fund any new tasks 
assigned to local government.  
The Local Government Act, 2001 provided for new committee structures and changes to the 
role of the local council. While policy framework and budget remained functions of the elected 
council, the policy support role and policy implementation was vested in the city and county 
mangers under this statute. The Local Government Act, 2001, also tasked the County/City 
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Mangers (now Chief Executives) with the duty to advise and assist the council when exercising 
their reserved functions. In practice, therefore, the executive and elected members now work 
together to discharge their respective functions; each relying on the experience and expertise 
of the other.  
This Act consolidated much of the diverse legislation which applied to local government, 
specifying the functions of councils, clarifying the executive-council relationship, and 
strengthening the policy role of councillor. 
In relation to the services and functions for which the local authority does hold responsibility, 
concerns had been raised throughout the public service reviews regarding the need to balance 
the time of elected representatives spent between their representational and policy-making 
roles. Given the historical backdrop of local authorities constrained by the ultra-vires rule, it is 
hardly surprising that more time was spent responding to the individual operational issues 
raised by their constituents and communities. While the power of general competence given to 
local authorities in 1991 to act in the interest of local communities should have helped to change 
the mindset and focus of elected representative, legislative changes alone are not always 
enough to achieve desired outcomes. 
In 2008 the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) analysed the 
array of public service reforms conducted in Ireland since the mid-1990s. It found that “the 
focus of the reform efforts to date in Ireland has tended, with some exceptions, to be inward 
oriented, focussing on improving internal processes and structures...the Irish Public Service 
now needs to become more outward focused by better integrating and utilising the systems and 
processes it has developed, so that it is best placed to more effectively contribute, alongside 
the broader society (citizens, business, unions and other actors), to the identification and 
attainment of overall societal goals” (OECD 2008: 11-12). 
The first wave of reform was interrupted by the 2008 -2014 recession which imposed decreased 
staffing levels in local authorities: 24.2% nationally between 2008 and 2013. The Local 
Government Efficiency Review Group (LGERG) made 106 recommendations designed to 
reduce costs, achieve efficiency, and enhance value for money in service delivery at the local 
level. Despite the introduction of a local property tax in 2013 following the financial crisis, the 
discretionary budget available to local authorities remains limited as much of the income is 
earmarked to resource the delivery of statutory services. During the same period, European 
funding programmes required the community and voluntary sector to undertake more extensive 
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administration and evaluation of its local development projects which further impacted their 
capacity. 
3.4.2 First Wave of Reform: Local Governance Focused Reform 
To reiterate: this study makes a distinction between governance and government due to the 
former’s capacity to cover the whole range of institutions and relationships involved in the 
process of governing. Many of the local government reforms implemented in Ireland promoted 
a governance approach. Both the Devlin (1969) and Barrington (1991) reports recommended 
broadening the scope of local government beyond its role as democratically-elected 
representation, to enable it to lead the coordination of all aspects of development in local areas. 
The proximity of local authorities to citizens was identified as a key strength as it positioned 
them to appreciate the needs and priorities of their local areas, making them a suitable conduit 
for participation. The Devlin Report (1969) recommended that services should be co-ordinated 
locally to enable complex problems to be dealt with in an integrated way. The potential for 
local authorities to become development agencies, as well as democratically-elected bodies, 
was also underscored with a view to developing new local projects and services, including 
entering into joint ventures with private sector bodies and community groups. The Barrington 
Report (1991) identified the need for structured arrangements to facilitate contact between local 
authorities and community groups in order to “tap into latent community potential where the 
combination of such groups with the local authority can often achieve results which are beyond 
the individual reach of either” (1991:42). It also highlighted the need for much greater public 
participation in the administration of public services: sentiments which were later echoed in 
reports from both the Devolution Commission (1996 and 1997) and the Constitutional Review 
Group. In fact, the Devolution Commission recommended alignment of local government and 
local development entities and co-ordination between agencies at local level and advocated for 
the creation of participation opportunities at local government level. A report from the Local 
Government Reorganisation Commission, as well as urging changes in town governance, 
proposed structured partnership between local councils and their communities.  
The modernisation programme outlined in Better Local Government (1996) recommended an 
integrated local government and local development system which would strengthen the local 
government system, whilst building on the lessons learned from the local development 
innovations described below. Focusing on the local institutional landscape, Better Local 
Government found that local authorities tended to be bypassed and offered few opportunities 
for participation. A reformed system to facilitate strategic interaction between elected 
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representatives, civil society, and local authority officials, would therefore require local 
authorities to embrace concepts of partnership and participation with the many external bodies 
which had emerged and whose role will be discussed below. Better Local Government also 
sought to enhance local democracy by ensuring that local communities and their 
representatives had a say in the provision of local services by strengthening the role of elected 
members and institutionalising enhanced representative and participatory forms of democracy.  
 
As described earlier, collaboration between local public services and relevant actors became 
increasingly institutionalised from the mid-1990s. Of particular significance were the County 
Strategy Groups, County and City Development Boards (CDBs), and Strategic Policy 
Committees (SPCs) created in 2000 on a statutory basis. The SPCs were intended to give 
elected representatives and civil society a greater role in policy-making, with committees fully 
embedded in the local authority.  
Two-thirds of the membership of each SPC therefore comprises elected members, with the 
remaining one-third consisting of ‘sectoral interests’ involving representatives of social 
partners, community and voluntary groups, and other relevant interests at local level. CDBs 
were designed to increase local coordination and integration of public services and local 
development, and to broaden the local authority sphere. The CDBs brought together 
representatives from local government, local development, social partners, and state agencies, 
and were thus regarded as the primary interface between local government and the local and 
community development sector.  
The multiplicity of community groups and local development bodies were eventually grouped 
into community and voluntary fora which then nominated community representatives for the 
various mechanisms including the CDBs, SPCs, Childcare Committees, and Sports 
Partnerships. The guidelines for operating such fora were devised by an Interdepartmental Task 
Force on the Integration of local government and local development systems and set out in its 
1998 report. The traditional social partners, trade unions, and business and farming 
organisations, were nominated directly to these organisations by their national bodies. 
The Local Government Act, 2001, enshrined many of the new structures and processes outlined 
in Better Local Government. Area committees were introduced and the SPCs given statutory 
recognition. It reinforced the policy-making role of elected representatives and also their 
supervisory powers over local authority managers. Better Local Government also expanded the 
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responsibility of local government to include ‘any matter of local interest’. In fact, Section 66.3 
specified that “[a] local authority may take such measures, engage in such activities or do such 
things in accordance with the law (including the incurring of expenditure) as it considers 
necessary or desirable to promote the interests of the local community”. The reform trajectory 
continued and the Green Paper on Local Government Reform, 2008, advocated strengthening 
local democratic leadership, fostering participative democracy, and further improving service 
delivery. However, electoral change meant its recommendations were not implemented. 
3.4.3 A Second Wave of Reform 
A second wave of local government reform commenced in 2011 following Government 
publication of a comprehensive Public Service Reform Plan outlining key commitments and 
actions for change across the public service. 2012 saw a new approach to local governance 
emerge with a blueprint for local government reform, Putting People First, which proposed 
“the most fundamental set of changes in local government in the history of the State” 
(Department of the Environment, Community and Local Government, 2012:i).  
Putting People First listed numerous recommendations for the reorganisation of local 
government structures, including formal integration of the community and voluntary sector 
with local authorities (Department of the Environment, Community and Local Government, 
2012). Putting People First envisioned local government as “the main vehicle of governance 
and public service at local level- leading economic, social and community development, 
delivering efficient and good value services, and representing citizens and local communities 
effectively and accountability” (Department of the Environment, Community and Local 
Government, 2012:1). The reform sought to maximise the democratic legitimacy of elected 
councils as a focus for consultation and participation. In so doing, it would enhance the links 
between local government and local public services in keeping with its democratic mandate to 
effectively represent the interests of the community and seek to realise the vision of local 
government as a primary vehicle of governance and public service at local level. This approach 
was welcomed by the OECD in 2013, who concurred that Ireland saw less networking at the 
local government level than their European counterparts. After much debate, the provisions of 
the White Paper were enacted. 
The Local Government Reform Act, 2014, provided for a major restructuring of local 
government. It rationalised the number of local authorities with mergers of local authorities in 
Limerick, Waterford and Tipperary, and dissolved town councils to make provision for 
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Municipal Districts covering rural and urban areas. It replaced the position of County/City 
Manager with Chief Executive and allowed for a process potentially leading to directly elected 
mayors. The Act also strengthened the role given to local government under Section 66.3 of 
the Local Government Act, 2001, as a forum for the democratic representation of the local 
community, by establishing local authorities as leaders in economic, social, and community 
development in their areas. Section 36 of the Act obliged each local authority to establish a 
Local Community Development Committee (LCDC), for the purposes of developing, co-
ordinating, and implementing a coherent and integrated approach to local and community 
development. Former City and County Development Boards were therefore dissolved. It 
further provided for an increased role for local authorities in economic development and 
enterprise support and led to the creation of SPCs for economic development and enterprise in 
local authorities. 
The 2014 establishment of the LCDCs institutionalised collaboration by bringing together local 
authority elected representatives and officials, state agencies, and those working with local 
development and community organisations.  
While local development companies may become members of the LCDC, they also exist as 
implementing bodies for local and community development in their own right. Local 
development companies have significant local development expertise in their areas which 
makes important contributions to the LCDC process. Local development companies have a 
history of successfully competing for LEADER funding and in some counties (but not those 
studied in this research) continue to be local action groups (LAGs) bidding for European 
Funding. Thus, situations arise where LCDCs acting as a local action group essentially compete 
against local development companies for European funding. Indeed, negotiating the structures 
and relationships so as to avoid having two different strategies for local and community 
development at the local level, while at the same time ensuring that the LCDC would not take 
over the role of the local development companies, but embrace them from a partnership 
perspective, is a delicate balancing act. The 2019 review of LCDCs by the Department of Rural 
and Community Development recognised this complexity. 
3.5 The Structures Which Emerged  
As previously outlined, previous government reform documents had advocated an increased 
role for elected representatives in policy determination, and for both elected representatives 
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and the executive in policy-making and future planning. They also identified the need for 
structured arrangements to facilitate interaction between local authorities and community 
groups. New SPC structures embedded in the local authority in 1999 were intended to afford 
elected representatives and civil society a greater role in policymaking. Additional supports 
had also been instantiated by the local authority in the form of a formal strategic planning 
process leading to the preparation of Corporate Plans. A new management tier was created 
comprising the new position of Directors of Services. To support the integration process, 
community and voluntary fora were established to streamline community and voluntary sector 
nominations to participate in the SPCs. The community and voluntary fora were replaced in 
2014 by Public Participation Networks (PPN). 
Cumulatively, the reforms identified and designated local authorities as the recognised conduit 
for participation, partly due to their ‘county’ structure and proximity to citizens, and partly 
because they now had the power/general competence to act as leaders for the good of the 
community. Better Local Government (1996) had emphasised that the local authority 
institutional landscape tended to be bypassed and recommended an integrated local government 
and local development system.  
The CDBs were established as a partnership between the local state and civil society, outside 
the local authority system but chaired by elected representatives. The SPCs directly involve 
governmental, sectoral, and community interests in local government. These new structures 
facilitated both representative and participative forms of democracy (Callanan and Keogan 
2003). SPCs and CDBs were the first formal mechanisms through which the community and 
voluntary sector could participate as full partners in strategic planning at the local authority 
level, although their influence was limited since all committees and boards were chaired by 
elected politicians and the community and voluntary sector were in a minority (Quinn 2012: 
107). LCDCs were established within local authorities in 2014 “to bring a more strategic 
joined-up approach to local development and community development in their respective 
areas” (Department of Rural and Community Development, 2019:3). Following the dissolution 
of CDBs in 2014, the economic role of CDBs was transferred to the SPC for economic 
development and enterprise, and their community role to the LCDC. The emergent structures, 
SPCs, CDBs and LCDCs, are now considered in turn. The CDBs that were established in 2000 
are not part of this empirical study as they were dissolved in 2014, but they are considered here 
because they were an important precursor to the LCDCs. 
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3.5.1 Strategic Policy Committees 
Origin and Motivation 
Strategic Policy Committees (SPCs) were first established in 1999, and were the first local 
authority committee to include statutory participation by other sectors: until that time, all local 
authority committees were solely comprised of elected representatives.  
The SPCs were given a statutory basis in the Local Government Act, 2001, to advise and assist 
the elected council in the formulation, development, monitoring, and review of policy 
reflecting the major functions or services of a local authority. This role was expanded in 2014 
to include making suggestions regarding the content of service delivery plans, performance 
standards, targets and indicators of services, relevant to the remit of the individual SPCs. Once 
policies are adopted, the role of the SPC extends to monitoring, reviewing, and evaluating the 
implementation of policy (Callanan 2018). SPCs are not concerned with individual 
representational or operational issues, and operational issues are discussed at separate local 
authority area committees.  
It is important to note that there were no regulations governing SPCs. However, succinct 
guidelines for their establishment and operation were issued by the Department of the 
Environment and Local Government in 1997, offering general advice and guidance on the roles 
and configuration of SPCs. These were further expanded in 1999, and a further set of guidelines 
issued in 2014. 
A Review of the Operation of Strategic Policy Committees, carried out in 2004 by the Institute 
of Public Administration (IPA), concluded that, despite problems identified, the SPC process 
does offer local elected representatives and sectoral interests an opportunity to engage in policy 
development to a greater extent than had been the case prior to Better Local Government (IPA 
2004). While Callanan maintains that “the institutionalized form of participation represented 
by SPCs lends itself to a socialization effect” (2005: 927), Boyle et al. (2003) found the 
effectiveness of SPCs varies between local authorities. 
 
Institutional Location 
The SPCs were devised as policy-focused committees within the local authority; comprising 
elected representatives and sectoral interests, and reflecting the various local authority 
programmes such as Transportation, Housing, Environment, and Planning. The Chair of each 
SPC is an elected representative and two-thirds of the membership comprises elected 
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representatives. While SPCs are not decision-making bodies, a function which remains with 
the elected council, one aim of SPCs is to strengthen the role of the elected representatives in 
the development of policy: which was also a key aim of the local government modernisation 
programme. The SPC system also offers an opportunity for deeper involvement of elected 
representatives in the corporate governance of the local authority.  
In adhering to core principles of Better Local Government to enhance local democracy and 
widen community participation in local authorities, SPCs aimed to facilitate strategic 
interaction between elected representatives, civil society, and local authority officials 
(Government of Ireland, 1996). The structure of SPCs institutionalised a more participatory 
culture between elected representatives and the sectoral interests, with one-third of the places 
on the committees reserved for sectoral interests made up of social partners (business, trade 
union, and farming sectors) and community representatives nominated through the local 
community and voluntary forum (now the Public Participation Network). Furthermore, the 
involvement of sectoral and community representatives was intended to foster a higher degree 
of community relevance and local participation drawing on the expertise of the various sectors 
and broaden participation through the direct involvement of sectoral interests.  
The Local Government Act, 2001 also provided for the establishment of a Corporate Policy 
Group (CPG) in each local authority to link and co-ordinate the work of the different SPCs. 
The CPG consists of the chairperson of each SPC, is chaired by the Cathaoirleach of the 
council, and supported by the County/City Manager. The Chief Executive is required to consult 
the CPG when preparing the corporate plan of the local authority and the draft budget.  
 
Putting People First listed recommendations for enhancement, suggesting the “need for SPCs 
to be proactive in setting the policy agenda for the authority, and for the chairs to be inclusive 
in communicating with the members of the Committee as regards decisions on policy issues 
by the Council” (Department of the Environment, Community and Local Government, 
2012:135).  It also advised that SPCs “perform a monitoring/oversight role in relation to the 
implementation of policy with Directors of Service being accountable to the relevant SPC in 
respect of their programme areas” (ibid.). While neither the subsequent Act nor the guidelines 
issued in Circular LG 07/2014 make this explicit, the role of CPGs has been expanded to 
monitor the SPC work programmes as recommended in Putting People First (Department of 
the Environment, Community and Local Government, 2012) and articulated in that circular.  
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Support for SPCs 
The work of SPCs was initially supported by a local authority Director of Service for the related 
service area and by other members of the local authority executive. The IPA Review (2004) 
concluded that local authorities should further develop the policy support role within individual 
sections of the local authority and increase their research capacity to prepare policy papers and 
research policy options, in order to give greater focus to the SPC discussions. It further 
recommended that research undertaken for SPCs should be presented in a short, clear, 
comprehensible format. While Circular 07/2014 suggests that local authorities “should 
develop as practicable as possible the policy support role for SPCs. This could include making 
greater use of the research capacity within local authorities”, specialised staff or additional 
capacity to support the SPCs was not provided as advised. 
SPCs are only required to meet a minimum of four times a year. The IPA recommended that 
SPC meetings should be conducted in a much less rigid and formal way than full council 
meetings, in order to create an informal and collaborative atmosphere that would allow honest 
views and opinions on policy issues (IPA 2004). This recommendation has been incorporated 
in the 2014 guidelines for SPCs but no follow-up action is yet evident. 
Review 
The conclusions of the IPA Review (2004) centred around the role of key actors in the SPC 
process which it argued was important in the context of their commitment to the process and 
whether they receive adequate support to fulfil a policy development role (IPA 2004). For 
example, the IPA Review (2004) made the following statements in relation to the various 
actors:  
 County/City managers: is the corporate agenda reflected in the work of the SPCs? 
 Directors of service and their staff: the role needs further development in the area of 
policy development and research.  
 Central government departments: central government priorities should be adaptable to 
local circumstances. 
 SPC members themselves: must treat them seriously, demonstrate a commitment to 
engage in policy matters, and take ‘ownership’ of issues. 
Better Local Government had hoped that the strengthened policy role which the SPC system 
conferred on councillors would afford more meaningful dialogue with central government. 
However, the structured arrangements which were to be put in place between the chairpersons 
of SPCs and senior officials of the Department of the Environment never materialised. Thus, 
the community-related role of SPCs remains vague. Indeed, the government’s Strategy to 
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Support the Community and Voluntary Sector in Ireland 2019-2024 (prepared by the 
Department of Rural and Community Development, and supported by the Cross Sectoral Group 
on Local and Community Development) makes only one passing reference to SPCs. 
 
The SPC system has now been in place for 20 years. Both Boyle et al. (2003) and Callanan 
(2005) commented on the potential for the SPCs and on the variations in implementation 
between local authorities.  
While the documentation and discussions leading to the 2014 reforms supported strengthening 
and clarifying the role of the SPCs, few specific changes were made. However, Circular LG 
07/2014, expressly states that SPCs “have a major role in assisting and advising the council in 
relation to functions of a strategic statutory nature’ as well as having ‘a function in other, non-
statutory policy fields”. One innovation of the 2012-2014 reform process therefore, was the 
obligation on local authorities to create SPCs dedicated to economic development.  
3.5.2 Economic Development SPCs 
The Local Government Reform Act, 2014, legislates “to provide for an increased role for local 
authorities in economic development and enterprise support”. The Act dissolved County and 
City Development Boards and transferred responsibility for the economic functions of CDBs 
to local authorities. This addressed an issue raised in the 2008 Indecon study of CDBs which 
demonstrated that while the CDBs had made some progress, particularly in the area of social 
inclusion, they had  been less effective on other fronts, such as economic development.  
The analysis and conclusions in the report on Promoting Economic Recovery and Employment 
(National Economic and Social Council 2012) were taken into account when formulating 
proposals regarding the role of local government in economic development. That report had 
concluded that the economic crisis had highlighted the important role of local authorities in 
assisting enterprise to identify and exploit business opportunities. Putting People First also 
recognised the potential for local government to help promote local economic development, 
enterprise, and job-creation, and acknowledged a strong rationale for increased local 
government involvement in economic development in that it “has unique characteristics, and a 
strategic position that make it well placed to lead economic development” (Department of the 
Environment, Community and Local Government, 2012:24). It further pointed out the close 
engagement between local authorities and businesses best positioned them to identify economic 
potential and to market their area for tourism, investment, and enterprise. 
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The reform programme sought to ensure local government became the main vehicle of 
governance and public service at local level, including leading economic development and 
representing citizens and local communities effectively and accountably (PPF 2012). The 
Economic Development SPC was therefore assigned to consider matters connected with the 
formulation, development, implementation, monitoring, and review of policy in relation to 
economic development. The SPC was also tasked to prepare the economic elements of a Local 
Economic and Community Plan for the LCDC. It was envisaged that this new structure would 
improve alignment between the economic programmes and enterprise supports in the local 
development sector and other local authority economic and enterprise programmes; thereby 
bringing greater coherence to the efforts of both sectors in this area. This would entail 
coordinating and targeting the substantial economic and enterprise supports under the local and 
community development programmes, with an emphasis on, and delivering, complementary 
programmes as part of the overall local government/local development alignment process. 
Particular reference was made in Putting People First to the mergers being implemented at that 
time in Limerick, Tipperary, and Waterford.  It argued that “strengthening the capacity of local 
government to promote economic and social development is a key objective in proposals for 
local authority unification” (Department of the Environment, Community and Local 
Government, 2012:27). The Limerick Reorganisation Implementation Group (2012) had 
prioritised the issue of economic revitalisation of Limerick City, including the commissioning, 
in conjunction with Limerick City and County Councils, of an Economic Development and 
Spatial Plan to identify ways to galvanize economic activity and related investment and 
employment in the city. This group had given consideration to the general role of the unified 
local authority in promoting economic development as Putting People First (Department of 
the Environment, Community and Local Government, 2012) suggested that the type of 
approach being developed in Limerick could serve as a template for other local authorities.  
Membership of the Economic Development SPCs was intended to mirror membership of the 
other SPCs. Indeed, Putting People First advocated that the Economic Development SPC 
membership “focused particularly on agencies with a strong economic role” (Department of 
the Environment, Community and Local Government, 2012:28). The Public Participation 
Network would nominate the community and voluntary members to the economic development 




Putting People First (Department of the Environment, Community and Local Government, 
2012) proposed the creation of a dedicated Director of Services post for Enterprise and 
Economic Development in local authorities containing National Spatial Strategy gateways and 
hubs, and in merging local authorities. In other local authority areas the function would be 
combined with another relevant directorate (such as spatial planning and/or local and 
community development). The post was given a strong remit, bringing together the economic 
development agencies and ensuring that key urban centres are competitive in attracting 
investment. The enterprise development remits of the local development companies (including 
LEADER) were to be aligned with the functions of the local authority to avoid confusion and 
duplication.  
While traditional SPCs were supported by local authority staff from the relevant functional 
area, the Economic Development SPC would additionally be supported by staff with adequate 
knowledge, skill, and training available from the establishment of the Local Enterprise Offices 
(LEO) with the incorporation of the former Community and Enterprise Boards and Business 
Support Units into the local authorities. 
3.5.3 County and City Development Boards 
Origin and Motivation 
Both Better Local Government (1996) and the developments arising from it, can be seen as 
representing a critical juncture in local government/governance in Ireland; encouraging the 
local government system away from a more narrowly service-oriented outlook into a more 
central role as a facilitator and co-ordinator of local governance (McInerney 2009). In short, 
Better Local Government (1996) underlined the need for greater integration, simplification and 
reorganisation, and the development of more structured relations between the local government 
and local development system. 
Community and Enterprise Groups were formed in 1996 following the publication of Better 
Local Government. Over a period of some 18 years they transitioned to County and City 
Development Boards in 2000, and finally to the LCDC in 2014, which became a collaborative 
mechanism embedded in the institution of the local authority. From a national perspective, 
extensive time and resources were committed at local and national level during this transition 
process; slowly building the trust and participation needed to steer these structures towards the 
integration of local government and local development (Interview 18 - elite interview).  
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Established in 1998, the Task Force on the Integration of Local Government and Local 
Development Systems produced a blueprint for the establishment of the County and City 
Development Boards. The 1998 Task Force, like Better Local Government before it, found that 
the local development process was disconnected from local government and likewise 
recommended that the complex multiplicity of public service organisations should be joined-
up to improve public services to citizens. In acknowledging the complexity of institutions, it 
cautioned that, however the new structures are configured, issues concerning institutional 
boundaries and relationships would doubtless remain.  
CDBs were established in 2000 by the Department of Housing, Planning and Local 
Government as a government response to the challenge of increased integration of public and 
local service delivery (Indecon 2008).  
Given statutory recognition in the Local Government Act, 2001, they were expected to ease the 
expanse of organisations that had emerged. The CDBs were comprised of local government, 
sectoral interests, and the local development sector. The community and voluntary sector, while 
continuing to function as independent entities, were also expected to collaborate with the local 
authorities in this multi-agency coordination structure.  
The aim of CDBs was to ensure an alignment of objectives between the organisations operating 
at the local level and joint evaluation of outcomes (Indecon 2008). In that regard they were to 
devise and work towards implementation of a 10-year strategy for economic, social, and 
cultural development for the county/city. The expectation was that this would bring about more 
co-ordinated delivery of local public services. The principles underlying strategy preparation 
included transparency and accountability in the process; participation and inclusion of a 
maximum number of groups; mutual respect by all the participants; decision-making based on 
consensus; responsibility and ownership of the process; and team-based working. 
Institutional Location  
It was envisaged that the creation of CDBs would afford local government a much stronger 
role in influencing and coordinating local development initiatives, and that local authorities 
would be centrally placed to lead and secure effective local policies and the delivery of local 
public services across agencies (Boyle et al 2003).  
Since the Boards comprised State, semi-State and non-State sectors, the community and 
voluntary sector could finally participate as full partners in strategic planning at local level. 
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The majority of members of the CDBs (normally 29 people) were drawn from State agencies 
and representatives of local government, including the elected representatives who chaired the 
Strategic Policy Committees, with 11 members drawn from social partners and the Local 
Development sector. They were chaired locally by an elected representative. 
Available Supports 
When the CDBs were first established, key supports were provided by the local authority and 
a Director of Community and Enterprise was initially recruited to support the network. 
Successful CDBs were characterised by the quality of executives, and those functioning most 
effectively boasted effective leadership (Indecon 2008). Along with internal recruitments, 
almost half of these posts were filled by open competition.  
CDBs had no direct executive powers and very limited financial and other resources (Indecon 
Report 2008). Lack of data and training were also recurring themes of that report, along with 
the fact that CDBs had no dedicated funding resource to encourage the leveraging of funds 
from other sources. Local authority executive respondents to that report maintained that the 
establishment of specialist board subcommittees would enhance the effectiveness of the CDBs, 
with over 90% of its respondents reporting that the establishment of special subcommittees on 
social inclusion improved their effectiveness. 
Review 
Two significant reports were published in relation to CDBs. The Report of the 
Interdepartmental Task Force on the Integration of Local Government and Local Development 
Systems (Department of Environment and Local Government 2002) was a comprehensive 
review and analysis of the Strategies for Economic, Social and Cultural Development produced 
by each of the 34 County/City development boards. The Indecon Report (2008) was 
commissioned by the Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local Government with 
the aim to strengthen and develop the CDBs and The Indecon Review of County/City 
Development Board Strategic Reviews and Proposals for Strengthening and Developing the 
Boards was published in 2008. 
The CDBs did draw up 10-year strategies for economic, social, and cultural development for 
the county/city and the 2002 Report indicated that the published strategies had been broadly 
adopted. The 2008 Report found that CDBs were effective in instances of goodwill and 
cooperation between the agencies; where objectives were defined, and work programmes clear. 
From a national perspective, one elite contributor to this research found the CDB to be the most 
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collaborative venture they were ever involved in with a dedicated team of five staff. Over a 
long and slow process, there was considerable buy-in to the final strategy from most of the 
participating sectors. However, they could not get national buy-in to some of the projects they 
wanted to progress and eventually resources were dispersed to other areas of the local authority 
(Interview 17 - elite interview). Similarly, the 2002 and 2008 Reports highlighted the extensive 
and varied range of goals and objectives in the strategies and questioned whether the volume 
of actions outlined was feasible.  
In that regard, the 2008 Report criticised the CDB structure for not devising a suitable 
framework to implement its strategies and joint evaluation of outcomes.  Initially there was no 
formal monitoring of the CDBs at national level by the Department of Housing, Planning and 
Local Government. The 2008 Report highlighted the need for national policy and central 
government commitment to, and oversight of, the CDBs. The Report advised that unless key 
decision-makers take account of the views and advice of the CDBs, the whole exercise would 
be of limited value. 
Part of the rationale for creating CDBs was the reported lack of links between local community 
development structures and local government structures (Department of Environment and 
Local Government 2002). This issue was raised again in 2008 with that review reporting that 
overall progress was limited to the CDB being a useful vehicle for local representatives of 
national agencies and community organisations to meet and exchange information and ideas. 
Some CDB partners were criticised for not properly engaging with the process, lack of real 
commitment, while some agencies bypassed the CDBs completely. The 2008 Report also noted 
that following the establishment of CDBs, a number of other new local initiatives had created 
their own new local structures creating the potential for even more overlap and duplication. 
Thus, the capacity of CDBs as an institutional solution to integration remained questionable 
due to commitment issues at local and central government level, and lack of resources and 
power. 
3.5.4 Local Community Development Committees 
Origin and Motivation 
Putting People First assessed that a level of coherence was brought to the local government 
sector by the CDBs (Department of the Environment, Community and Local Government, 
2012). However, an earlier review of the CDBs (Indecon 2008) and an elite interview 
contributor (Interview 17 - elite interview) identified a lack of commitment and engagement 
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by some of the agencies participating on the Boards. While the CDBs prepared the required 
strategies, their capacity as an institutional solution to integration remained an issue due to 
questionable commitment at local and central government level, as well as lack of resources 
and power. Putting People First identified there was still significant scope for a more joined-
up approach by the local government and local development sectors that could harness the 
mutual strengths and experiences of both sectors to provide more meaningful impacts for 
communities (Department of the Environment, Community and Local Government, 2012).  
 
Putting People First set out to strengthen the position for local authorities in local development, 
giving them greater implementation responsibility than was possible under the CDB structure 
(Department of the Environment, Community and Local Government, 2012). The Local 
Government Reform Act, 2014, gave legal effect to these proposals and provided for Local 
Community Development Committees (LCDC) in all local authority areas. Section 36 of the 
Act specifies the purpose of the LCDCs as “developing, co-ordinating and implementing a 
coherent and integrated approach to local and community development”. Specific statutory 
regulations, the Local Community Development Committee (Section 128E) Regulations, 2014, 
were also devised to provide a regulatory framework for the establishment and operation of the 
LCDCs. A set of revised guidelines for the operation of LCDCs was published in 2016.  LCDCs  
were given the role of preparing, implementing (or overseeing the implementation of), and 
reviewing the community elements of the six-year Local Economic and Community Plans 
(LECP) with the economic elements of the LECP developed by the SPC for economic 
development and enterprise, and implemented by local authorities.  
 
Institutional Location 
The first LCDCs were formed in January 2014 as local authority committees. Membership of 
the LCDC comprises both public and civil society members drawn from the local authority 
administrative area. There are a maximum of nine public sector members including elected 
representatives, local authority officials, and State agencies. A minimum of 10 civil society 
representatives for the LCDC are drawn from community and voluntary interests; social 
inclusion interests; environmental interests; local development and community development 
bodies; farming/agriculture interests; business/employer interests; trade union interests; and 
other relevant local and community interests.  Nominations from the community and voluntary 
sector come through the PPN. The chair of the LCDC is an unpaid position and selected by the 
LCDC members. As the LCDC is a decision-making committee, public sector interests cannot 
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exceed more than 49% of the voting rights; giving civil society/sectoral members a majority 
with increased power and importance.  
 
As previously mentioned, potential tensions between LCDCs and local action groups can arise. 
In Limerick City and County Council, for instance, it took a considerable time to bring the 
three local development companies in Limerick under the umbrella of the LCDC and to consent 
to forming a single Local Action Group for Limerick under the LCDC. The local development 
companies, having been very successful in their own partnerships, clearly found it difficult to 
trust or have confidence in the competence of the local authority in the area of local and 
community development. Conversely, local elected representatives were equally resistant to 
the establishment of LCDCs. After approximately two years of tough negotiation, a single 
Local Action Group for Limerick was finally agreed and is now a pivotal mechanism in 
Limerick’s development trajectory, channelling the experience and expertise of its members.  
 
Although the LCDC is independent of the local authority in the performance of its functions, 
the local authorities are required to manage the work of LCDCs generally. In terms of LEADER 
and SICAP (Social Inclusion and Community Activation Programme), the establishment of 
LCDCs transferred accountability for the delivery of the programmes from the local 
development companies to the local authority/LCDC. The local authority is the financial 
partner for LEADER and SICAP and signs the statutory contracts for local and community 
development funding with the successful applicants.  
 
Available supports 
The Department of Rural and Community Development resourced local authorities to provide 
dedicated staff support to the LCDC. Meetings are held monthly and the media are not invited 
to attend. There is also a national LCDC Support Unit within the Department of Rural and 
Community Development. In implementing its responsibility, Limerick City and County 
Council sought “to develop the role of the LCDC as a key structure to drive the agenda of local 
policy co-ordination and joined up action to benefit citizens and communities in Limerick” 
(LECP, Limerick City and County Council, 2016-2021:51). In fact, Limerick City and County 
Council appointed a dedicated social researcher to support the LCDC and an advisory 





A recent Review of Local Community Development Committees nationally confirmed that “all 
local authority areas now have representative, accountable and transparent governance and 
decision-making structures” (Department of Rural and Community Development, 2019:6).  
Nonetheless, the Review drew attention to a range of challenges for LCDCs which they 
presented under four themes: 
 
 Governance and Structure:  
for example, clarity on roles and functions, balancing strategic and operational 
priorities, and state agency participation and engagement including national inter-
agency and cross-government relationships 
 Strategic Effectiveness: 
for example, additional administrative and training supports, more time and greater 
collaboration to implement and evaluate LECP aims and objectives, and central 
government supports to foster a more strategic approach 
 Participation and Engagement:  
for example, gaps in membership and capacity of community and voluntary sector, 
opportunity to harness best practices in governance and management approaches in 
some LCDCs, and communication within and across LCDCs 
 Administrative Support and Development: 
for example, use of sub-committees, human and financial resources, and PPNs and 
resources to support engagement by PPN representatives 
The Review makes direct reference to continued Government commitment in Our Public 
Service-2020 citing, “LCDC structures as the primary vehicle for collaboration between all 
national public service providers at local level” and with both LCDCs and the LECP as 
providing “a governance, planning and evidence-based framework for the co-ordination and 
management of local funding including EU-supported community-led local development 
funding from 2020- 2027” (2019:11). 
3.6 Conclusion 
A shift towards governance at local and national level emerged in Ireland from the late 1980s. 
The National Social Partnership established in 1987 was a critical juncture that also inspired 
greater collaboration between social partners at the local level. Over time, and heavily 
influenced by the EU, central government instantiated mechanisms of collaboration at the local 
level which led to increased engagement between local partnerships and local government.  
However, certain actors felt they still lacked democratic legitimacy. Eventually, more formal 
links to the local government system emerged. 
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At local level, the governance shift was accompanied by managerial reforms which reflected 
the emerging influence of New Public Management. A new approach to corporate planning 
and performance management evolved in local authorities, together with a new management 
tier to support the evolving collaborative mechanisms. However, combining participatory 
impulses with managerial reforms proved challenging. 
There was also a parallel process of strengthening the role of elected representatives in the 
policy process on the one hand, and arguably diminishing their role due to the inclusion of non-
elected members on Strategic Policy Committees, on the other.  
Despite originating from the same source (Better Local Government and the then Department 
of the Environment), the SPCs and the CDBs were driven by entirely different institutional and 
operational logics.   
The second wave of reform assigned local government a greater role in leading local 
community and economic development, and also indicated that merging local authorities like 
Limerick, would act as leaders for the latter. The mechanisms that emerged in 2014 were 
established by two different government departments. As outlined, SPCs for economic 
development and enterprise were established by the Department of the Environment, Heritage 
and Local Government, while the LCDCs were established by the Department of Rural and 
Community Development, as committees of the local authority. However, once again, the 
LCDCs were predicated on very different institutional and operational rationales than both the 
SPCs and their immediate forerunner, the CDBs. As this study will show, these have had a 
direct impact on their respective ability to foster meaningful collaboration.  
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Chapter Four: Methodology 
4.1  Introduction 
This chapter presents and justifies the qualitative methodological approaches adopted for this 
study. Based on the findings of the literature review, it details the operational framework drawn 
from the literature on public value, collaboration, and institutionalism. It presents the research 
design and methodology employed for this study including the techniques and methods used 
for data collection and data analysis. It also elaborates upon the limitations and ethical 
considerations for the study.  
This qualitative study consists of a multiple-case study of three governance mechanisms 
established in a single local government setting and detailed semi-structured interviews with 
elected representatives, civil society, public and private citizens participating in these local 
mechanisms, plus elite interviews with three key informants of national policy-making. 
Section 4.2 presents the operational framework including the indicators and evidence of PVM 
together with indicative research questions for data collection.  
Section 4.3 elaborates on the philosophical assumptions and methodology, outlining the 
rationale for choosing a qualitative approach. It outlines the multiple case-study approach, the 
application of semi-structured interviewing, and the subsequent coding of collated data for 
analysis.  
Section 4.4 considers the limitations of a qualitative approach in terms of case-study 
generalisation and reliance on researcher interpretation which nonetheless afford deep and  
concentrated accounts of the cases studied, and the advantages of insider research which 
arguably outweigh any potential for bias.  
Section 4.5 concludes the chapter with summative remarks. 
4.2 The Operational Framework  
This section presents the key theoretical concepts which have emerged from the literature 
review to elaborate on a more detailed set of indicators for each of these concepts. Together 
these form an operational framework to guide the empirical research and help to frame the 
presentation and analysis of the findings. The public value framework guides the empirical 
research into Public Value Management in the local context. The three components of public 
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value, legitimacy and authorisation, and operational capacity are infused with elements from 
the literature on institutionalism and collaboration.  
Indicators are identified for each of the components together with likely forms of evidence for 
each indicator. Each of the three components are operationalised in this section.  
4.2.1 Public Value 
As set out in the literature review, the strategy for deciding public value outcomes is based on 
a collaboration of State and non-State actors who collectively frame the problem and deliberate 
about choices and alternatives. During the collaborative process the strategic aims are defined 
and the actors arrive at a consensus around preferred outcomes. As such, the following 
elements should be discernible:  
 common purpose: fostering a collaborative space that is focused on strategic 
outcomes 
 informed and empowered actors: participants are sufficiently informed and 
empowered to participate 
 improved deliberation: enabling competing perspectives to be properly aired and 
considered before decisions are made 
 
4.2.2 Legitimacy and Authorisation 
The strategy is supported by the authorising environment which public managers rely upon for 
approval and support in order to secure the finance and authority to deliver public value. 
Stronger relationships emerge from open engagement, persuasion, mutual understanding, and 
shared commitment to achieving the common purpose. Such relationships, particularly where 
public preferences are key, should enhance public trust in government. As such, the following 
elements should be discernible:  
 broad actor participation: involvement of a broad range of state and non-state 
stakeholders.  
 trust: confidence in the capability and behaviour of the committee and its participants. 
 decision-making and accountability: participants have the power to make decisions 
and are accountable for their actions 
 
4.2.3 Operational Capacity 
Public managers should respond to this strategic approach by scanning the authorising 
environment for opportunities to create public value and the necessary resources to deliver the 
desired public value outcomes. They should have the capability to establish, steer, facilitate, 
operate, and monitor the cross-sectoral multi-organisational arrangements from which actors 
are drawn. Indeed, the act of having a process of engagement with other stakeholders supported 
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by public managers, is in and of itself a determinant of public value. However, the shifting 
focus on collaboration over administration requires public managers to instil the value of the 
actual processes of political and social inter-action with citizens, users and stakeholders 
throughout the organisation. In order to do so, the following elements should be discernible :  
 leadership: influence, mobilise, and direct state and non-state actors to collectively 
create public value. 
 procedural facilitation: availability of resources and capability to facilitate 
collaboration. 
 
Table 1 presents the operational framework and summarises the indicative interview questions 
devised to elicit data in respect of the research questions:  
Research Question 1: Does the nature of local State-civil society/non-State collaboration 
indicate a shift towards a broader authorising environment within which public policy 
priorities are determined? 
Research Question 2: Has the local State enabled the appropriate operational capacity to 








Indicator Evidence Indicative Questions 
Public Value 
Outcomes 
1. Common purpose 
 
 Shared strategic intent Q. Would you say there is a shared understanding of the intended 
outcomes of the committee?  
Q. Do people on the committee know what the committee is 
expected to achieve? 
2. Informed and 
empowered actors 
 Well informed actors 
 Exchanging knowledge, insights and 
perspectives 
Q. What is your view on the flow of information within the 
committee and into your sector?  
Q. Is knowledge freely shared among the group? 
3. Dialogue and 
deliberation 
 Agenda setting 
 Dialogue and Deliberation 
Q. In your opinion is there good quality dialogue and deliberation 
within the committee? 
Legitimacy and 
Authorisations 
4. Broad actor 
participation 
 
 Citizen participation 
 Civil society participation 
 PSO participation 
 Availability of participants 
Q. Is the composition of the committee appropriate? 
 
5. Trust  Trust building Q. Do you have confidence in the committee? 
Q. Are you motivated through your involvement in the committee? 
6. Decision making 
and accountability 
 Decision making 
 Accountability 
 Transparency 







7. Leadership  Strategic Management 
 Motivation 
 Fostering collaboration 





 Internal resources 
 Training  
 External resources 
 Institutional design 
Q. In terms of the structures and processes around the operation of 
this committee, do they function well? 




4.3 Research Design 
This section explores and justifies the methodological approach used in this study. The 
philosophical assumptions underpinning this research in terms of the ontology and 
epistemology which inform the research paradigm are therefore rehearsed in detail.  
The study is situated within a social constructivist ontological paradigm and an interpretivist 
epistemology is used. Qualitative methods were deemed the most appropriate research 
approach to addressing the research questions. A multiple-case study was chosen as the most 
suitable research strategy for exploring local State – civil society/non-State collaboration in the 
governance mechanisms studied at the same site. Semi-structured interviews were identified as 
the most appropriate method of data collection to generate the rich data needed to fully address 
the research questions. The approach to data analysis and coding is described in the final 
section. 
The evolving approaches to and perceptions of public management over time encouraged 
researcher interest in the study of public management. Having been employed in the public 
service at senior management level for almost 25 years, the researcher’s personal experiences 
of public management have evolved over time, and bear witness to the changing perspectives 
and approaches of others in the field of public management (State and non-State).  
4.3.1 Ontology and Epistemology of the Study 
Ontology and epistemology are the assumptions which shape and determine an approach to 
enquiry. Ontology is concerned with what exists in reality. Bryman (2016) and Creswell and 
Poth (2018) concur that the nature of reality is that people (social actors) interpret their social 
roles in accordance with the meanings they give those roles, and interpret the social roles of 
others in accordance with their own individual set of meanings. It follows then, that different 
researchers embrace different realities, as do the individuals being studied and subsequent 
readers of the study. Therefore, it is the intention of the researcher to study individuals who are 
likely to present different perspectives and to capture and report the complexity of such views. 
Epistemology is a theory of knowledge that reflects our view of what can be known and how 
it can be known (Hay 2007). It is the intention of the researcher to get as close as possible to 
the participants being studied. Close access is possible since the researcher is situated within 
the sphere of public management and can derive subjective evidence from the State and non-
State actors who are the subject of the research questions.  
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Since the researcher aims to rely on their views as much as possible, the research questions 
have been designed to be broad and open-ended. Moreover, since individual views are 
informed through interaction with others, the researcher will seek to elicit views on the 
processes of interaction among individuals within the cases. This approach is consistent with 
the social constructivist paradigm.  
Consequently, the methodology for the study is located in the social constructivist paradigm 
which maintains that situations are not inevitable but rather based on jointly-constructed 
understandings created through social interaction and influenced by factors including culture 
and social context. This paradigm acknowledges the existence of an objective reality while also 
recognising the influence of both research participants and researcher on shaping the nature of 
knowledge through social interaction, accessing knowledge, and constructing/building on 
knowledge through interaction with others. This position aligns with the objectives of the 
research. 
Furthermore, the research is situated in a democratic society within which there is an increasing 
obligation on public managers to collaborate with stakeholders to solve complex problems. 
Such thinking underpinned reform of Ireland’s local government system: the arena for this 
research. In the process of collaboration there is an expectation that stakeholders will share 
information and challenge perspectives, and by so doing increase their knowledge and 
understanding of their social world. As the researcher is interested in investigating the efficacy 
of such collaboration in terms of creating public value, this empirical study will benefit from 
comprising a diverse range of stakeholders in the sphere of public management rather than a 
manager-centric approach. To this end, the study therefore adopts an interpretivist position 
which focuses on the understanding of the social world through an examination of that world 
by its participants, and through the researcher’s subsequent interpretation of participant 
perspectives (Bryman 2016). 
4.3.2 Qualitative Methods 
Qualitative research can be construed as a research method that usually emphasises words 
rather than quantification in the collection and analysis of data, and which prioritises the ways 
in which individuals interpret their social world. By contrast, quantitative research can be 
construed as a research method that emphasises quantification in the collection and analysis of 
data, that incorporates the practices and norms of the natural scientific model and embodying 
a view of social reality as an external, objective reality (Bryman, 2012:36).  
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The philosophical assumptions combined with the interpretive framework led the researcher to 
select qualitative research in order to derive detailed rich descriptions of the social settings 
being investigated and gain deeper insights into practices that would not be elicited through a 
quantitative approach. A quantitative approach was not undertaken in this study because of the 
researchers focus on depth and the need to draw out the in-depth views and meanings of 
interview participants, rather than the breadth and standardisation of data collection associated 
with quantitative research. The philosophical assumptions combined with the interpretive 
framework led the researcher to opt for qualitative research in order to elicit richly detailed 
descriptions of the social settings under investigation. Social constructivism focuses on an 
individual’s learning based on interactions in a group. It is also based on the belief that multiple 
interpretations can be made of any inquiry and hence lends itself to qualitative methods. 
The various approaches to qualitative research include Narrative which explores the life of an 
individual; Grounded Theory which develops a theory grounded in data from the field; and 
Phenomenology which examines the essence of the phenomenon (Cresswell and Poth 2018). 
This research will use a Case Study approach as recommended by Cresswell and Poth (2018) 
in instances when the inquirer has clearly identifiable cases with boundaries and seeks to 
provide an in-depth understanding of cases or a comparison of several cases. Furthermore, case 
studies privilege the viewpoint of the participants which also aligns with the ethos of this study.  
The study undertakes research on three case studies within a single site. The single site is 
justified by the insider access by the researcher to the study participants. The objective of the 
study is to obtain a rich understanding of the effectiveness of collaboration at the local level. 
In prioritising depth rather than breadth, the study will incorporate three small groups 
concerned with a specific aspect of public value/collaboration in the local authority context. It 
will also capture a rich account of the details of the public management within that 
collaboration.  
4.3.3 Case Selection 
This research problem will be examined using a multiple case study approach in a single site 
and point in time. This strategy is recommended by Creswell and Poth (2018) where the issue 
of concern is examined across a range of cases to elicit differing perspectives of an issue.  Cases 
may therefore have contrasting features or be selected based on similarity rather than 
difference. In addition, they argue that a comparison of multiple cases allows the distinctive 
and common features of cases to be drawn out. 
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The cases selected to study the potential to create public value are three publicly mandated 
governance networks established under two separate waves of local governance reform in 
Ireland as described in the context chapter. Strategic Policy Committees (SPCs) were 
established by the Department of Housing, Local Government and Heritage in 2000 under the 
first wave of reform. The uniqueness of the SPCs at that time was that they were fully 
embedded committees of the local authority that gave elected representatives and civil society 
a greater role in policy making. The 2014 reform wave continued the SPC format but obliged 
local authorities to create Economic Development SPCs. A Local Community Development 
Committee (LCDC) was established in each local authority by the Department of Rural and 
Community Development in 2014 under the second wave of reform which institutionalised 
collaboration between state and non-state/civil society actors. The LCDC was unique because 
of its democratic deliberation purpose, with LCDCs being given decision making autonomy 
for local community development funding. Despite the different subject matter dealt with by 
these committees, the overall aim of these collaborative governance mechanisms is to mobilise 
the resources of a broad range of actors, enhancing the legitimacy of local government and 
jointly creating public value through collaboration. The two types of committee are embedded 
in the same local authority giving the researcher, who was formerly an employee of that local 
authority, access to the participants of these committees who agreed to participate, and enabling 
the researcher to observe any variations in collaboration at this single site. The case selection 
method does not ensure that the sample of cases is fully representative of what happens in the 
research domain and it does not allow for statistical generalization of the results (Yin 2018). 
However, it does allow for exploration of PVM, the shift towards a broader authorising 
environment within which public priorities are determined and the operational capacity for 
collaboration, which is the aim of the empirical study. Each case provided a unique arena for 
studying PVM combined with collaborative governance and institutionalism. The research was 
designed to enable the in-depth study of distinctive local contexts, combined with a capacity 
for comparison between cases in relation to specific variables. 
The SPCs selected for the research were the Travel and Transportation Strategic Policy 
Committee (SPC) and the SPC for Economic Development, Enterprise and Planning. The 
Travel and Transport SPC was selected because it is an existing well-established mechanism 
of collaboration in local authorities. The first SPCs were created to provide an opportunity for 
an early and in-depth input into the local authority’s policy development process and to 
consider matters connected with the formulation, development, monitoring, and review of 
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policy and to advise the authority accordingly. A Travel and Transport SPC is established in 
every local authority in the country and is very significant in the current context of climate 
change and the potential for local government to carve out a new role in the community adding 
value to the public sphere in addition to its normal functions. Other SPCs could have been 
chosen, for example the Housing SPC which could be more contentious, however the 
researcher was a member of the Housing SPC during this period. The SPC for Economic 
Development, Enterprise and Planning was selected because it was established under the Local 
Government Reform Act 2014, fourteen years after the first SPCs were established. The 
establishment of this SPC reflects the extended autonomy given to local government under the 
second wave of reform to play a lead role in economic development, with restructured 
membership which particularly promotes agencies with a strong economic role, and gave 
responsibility to merging local authorities to act as leaders in progressing the enhanced 
economic development role of local authorities. By selecting an old and a new SPC it was 
possible to examine the extent of path-dependence evident on the  ‘old’ SPC versus the newly 
created SPC.  The LCDC was selected as it was established in 2014 to facilitate a more co-
ordinated and joined-up approach to local and community development between the local 
government and local development sectors at local level. In contrast to the SPCs, the LCDC 
remit centres on the implementation of local and community development programmes through 
collaboration of state and non-state/civil society actors.  
While the experience of each SPC is unique and the case study method does not allow for the 
generalisation of results, the findings from a PVM perspective are likely to be comparable 
across the SPCs of the different local authorities because the structure and membership is pre-
defined. The contrasting functions and structures of the LCDC and the SPCs may help to draw 
out distinctive features that support or discourage cross-sector collaboration in mandated 
settings.  The researcher is not directly involved with any of the committees selected.  
In terms of their composition all three committees enjoy representation from civil, public, 
private, and elected representative membership, with civil representation nominated through 
the Public Participation Network (PPN).  The SPCs are supported by the Director of Service 
for the relevant function, who, in turn, operates under the general direction of the committee 
who submit policy review papers for the service or services in question. The LCDC is 
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supported by a Chief Officer1 appointed by the Council Executive. All three committees are 
chaired by an elected representative. 
The common and contrasting features between the SPCs and the LCDC will provide unique 
evidence that will capture the potential and complexity of implementing a PVM approach and 
identify gaps in the systemic and democratic dimensions of PVM in these mandated 
collaborative governance mechanisms. 
4.3.4 Data Collection 
The primary data source for this research is semi-structured interviewing which has the 
flexibility of gaining an in-depth understanding of the world-view experiences of the 
participants, recording the different perspectives of the participants from the various social 
groups on a wide range of issues, obtaining a good account of the context within which the 
social behaviour is taking place, probing for more information, and capturing unexpected 
concepts that can emerge during the interview (Bryman 2012). The researcher had twenty-one 
years’ experience at a senior management level across both local authorities at the 
commencement of this study which gave the researcher convenient access to the participants 
of the collaborative mechanisms studied. The research participants were familiar with the 
researcher who they could trust with their honest and open perspectives, perceptions and 
experiences in their responses to the interview questions. This approach enhances the 
opportunity of revealing genuine participant perspectives and capturing particularly important 
aspects of people’s social world which may not otherwise be forthcoming. It also enables issues 
that may not have previously been identified to be followed up in further questioning. 
A qualitative research strategy is used to interrogate three case studies in a single context by 
using semi-structured interviews to elicit deep and rich interpretations of their structures and 
processes. This forms the basis of a thorough empirical analysis to advance a better 
understanding of the public value framework. The depth and richness of the data collected 
through the semi-structured interview approach could not have been elicited using other 
methods that could potentially have been employed such as participant observation, focus 
groups, or surveys. Other qualitative data collection methods were considered. The data 
required to answer the research questions could not be obtained from participant observation 
alone and this method was considered inappropriate and impractical for a number of reasons. 
 




While some advantages offered by participant observation may have yielded useful additional 
insights from observation (e.g., interactions amongst members in the settings as they examine 
issues and decision-making), the data generated by this method would not yield additional 
value to the research relative to the time input required by the researcher in data collection and 
analysis. As a former senior official of the local authority under study, the researcher is entirely 
familiar with the culture of local authorities. As participant observation is often used in order 
to immerse the researcher in the cultural setting of the research so that they understand better 
nuances of context, this was not necessary in this case. In terms of focus group interviews, 
these were considered as an option but later discounted because of the tendency for popular 
group opinions and/or strong voices to dominate focus group discussions with other 
participants not being heard (Creswell and Poth 2018). In terms of survey, this method is more 
appropriate to quantitative research and the strength of this method is to uncover large-scale 
social trends (Bryman 2012). While a survey could have been extended to the interview 
participants to obtain a quantitative description of trends, attitudes and opinions (Creswell and 
Poth 2018), this was considered to be of limited value in answering the research question. 
Depth rather than breadth was most important in order to examine the experiences, opinions 
and perspectives of the participants and what they see as important and significant from their 
involvement in the cases studied. On balance, it was concluded that the widest range and depth 
of data/information would be generated by semi-structured interviewing. 
The use of semi-structured interviews to collect the data also creates an opportunity for a 
detailed investigation of individual perspectives which may further elucidate the personal 
context in which the research phenomena are situated (Richie et al. 2013). Specifically, this 
approach aligns with of the researcher’s commitment to unearth deep and rich data from the 
three cases under scrutiny; particularly as semi-structured interviewing enables data collection 
to be examine the phenomena of public value without pigeon-holing interviewee responses. 
Additionally, the inherent flexibility of the interview approach allows for specific issues to be 
drawn out to further develop or inform the theory of public value. This section therefore 
outlines the approach to devising the semi-structured interview questions, how the interview 
participants were selected, the challenge posed by insider research, the process for engaging 
participants, and other documentary sources used.  
The interview questions were guided by the operational framework drawn from public value, 
collaborative governance, and institutional theory. Semi-structured interviews drive an in-
depth conversation led by the researcher; working through an established set of core topics but 
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allowing for considerable variation between participants. The interview questions were 
carefully designed to allow for alternative avenues of enquiry that might arise during the 
interviews. Semi-structured interviewing is flexible enough to enable more specific issues that 
arise to be addressed, and for themes that might emerge from early interviews to be 
incorporated into later interviews. The overall aim is to generate an appreciation of what the 
interview participants see as significant and important in relation to the topic. Thus, a common 
set of core questions were used to interview the participants from the three cases studied to 
ensure cross-case comparability. The semi-structured interview was piloted with an elected 
representative from another local authority in order to gauge understanding of the questions, 
the language used, and to check the length of the interview. With the exception of one minor 
change, the pilot interview template was deemed to be satisfactory for the study proper.  The 
interview questions are set out in Appendix A. 
The site of the research was selected based on its relevance to the research questions and 
researcher access to the study participants. The initial contributors to the study were chosen 
from the list of participants involved in the cases studied taking account of the specific 
characteristics of the individuals to ensure a good cross section of sectoral, geographical, 
gender, and political party allegiance representation.  
This empirical research benefited from involving a diverse range of stakeholders from the 
sphere of public management rather than using a purely manager-centric approach. The 
objective was to select people participating in structures aimed at creating public value in order 
to develop a deeper insight into the complex processes of public value management. Each of 
the three cases studied therefore comprises elected representatives, community representatives, 
sectoral representatives, and public sector staff. The researcher interviewed elected 
representatives, public sector staff, and community and sectoral representatives from the three 
statutory committees, as key informants on the extent and effectiveness of collaboration within 
the reformed local government system. The selection of interview participants was purposive 
and guided by the composition of the committees to ensure adequate sectoral, geographical, 
gender, and political party allegiance representation. Eventually, after 16 local interviews were 
conducted, the issues raised by the research questions were covered and further interviews at 
the local site were not likely to yield new information. 
Towards the end of the research, the researcher carried out three ‘elite’ interviews with key 
informants of national policy-making to explore broader policy on collaboration and recent 
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reform in the area since they are key to understanding the public policies behind the 
establishment of these cases. As Kezar argues, “during elite interviews,  the interviewee is 
encouraged to structure the account of the situation and is able to introduce his or her notions 
of what is most relevant instead of relying on the investigator’s notions of relevance” 
(2003:397). These elite interviews added richness to the study data because of the specialised 
knowledge that the interviewees possess. A separate common set of semi-structured interview 
questions informed by the analysis, conclusions, and operational framework was devised 
(Appendix A).  These interview participants were drawn from senior practitioners and advisors 
from central government, local government, and private sector. The full anonymised list of 
interview participants is set out in Appendix B. 
The 16 local interviews were conducted face-to-face but the 3 elite interviews carried out in 
November 2020 were conducted online due to Covid-19 restrictions. There was no difference 
in the quality of information between the two sets of interviews, in fact it was more convenient 
to meet the elite interview participants remotely as they were geographically located outside of 
the study area. 
The research seeks to offer insights on whether and how collaboration could be enhanced and 
the public value framework will be used to guide the data collection and analysis.  
To locate participants, initial contact was made by email, providing a brief description of the 
research topic, and requesting them to participate in an interview at a time and location suitable 
and convenient to them. All the participants contacted agreed to be interviewed, and were 
subsequently provided with a follow-up e-mail containing an information letter which outlined 
the research, and a consent form was discussed with and signed by each of the participants. 
The information letter and consent form are set out in Appendix C. A total of 19 interview 
participants were ultimately selected for interview. While the membership of these committees 
is publicly available, a commitment was given to their anonymity and confidentiality.   
All contributions were anonymised and no research participant was identified by name. Instead, 
each participant was identified by number and sector, with ‘Public’ denoting public officials 
and elected representatives, and ‘Civil Society’ denoting community and sectoral 
representatives and local development companies. All contributions were coded and stored in 
the researcher’s password protected personal computer. Audio recordings were securely stored 
and assigned code numbers prior to data transcriptions. The ‘key’ to re-identify the data is 
retained by the researcher. 
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Secondary sources of data in the form of documentary analysis and descriptive reports provided 
additional information. These included legislation, formal presentations, statistics, and relevant 
published reports which provided first-hand accounts of public policy and reform proposals. 
All case-study notes were organised, categorised, and retained.  
4.3.5 Data Analysis  
The primary data from 16 local interviews was analysed using the Newell and Burnard 
approach to qualitative data analysis (2010). It is described as content analysis as “it refers to 
the organising and ordering of textual data, which is a method used to analyse the text in 
transcriptions of interviews” (Newell and Burnard 2010:119). To assist in the data analysis a 
computer software package called NVivo was used. This is a computer-assisted qualitative data 
analysis computer software package produced by QSR International, which enables qualitative 
researchers to organise, analyse, and derive insights from qualitative data instruments such as 
semi-structured interviews. The software was selected for this research project since it 
facilitated rigorous analysis of the semi-structured interviews with the initial 16 contributors to 
the research. The software tools enabled the researcher to import the data, and code it with 
thematic labels. It was also useful for managing the interview audio files to make it easier for 
the researcher to transcribe them.  
A staged approach was then undertaken to analysing the data. The data analysis followed the 
six stages of the Newell and Burnard thematic content analysis approach (2010) as follows: 
 Stage 1: The interviews were recorded and imported into NVivo 12. They were fully 
transcribed by the researcher as “it is better for the researcher to transcribe his or her 
own interviews as this brings the research closer to the material that makes up the 
data” (Newell and Burnard 2010:119). Notes were made following each interview 
regarding the topics discussed. 
 Stage 2: The transcripts were read through with the aim of becoming “immersed in 
the data and to get to know it very well’ (2010:123); and notes made of the general 
themes.   
 Stage 3: The transcripts were re-read several times, and words and phrases were 
collated which summarised participants’ responses. This phase of ‘open coding’ 
“categorises  the data, which in turn, will lead to some reduction in text” (2010:123). 
 Stage 4: The data was revisited and duplicate codes eliminated. At this stage, as the 
categories were collated together, any overlaps were grouped together into higher 
order codes. In this way the codes themselves were reduced.  
 Stage 5: At this stage the text in the interview transcripts were marked up under the 




 Stage 6: The organised data finally forms the material from which the qualitative 
report is written, in this case, the data-set from which the findings were written up and 
related back to the literature review and the research questions. 
The NVivo codebook for the final round of coding is presented below in Table 2. The NVivo 
codebooks for all rounds of coding are presented in Appendix D: 
Name Files References 
Capacity to participate 12 165 
Engagement, representation & feedback 12 231 
Formulating outcomes 12 196 
Information, learning & depth of discussion 12 174 
Leadership 11 36 
Managing the committee 12 215 
Monitoring, evaluation and accountability 12 69 
Trust 12 87 
 
Table 2 NVivo Codebook, final round of coding of the local case semi-structured interviews 
 
The final three national level interviews were also organised and transcribed using NVivo; 
common themes were noted, and the findings integrated into the initial data analysis and used 
to inform the final conclusions. 
4.4 Limitations and Ethics 
This section considers the limitations of the study in terms of researcher interpretation, case 
study generalisability, and insider research. This is followed by details of ethics approval and 
the approach to managing the potential for bias. 
4.4.1 Limitations 
Qualitative findings rely on researcher interpretations/views of significance and magnitude, 
and the personal relationships which can ensue with the people being studied. Since values 
reflect the personal opinions and feelings of the researcher and influence the conduct of social 
research (Bryman 2016), the researcher recognises and acknowledges that such research cannot 
be wholly value-free. However, in efforts to maintain objectivity the researcher did not let 
personal values impact the conduct of the research and/or the findings derived from it, and 
remained self-reflective about the part played by such factors in the study.  
The research was highly sensitive to the context of the social setting, relevant theoretical 
positions, and the ethical issues and biases as discussed further below. To this end, the 
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researcher kept an audit trail/complete record of fieldwork notes, interview transcripts, data 
analysis decisions, and so on, in an accessible manner. This record is available for audit 
including the degree to which theoretical inferences can be justified.  
One of the criticisms of case-study design is a lack of generalisability. However, Bryman 
(2016) counters that this is not the purpose of case-study design since a single absolute account 
of social reality is not feasible. Moreover, Bryman (2016) argues the people who are 
interviewed in qualitative research are not intended to be representative of a certain group: the 
findings of qualitative research are to generalise to theory rather than to population. Therefore, 
the quality of the theoretical inferences derived from qualitative data is what is crucial to the 
assessment of generalisation. The case selection method does not ensure that the sample cases 
are fully representative of the research domain and does not necessarily allow for statistical 
generalisation of the results (Yin 2018; Krogh 2020 ). However, it does allow for exploring the 
potential for collaboration and the relevance and applicability of a PVM approach in these 
nationally-mandated governance mechanisms. Bryman (2016) also suggests that the credibility 
of the findings that the researcher arrives at is underpinned by an understanding that the 
research was carried out according to the principles of good practice. This qualitative research 
concentrated on depth rather than breadth in its study of three small groups set in the context 
of the specific aspect of public value/collaboration in the local authority context. As such, it 
offers a rich account of the details of the public management within that collaboration.  
While insider researchers have the advantage of their knowledge and understanding of the 
complex institutional context, it is important to note the possible adverse impact of being too 
close to the research setting (Saunders et al. 2012). The fact that the investigator has a direct 
influence on the study had the potential for bias which could skew the design and undertaking 
of the case-study. Mindful of this, the researcher diligently reflected on her assumptions and 
preconceptions throughout the duration of the research and strove to report all evidence fairly.  
The case-study followed a set of pre-specified procedures. In any event, the advantages of 
insider investigation were deemed to far outweigh any potential bias and was very beneficial 
in that it helped clarify existing concepts enabling a better assessment of the indicators of public 
value.  
 
Ultimately, the case-study’s unique strength is its capacity to absorb a wide variety of evidence. 
Usually with a qualitative research strategy the case-study adopts an inductive approach to the 
relationship between theory and research. However, Bryman (2016) sees no reason why 
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qualitative research cannot be applied to test theories which have been specified in advance of 
data collection. Thus, in this instance, this inductive approach was drawn from Moore’s (1995) 
initial formulation of the public value framework.  
The overarching approach taken in this research was to develop the public value theory by 
linking it to the institutional and collaborative governance theories and applying it within an 
empirical setting.  
4.4.2 Research Ethics and Ethical Approval 
This research study received Ethics approval from the University of Limerick Arts, Humanities 
and Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee (2017-09-18-AHSS). The issue of insider 
research was also managed carefully throughout the entire data collection process. The 
researcher was aware of the following personal challenges: 
1. Dual roles: organisation member and insider researcher.  
2. Pre-understanding: sometimes needing to step back to see things more critically. 
3. Organisation politics: being aware of the success of research and impact on the 
researcher’s own career. 
At the commencement of this research the researcher held the position of Acting Director of 
Services in Limerick City and County Council, the local authority in which the research took 
place. In this leadership role the researcher had responsibility for the delivery of certain 
programmes and functions/services of the local authority, and as a result had regular 
professional contact with many of the interview participants. This offered the advantage of 
gaining access and developing a rapport with the interview participants. However, as it also 
presented challenges for managing the interviews as an insider researcher, certain mechanisms 
were successfully put in place to manage the interviews from an insider researcher perspective. 
While being mindful of the potential for bias after 25 years of public service practice, the 
insider view afforded the advantage of a rounded and deep understanding of where the local 
government sector is coming from with regard to innovations in governance; and, linked to 
this, a capacity to understand what is and is not changing, and to what extent. Uniquely, the 
experience of the insider researcher in the single site was very beneficial to the study as it 
helped to clarify existing concepts and better assessed indicators of public value. This approach 
further supported the case-study’s unique strength in its capacity to engage with a wide variety 
of evidence.  
In planning the research then, the researcher was highly conscious of the implications, 
advantages, and disadvantages of understanding insider research; particularly as she held a 
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senior position in the local authority studied. To offset any such disadvantages the researcher 
read widely around the issue of insider research and the following mechanisms were identified 
and used to reflect on and ensure best practice in carrying out insider research (Symon and 
Cassell 2012): 
 a log of all interview activities was maintained  
 an individual diary was used to reflect on the on-going research and how participants 
responded to the interviews 
 the researcher listened to the audio recordings of all the interviews noting how the 
presence or interaction as the researcher affected the process 
 the researcher debriefed and shared the findings with supervisors, thinking critically 
about the research and any feelings that may affect judgement 
The need to interview a small number of officials who reported directly to the researcher was 
also initially anticipated. While the operation of local authorities is considerably less 
hierarchical than it once was, the researcher was conscious of potential power asymmetries that 
might exist in such interviews. The original intention was to secure the support of a peer 
interviewer. However, the researcher’s promotion to the permanent position of Director of 
Services in another local authority eliminated any potential research conflicts arising from 
direct reporting relationships with any of the interview participants. 
4.5 Conclusion 
Local government reform is multi-faceted.  In order to assess the changes then, it is essential 
to establish the views of the various stakeholders. This research relied on participants to provide 
the necessary data on the impact of the reforms with the objective of gathering the perspectives 
of people involved in the reformed structures. It was envisaged that individual interviews 
would broaden and deepen understanding of the changes and interview data would strengthen 
the evidence-base for conclusions about the extent and impact of collaboration within the three 
cases studied.  
This chapter has presented the operational framework and research design employed for this 
study including the techniques and methods used for data collection and analysis. It justified 
the multiple case-study approach and the use of semi-structured interviewing, with the 
interview questions drawn from the operational framework. The purposive sampling approach 
led to 16 interviews from the local site being conducted, coded and analysed; while three 
additional elite interviews offered a national perspective on the reform of local government 
which led to the establishment of the three collaborative mechanisms studied.  
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Finally, the chapter elucidated how the benefits of insider research and the depth of research 
undertaken outweigh the limitations presented by the qualitative approach taken, and the  





Chapter Five: Presentation of the Research Findings 
5.1 Introduction 
Recent reform of Ireland’s local government has promoted an enhanced developmental role for 
local government: to be achieved through the bringing together of State and non-State actors 
in a structured manner (PPF 2012; Callanan 2020). This study examines those structures from 
the participants’ perspectives. This chapter presents the views of key participants in relation to 
the presence of or potential for a Public Value Management approach to inform the practice of 
local governance in Ireland. It outlines the perspectives of the interview participants on the 
nature of collaboration in the three cases studied: namely, the Travel and Transport Strategic 
Policy Committee (T&T SPC); the Economic Development, Enterprise and Planning Strategic 
Policy Committee (ED SPC); and the Local Community Development Committee (LCDC). 
The key findings of the anonymised2 interview data are set out in accordance with the three 
components of the operational framework of this study as follows: 
 Component 1: Public Value Outcomes 
 Component 2: Legitimacy and Authorisation 
 Component 3: Operational Capacity 
5.2 Public Value Outcomes 
This section sets out the empirical data collected in relation to each of the indicators of public 
value outcomes in turn. The literature suggests that a public value approach would ideally 
determine a process for deciding public value outcomes based on State and non-State 
collaboration in terms of framing problems, and deliberating choices and alternatives to resolve 
these issues. Moreover, in the course of the collaborative process the strategic aims would 
become clear and the actors arrive at a consensus around preferred outcomes. Importantly, it is 
posited that a public value approach would evaluate whether public interventions are achieving 
positive social and economic outcomes. From a PVM perspective, these would be realised 
through an engagement and exchange between the relevant stakeholders and facilitated by 
public officials.  
It is evident that structures which are designed to attract and realise inclusive participation are 
not always successful.  
 
2 All interviews were anonymised and in line with this commitment random numbers were assigned to each interview and these appear at the 
end of the direct and indirect quotations. ‘Public’ denotes public officials and elected representatives, and ‘Civil Society’ denotes community 
and sectoral representatives and local development companies. A full list of the anonymised participants is provided in Appendix B. 
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Thus, empirical enquiry is necessary to evaluate whether such structures lead to the 
development of publicly valuable strategies. As outlined in the operational framework,  
evidence of the following of elements would be expected:  
 common purpose: fostering a collaborative space which is focused on negotiated 
strategic outcomes  
 improved deliberation: enabling competing perspectives to be aired and considered 
before decisions are made 
 informed and empowered actors: participants are sufficiently informed and 
empowered to participate 
The findings from the contributors interviewed regarding each of these elements are now 
discussed in turn. 
5.2.1 Common Purpose  
The literature contends that participants in a collaborative process aimed at creating public 
value would be expected to move beyond their individual self-interests towards recognition of 
common interest and identify outcomes that are good for the public. The operational framework 
purported that public value networks which operate on a truly collaborative basis demonstrate 
evidence of shared strategic intent and a joint framing of policies and strategies to achieve that 
intent.  
Shared Strategic Intent 
This section examines the task and practice of creating a shared strategic intent from the 
perspective of contributors who participated in the mechanisms studied.  SPC contributors, 
particularly from the public sector, appeared to comprehend the strategic intent of their 
respective committees. For example, these SPC contributors explained: 
The purpose of the committee is to make our places where we live and work and drive safer 
and more enjoyable, and I think almost all our policies that are emerging at present are geared 
towards making communities better places. (Interview 01 - public T&T SPC) 
The goal is to improve economic development...improving employment, improving jobs 
infrastructure, we look at tourism ...we are particularly spurred on by Limerick 2030 and the 
opera site, we have those big projects that keep us focused. (Interview 07 - public ED SPC) 
The SPC members were aware of their remit in jointly framing problems. Specifically, 
contributors from both the T&T SPC and the ED SPC reported that they understood the SPC 




Its role is to set and support a strategic agenda, particularly in economic development, and 
take the view of the stakeholders in Limerick. (Interview 15 - public ED SPC)  
…working in networks with a view to the greater goal of economic development in Limerick 
City and County Council. (Interview 09 – public ED SPC)  
What we are trying to drive is the bigger picture. (Interview 08 - civil society T&T SPC). 
However, some contributors claimed that the committees did not demonstrate shared strategic 
intent in practice. Some T&T SPC participants observed that the committee was seen by some 
of its members as a place where operational issues could be resolved, whereas others appeared 
more focused on the original intent of the SPCs to develop policy. For example, contributors 
asked: 
Why aren’t the meetings more policy-orientated or more relevant to the real issues that are 
affecting our communities? (Interview 02 -civil society T&T SPC)  
And complained: 
We were there to develop policy...but it was just a talking shop. (Interview 12 - civil society 
T&T SPC),  
 We were under the impression that they would develop policy but they haven’t really done that. 
(Interview 11-01 - public T&T SPC)  
The following viewpoint reflects the overall discussion with T&T SPC contributors: 
If you take into consideration the role of the SPC which is the formulation and development and 
policy making aspect, that doesn’t happen all the time at the SPC meetings ....You spend the 
time discussing motions that have been referred from the full council meeting and they are not 
quite policy-making -more motions than policies. And lots of presentations. (Interview 05 - 
public T&T SPC) 
T&T SPC contributors were clearly frustrated that their committee was not more focused on 
developing policy and seemed to lack shared strategic intent. The ED SPC, on the other hand, 
did seem to aim for a more strategic orientation than the T&T SPC, as one contributor reported: 
We would bring in all the strategy pieces like a road test, and in the latter part of the life of 
the committee, we would make them open workshops that the rest of the council could come 
in and that gave it a full debate. (Interview 15 - public ED SPC)  
Despite the strategic intent of the ED SPC, and reference made by some contributors to 
discussions on the Limerick 2030 Economic and Spatial Plan for Limerick and other strategic 
plans (Interview 07 - public ED SPC; Interview 09 - public ED SPC), one contributor 
remarked:  
Setting outcomes from the start, I think would be important. That probably wasn’t as nailed 
down - it was a bit more fluid. (Interview 15 - public ED SPC) 
In contrast to the SPCs, the LCDC members seemed clearer on their remit:  
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The Limerick LCDC has a full understanding of what it is expected to achieve and what its 
objectives are. (Interview 06 - civil society LCDC)  
namely, to: 
…bring local knowledge together and local expertise so that we can advise on development 
locally. (Interview 03 - public LCDC) 
Furthermore, in terms of the integrated approach taken by the LCDC, one contributor 
maintained the process of developing the Local Economic and Community Plan: 
…enabled them3 to come together and understand the shared direction. (Interview 13 - public 
LCDC) 
While another referred to: 
 
…a feeling I get around the table - different sectors are coming from their own perspective. I 
think that’s normal, and I think it’s very good because I think that’s the whole purpose of the 
LCDC…is that people can bring their perspectives and influence the others around the table 
and bring them around to their way of thinking. (Interview 03 - public LCDC)   
Strategically the LCDC was established with the clear and specific remit of developing, 
coordinating and implementing a coherent and integrated approach to local and community 
development 4 . One contributor asserted this brought focus to the work of the LCDC by 
“preventing it from becoming a talking shop” (Interview 03 - public LCDC), and that members 
appeared to work well  together to deliberate on the funding programmes, which, in turn, 
appeared to have informed the LCDC about the needs of its constituent communities: 
The grants give us a focus and there is a good link with the grants coming back saying this is 
the type of funding people need, or the type of funding people are applying for, and the 
deficiencies that are out there that inform our thinking. (Interview 03 - public LCDC) 
The above observations convey the extent to which the LCDC and the SPC contributors 
understood the purpose of their committees. The task and practice of the committees, however, 
seems to be in sharp contrast with each other: an issue which is explored further in the 
remaining sections of this chapter. The key insights on committee purposes and tasks elicited 
above indicate that: 
 Contributors reported varying levels of clarity about their particular committee’s task. 
 The LCDC contributors had collectively agreed a shared strategic intent. 
 With the exception of some local plans brought before the ED SPC for their input, the 
SPCs did not appear to be developing policy as intended.  
 
3 Referring to the LCDC 
4 Section 49A of the Local Government Act 2001 
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5.2.2 Informed and Empowered Actors 
A public value approach would expect collaborative processes to inform actors and ensure that 
preferences could be articulated; with actors willingly exchanging knowledge and expertise on 
the problems to be solved.  
Such an approach would also empower actors to determine priorities for decision and delivery. 
The operational framework also emphasised that well-informed and empowered actors would 
cooperate in an exchange of insights, knowledge, and perspectives. The following section 
describes where evidence of this was apparent in the empirical data. 
Well-informed Actors 
There was evident correlation between contributors’ understanding of the purpose of the 
various committees and the level of information available to committee members. On one hand, 
the LCDC appeared to be clear about its purpose, and the contributors appeared to be well 
informed in that regard; on the other, the intended outcomes of the T&T SPC seemed unclear 
and the level of information imparted to this committee less than needed. The level of 
information imparted to and by the committee members is explored further in this section. 
SPC contributors generally agreed that information usually came in the form of presentations 
from council officials which mainly originated from central government,  Thus: 
It wasn’t a flow of information as such, but presentations. (Interview 11-01 - public 
T&T SPC) 
Neither was the information always understood. Participants largely agreed, the information 
should be more condensed, delivered in plain language, and an overview provided to the 
members in advance of the meetings (Interview 08 - civil society T&T SPC; Interview 12 - 
civil society T&T SPC; Interview 09 - public ED SPC). The need for greater information 
emerged as particularly important for civil society contributors. As one contributor put it: 
My experience is that the sectoral nominees tend to be a little bit less informed on the items 
on the agenda and maybe hesitant to speak often because of that. And if they have an opinion, 
it’s an opinion on the outcome, and not an opinion on what we are discussing. And that’s 
maybe just down to they haven’t been involved in the five or six discussions with the executive 
or with the other councillors. They don’t have that perspective.  So when there are councillors 
talking very expertly on things, they don’t feel empowered to speak. (Interview 07: public ED 
SPC) 
While public sector representatives felt they had often heard the same presentations in other 
forums then (Interview 05 - public T&T SPC; Interview 11-01 - public T&T SPC), civil society 
contributors of the T&T SPC, admitted the low level of information frustrated them and 
negatively impacted their ability to properly consult within their own sector: 
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It feels like the volunteers are treated differently...Once we come out of the door of that meeting 
we hear nothing until the Thursday before the next meeting. You go in for two hours once 
every two months… You can’t gain knowledge in that space of time. Maybe if we understood 
more we would be less agitated. (Interview 08 - civil society T&T SPC)  
Moreover, contributors noticed that discussions following presentations sometimes felt more 
reactive than proactive; partly because the information had not been circulated in advance 
(Interview 10 - civil society ED SPC; Interview 09 - public ED SPC). Ultimately contributors 
reported that, while they were more knowledgeable as a result of participation in these 
committees, improved advance information would have enabled them to prepare better and 
contribute to meetings more effectively.  
In contrast to the SPCs, the LCDC contributors all reported being well-informed. One 
contributor regarded the local authority officials as very supportive:  
I have noticed with the Chief Executive; that he will give you the job, he will expect you to do 
it.  But he will also give you the tools to do it so you are not left high and dry. (Interview 04 – 
public LCDC) 
 Another agreed: 
The officers with the local authority are quite good: they make sure that everyone gets the 
same amount of information. (Interview 03 - public LCDC) 
Indeed, LCCC engaged a social researcher to assist the LCDC with its work who  was deemed 
to have: 
…paved the way in a lot of what we had to do... brought a massive amount of help to the table 
in terms of the social makeup, deprivation, information and statistics, that were all very 
important in explaining how this was going to work. (Interview 04 - public LCDC)  
In general, LCDC contributors welcomed the knowledge and information imparted by the 
social researcher which they described as ‘excellent’ and ‘necessary at the time’ (Interview 06 
- civil society LCDC). The local development companies were also held to be an important 
source of information. For example, one contributor, who was given a tour of the city which 
benefited from SICAP funding observed: 
...of the forty members of the council, and more than half of them from the county, we had 
never seen such social deprivation difficulties. Real on-the-ground stuff, and very important 
work. (Interview 04 - public LCDC)   
Tasked with decision-making around local and community development grants, therefore, the 
well-informed LCDC participants were able to do so effectively. This also necessitated an in-
depth examination of issues which required some members to participate in the sub-committees 
and/or evaluation committees established by the LCDC.  
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Additionally, considerable information was imparted through pre-briefing sessions facilitated 
by LCCC with any groups who wished to convene prior to the main LCDC meetings. This 
allowed them to participate more effectively in the main meeting. It is apparent that the definite 
purpose and clear decision-making role of the LCDC led the members of that committee to 
better informed than the members of the T&T SPC. The overall flow of information was 
summarised by one contributor: 
The flow of information is quite good actually. The officers within the LA are quite good: they 
make sure that everyone gets the same amount of information. I think if you are sitting on 
certain sub-committees you actually have access to more information... and if they’re not, it’s 
probably their own fault for not accessing the information informally themselves. (Interview 
03 - public LCDC).  
The information relating to all committees was stored on a LCCC database which is available 
to all members: 
We have our own Alfresco5 system and we are well and truly informed. (Interview 04 - public 
LCDC)  
The key insights on the nature, quality, and impact of the information available to the 
committees indicate that: 
 Inequitable access to information by committees and by sectors, was of a particular 
concern to contributors. 
 SPCs appeared to be bombarded with endless information. Civil society contributors 
felt that, compared to the elected representatives who were exposed to information in 
different forums, they were disadvantaged by not being given relevant information in 
a timely manner. This affected their capacity to contribute to the meetings. 
 In contrast, the LCDC was well-informed with good quality, timely, and relevant 
information, and had engaged a social researcher who provided members with local 
socio-economic data and analysis. 
Exchanging  Insights, Knowledge, and Perspectives   
Having access to information is obviously important, but the opportunity to exchange insights, 
knowledge, and perspectives, is another important component of the Public Value Management 
approach. In comparison to the main council meetings which comprise long agenda, 
contributors welcomed the greater opportunity for discussion at the SPCs level (Interview 05 - 
public T&T SPC; Interview 07 - public ED SPC). They also acknowledged that the 




5 Alfresco is a document management system used by Limerick City and County Council 
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... with your fellow councillors you share the same information because you are within the same 
system.  But having the sectoral representatives on board is different...they come with a different 
approach or a different perspective, and it’s great to have such interaction...for example, age-
friendly...the contribution from sectoral representatives broadens your understanding; opens 
your eyes. (Interview 05 - public T&T SPC) 
While the SPC structure arguably presented a good opportunity to share insights, knowledge, 
and perspectives between the public sector and civil society, it was more evident in the ED 
SPC than the T&T SPC. For example, T&T SPC contributors reported that while some 
members appeared to be very engaged and do their own research, they had little opportunity to 
share it with the other members (Interview 01 - public T&T SPC). Similarly, another 
contributor felt that knowledge exchange was the effective component of the T&T SPC 
meetings it should be:  
That is where you are really going to get public value for money. It comes down to people 
understanding each other; understanding where they’re coming from; and the criteria within 
which they are trying to operate within the public sector... But I think the engagement is not 
meaningful enough. (Interview 02 -civil society T&T SPC) 
Conversely, the ED SPC seemed to make more time for discussion, either by extending the 
time-limit for meetings or organising supplementary workshops. In this context, one 
contributor elucidated: 
We deliberately had a short agenda. Everybody was allowed to talk. They were clearly very well 
prepared and it allowed for really good collaboration. (Interview 07 - public ED SPC)  
This SPC contributor further reflected:  
I think there is more of an awareness of how people operate...You get a better perspective and 
more of an appreciation of where people are coming from because there is more time to talk 
openly. (Interview 07 - public ED SPC) 
The LCDC was even more conducive to this approach. Contributors from the LCDC noted the 
excellent flow of information with members sharing expertise. This had led to significant 
learning from each other throughout the group and a greater appreciation of what the other 
sectors are doing:  
We see different perspectives, a great flow of knowledge, and see other people’s perspectives 
as being important ... It’s the network. It’s the information that we can bring to the table as well 
from the point of view of informing others, because people sometimes think that we can do this, 
and we can do that, whereas it’s very important that we can say that, this is what we can do, 
but equally it’s as important to say that this is what we can’t do. (Interview 03 - public LCDC)  
What I did learn was not about to respect different voices and opinions because I have that, I 
brought that with me. What I did learn more was the challenge of say the Leader companies in 
terms of staffing resources and how that impacts, and how the system is now: they will get 
demands from the Department.  This has to be in by such a time. And in truth, they have very 
little time in order to achieve. And then the ground rules have been identified, and then 
sometimes by the next meeting those ground rules have changed, and for people like myself, the 
man on the street on the periphery, unless I had sat in on those LCDC meetings on a regular 
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basis I would have had no appreciation or understanding of that. And in terms of systems, I 
actually think it really was an eye-opener for me. The things I might assume, say, we have gone 
past that stage - it wasn’t always the case. And, that, in turn, for me, indicates the worth of the 
LCDC ,and there is great potential in it provided it’s given support. (Interview 06 - civil society 
LCDC)  
This sentiments were echoed by another contributor: 
There is a very good wisdom around the table.  The members are both leaders and informants, 
and everyone is wiser because of it. (Interview 04 - public LCDC)  
Key perceptions on these topics throughout this section indicate that: 
 The time available for discussion was a recurrent theme.  
 SPCs did not seem to have sufficient time to engage effectively as they were only 
obliged to meet four times a year. However, the ED SPC created more time by 
organising occasional workshops and streamlining their agenda. 
 In contrast, the LCDC participants appeared to share insights, knowledge, and 
perspective between public sector and civil society. They met monthly which gave 
them more time than the SPCs to develop this engagement. 
The study also sought to examine the commitment of the committees to engage meaningfully 
on policy issues, in terms of time allowed for and depth of deliberation as discussed in the next 
section.  
5.2.3 Dialogue and Deliberation 
The literature review suggested that a collaborative public value process would ideally build 
agreement around a shared agenda and seek out opportunities to enable dialogue between State 
and civil society actors. In fact, agenda-setting and good quality dialogue and deliberation are 
defining features of PVM.  
Agenda Setting 
Since processes for creating public value should encourage committee members to raise issues 
for debate and dialogue, a collaborative approach would expect any agenda to be open to 
question and input by all committee members. During the interviews it became clear that  
agenda-setting was an important aspect of the deliberation process as it enabled them to 
participate in and influence the discussions. This section presents the fieldwork findings in 
relation to agenda-setting across the three case-studies.  
T&T SPC contributors agreed the agenda was strictly managed by the local authority executive,  
and that the agenda was only circulated a few days prior to the meetings which convened three 
or four times a year. Furthermore, the items on the agenda were heavily determined by 
executive priorities and much of the time was taken up with items referred to it by elected 
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representatives from the council meetings or the CPG. Specifically, contributors indicated that 
participants would like to have seen a greater range of topics on the agenda:  
It addresses the Council priorities but not what sectoral interests may wish to discuss...From 
time to time, we would ask for particular topics or particular areas of interest they would have 
that they would like to see covered in the meetings and would like to see policies on... there 
are different things we have looked at and brought forward information on and sought funding 
for from the national transport authority. (Interview 01 - public T&T SPC) 
Moreover, in terms of structuring the agenda, another contributor maintained:  
When there are policies to be discussed, maybe the agenda should address those policies alone, 
and give people more time to shape it instead of having a lot on the agenda. (Interview 05 - 
public T&T SPC).  
Importantly, although bemoaning the executive dominance of the agenda, T&T SPC 
contributors largely agreed that if they could better influence the agenda, it could lead to better 
deliberation.  As one contributor reflected:  
I think if it was more focused on particular topics as opposed to presentations: if it was more 
on debate on what are the key issues - one meeting might be about roads, another about 
pedestrianisation, another about bus, what innovations are happening out there, what other 
cities are doing,  other similar locations to us, similar challenges and how are they dealing 
with them… Inform us, educate us, or even give us stuff to read up on between meetings to 
make better use of us, and educate us to contribute better… (Interview 02 -civil society T&T 
SPC) 
Another point made was that what might appear to be a merely operational item for the 
executive could be a very important issue for civil society. For instance: 
…footpaths mightn’t look important to many people but they are important. Like dishing of 
footpaths to ensure they are level with the street ...for wheelchair users ... I would be aware 
that those kind of things are needed. (Interview 08 - civil society T&T SPC) 
However, the ED SPC seemed to take a more inclusive approach to agenda-setting. In contrast 
to the T&T SPC, the ED SPC seemed to focus more on particular strategic topics such as the 
national planning framework, tourism strategy, and economic policies. The ED SPC also 
seemed to have a better understanding of the wishes of the committee members regarding their 
input into the agenda. As one contributor elaborated: 
They wanted more on the agenda and we were happy to shape it with them.  And once they 
knew we were open to that, and we weren’t just pushing things at them, it was a lot better. 
(Interview 15 - public ED SPC)  
Notwithstanding that level of commitment, certain contributors only felt able to raise their 
issues under AOB: 
It was usually brought up under AOB rather than the chairperson coming to me and saying 
what would you like on the agenda today - that you would like to raise? Now maybe I could 
have been a bit more proactive in that respect but I was new to that procedure and I was 
essentially just feeling my way. (Interview 10 - civil society ED SPC) 
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The ability of SPCs to set their agenda has, of course, to be seen in the light of the constraints 
on the autonomy of local government. This was highlighted by one of the elite interviewees 
who elucidated: 
I think there needs to be clarity of purpose for the SPCs. I know a number of the SPC.  What I 
see them doing is getting updates on what’s going on in the organisation rather than strategic 
policy - but I think in terms of strategic policy the amount of strategic policy that local 
authorities have to do that isn’t already dictated nationally is getting more and more limited.  
And you need the agenda to be very clear on what is the policy that you expect them to have an 
input into. (Interview 17 - elite interview) 
Conversely, discussions with LCDC contributors indicated that while the LCDC agenda was 
generally decided between the chair (who in the Limerick case was always an elected 
representative) and the Director of Services, they nonetheless felt they could contribute to the 
agenda, noting: 
The chair has been very approachable in terms of including items on the agenda. (Interview 11-
02 - civil society LCDC)  
and: 
I am happy with how its arranged. A draft agenda usually goes out two weeks in advance. It’s 
up to us if we want to input into it. Perhaps it should be said once in a while if you want to 
add something in the email it would be useful, because some people are more hesitant than 
other. (Interview 06 - civil society LCDC)  
However, the role of the LCDC in relation to co-ordinating, managing, and overseeing the 
implementation of local and community development programmes means their agenda was 
impacted by the tight deadlines set by the Department’6 to deal with those topics. Contributors 
explained: 
The Department: they want it done in a certain way. They want it done in a short timeframe. 
(Interview 11-02 - civil society LCDC) 
... they were items that were set by the agenda which came from the Department or time 
constraints or deadlines which we have to reach. (Interview 03 - public LCDC)  
We get demands from the Department: this has to be in by such a time.  And in truth, they have 
very little time in order to achieve. (Interview 06 - civil society LCDC) 
Interestingly, one contributor acknowledged the chair of the LCDC as well as the participants:  
…has to be very conscious of allowing time within an agenda and a structure for allowing 
time for discussions outside of what is predefined for us. (Interview 03 - public LCDC).  
Key insights from this section focus on the capacity of the committees to set their own agenda: 
 The LCDC agenda was superseded by central government priorities and tight 
deadlines.  
 The SPC agenda is also restricted because local government strategic policy is 
predominantly decided at national level. 
 
6 Department of Rural and Community Development 
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 SPC contributors would welcome more relevant topics on the agenda that was 
controlled by the council executive. In contrast, the LCDC contributors could openly 
contribute to the agenda. 
Dialogue and Deliberation  
Under PVM and collaborative governance, participants of collaborative mechanisms are 
expected to deliberate on the topics brought before them and hear the perspectives and opinions 
of others prior to final decisions. As this entails a respectful and open dialogue between all 
participants, this section delineates the significant contrast between the SPCs and the LCDC in 
terms of participant ability to initiate discussion and question and debate the issues brought 
before them. 
Views were mixed regarding the level of discussion and debate within the SPCs. As previously 
discussed, the topics being discussed sometimes had a direct bearing on the level of debate. 
For example, contributors reported: 
We do go into a very deep level on certain issues: particularly ones where members would have 
very strong viewpoints. (Interview 07 - public ED SPC)  
Topics that affect the community, the people: they generate very good and thoughtful and 
insightful debate. (Interview 01 - public T&T SPC)  
The discussions and debate on the bus issues was pretty enlightening...it was a good forum for 
people.  There was good debate. (Interview 12 - civil society T&T SPC)  
Nonetheless, contributors felt that the work of the SPCs was not as collaborative at it could be: 
rather, they were just reacting to the presentations brought before them. Indeed, contributors 
claimed that the executive would bring presentations and strategies to the SPCs input which 
had not been made available to members in advance. Moreover, while they were not presented 
as finalised documents, meaning they could still comment on them, neither did it appear that 
the early input from the members had been sought: 
So a generic plan is presented and then there is a discussion.  The discussion is usually reactive 
as opposed to proactive. So it is done within the framework of what is presented by the executive. 
So then the councillors will react to what is in the plan and then might supplement it and add to 
it in some certain ways. (Interview 09 - public ED SPC) 
We would have had discussions on the presentations that were made by the executive of the 
local authority ...You could make your points - but no there wouldn’t be any in-depth discussion. 
(Interview 02 -civil society T&T SPC) 
Notably, several of the contributors indicated a wish to deliberate further on the issues raised 




You can make contributions at the meetings...whether they are discussed sufficiently; 
that’s another thing. And that’s because time doesn’t allow you to discuss it at length. 
(Interview 05 - public T&T SPC)   
In fact, even where policies were developed within the committee, they were still arguably 
dominated by the local authority executive, with little input from, or dialogue with, the other 
members:  
We had one good piece of work and that was one piece of policy on speed ramps in estates. And 
I think that was probably the only piece of policy that we actually developed over the time...I 
would think the executive dominated the discussion in regard to that: they came with a proposal 
that was accepted in the main.  Again we didn’t have what I would consider a huge informative 
discussion on it. (Interview 11-0: Public, T&T SPC) 
It’s a bit of a talking shop, really. I don’t think it achieves a whole lot. It’s an information session 
really. (Interview 02 -civil society T&T SPC)  
Specifically, some civil society SPC contributors had expected to be invited to contribute to 
the discussions rather than initiating the dialogue themselves (Interview 02 -civil society T&T 
SPC: Interview 10 - civil society ED SPC). Neither, did it appear that the SPC members were 
challenged to debate and question the particular presentations or issues: 
I don’t think the dynamic is there. I haven’t been challenged by particular issues ... There is no 
such thing as ‘here is something we are thinking, what do you think?’ I should be put on the 
spot. Where are you coming from? (Interview 02 -civil society T&T SPC)  
This chimed with another contributor’s assessment:  
Maybe I could have been a bit more proactive in that respect, but I was new to that procedure, 
and I was essentially just feeling my way. (Interview 10 - civil society ED SPC) 
On the other hand, LCDC contributors agreed that the LCDC is a comfortable space to 
participate; describing ‘a great buzz’ at the meetings, during which: 
…the chair gave opportunities for all parties to feel they were part of the decision making. 
(Interview 13 - public LCDC)   
The LCDC members also behaved reasonably towards each other. For instance, one contributor 
mentioned being involved in a disagreement on an issue which she felt very strongly about. 
However, the way that information and knowledge was shared, and differences discussed, 
negotiated, and resolved, demonstrated the goodwill and respect around the table. Other 
contributors concurred: 
Ask the awkward question because sometimes that question is relevant and it needs to be 
asked. We shouldn’t all have the one and the same voice.  The emphasis is on giving and 
taking: not just one way. (Interview 06 - civil society LCDC)  
Generally people are accepting of other peoples’ view.  And while they mightn’t agree with 




In contrast to the SPCs, more robust dialogue and discussions were reported during LCDC 
meetings. Moreover, contributor appraisals of committee deliberations indicated it was 
worthwhile for the members to participate in the LCDC, with potential benefit for all involved. 
All reported a willingness to share views with the other members (Interview 11-02 - civil 
society LCDC) and entitled to influence the discussions:  
On a few occasions the Chief Officer 7has gone in with something, saying we need to consider 
this.  And he has been told to go away and come back with a position paper on it, which is good. 
They don’t go without advice on this; they don’t make decisions lightly - and that reflects how 
much they discuss things. (Interview 14 - public LCDC) 
Nevertheless, there were clear tensions within the LCDC. For example, one contributor was 
dismayed by: 
  
…match-marking going on which was particularly evident in the earlier meetings. 
(Interview 13 - public LCDC)  
 
However, such conflicts seem to have been managed effectively by both the individual chairs 
and the Chief Officer, as these contributors explained: 
It’s like having a large family: there will be good days and there will be bad days ... From time 
to time, one has to flex the muscles slightly so that they don’t get too complacent. (Interview 06: 
Civil Society LCDC)  
There is a good depth of discussion and deliberation within the committee around the issues 
that are on the table: an extremely serious debate. Conflictive partnership would be a way of 
describing the process that you experience around that table. It is robust. People have very 
strong views. They are listened to. (Interview 13: Public LCDC).  
An elite interview similarly highlighted how a committee becomes more consensus-orientated 
when focused on a clear and local topic:   
When people start to work on things they begin to lose their mantle as to whom they are there 
to represent, and they begin to focus instead on what the objective is. And when they get 
beyond that idea of’ I am here to represent, say the council’, and they look at the task, and 
that goes back to the vision we were trying to create, is that we were all focused on delivering  
- what was best for the area. And by the time we were finished, and you were listening to the 
presentations people would make, it would be impossible for you to identify who they were 
representing, and that was a big success. (Interview 17 - elite interview) 
Issues of concern highlighted in relation to dialogue and deliberation include: 
 Topics for discussion tended to influence the potential for and effectiveness of 
dialogue and deliberation. 
 Topics which had local impact appeared to generate deep and insightful discussion in 
all committees. 
 
7 Chief Officer is a statutory role in the LCDC assigned to a local authority senior staff member. 
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 SPC contributors were obliged to react to pre-prepared plans and policies rather than 
being asked for early input. Civil society contributors who wanted to make a greater 
contribution were particularly frustrated by this approach.  
 In contrast, robust dialogue and deliberation characterised the consensus-based LCDC 
approach which focused on the local setting.  
The uneven empowerment apparent between these collaborative mechanisms was a key theme 
highlighted in this section. This was manifested in the inequitable access to information and 
available time for properly sharing insights and perspectives. From a public value perspective, 
the engagement was more effective where issues of local interest were discussed. However, the 
central government control over local government agendas which curtailed opportunities for 
the mechanisms to focus on local priorities was another pronounced theme which emerged.  
5.3 Legitimacy and Authorisation 
The literature review and context chapter outlined how the reform of local government aims to 
balance representative and participatory democracy. Public value management was designed 
to boost the legitimacy of government decisions and policies by broadening civil society 
participation in local governance. This section therefore elaborates on the broad authorising 
environment in which the three mechanisms operate the relationships which have developed 
between stakeholders, and how it has balanced accountability between national mandates and 
local expectations. This research is seen through the lens of actors directly participating in these 
participatory processes. To reiterate, the operational framework would envisage inclusion of 
the following elements:  
 broad actor participation: involving a broad range of state and non-state stakeholders.  
 trust: confidence in the capability and behaviour of the committee and participants. 
 decision-making and accountability: participants have the power to make decisions 
and are accountable for their actions 
 
5.3.1 Broad Actor Participation 
Civil, political, government, and administrative actors comprise the diverse range of 
stakeholders collaborating in the pursuit of public value. This section delineates the 
contributors’ experience of the authorising environment in which the three collaborative 
mechanisms are established and the effectiveness of stakeholder participation within these 
committees. A PVM approach would demonstrate on-going support for the decisions and 
legitimate or judgements derived from key political and relevant stakeholders, since evidences 
a broad range of participants and their availability and opportunity to participate.  
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Further, this reinforces a recognition of the legitimacy of the role of the different actors 
involved; especially civil society. 
A Broad Range of Actors 
This section offers contributor views on the composition of the committees in terms of whether 
all sectors of society are represented. The level of attendance at these meetings is also 
discussed. The composition of the SPCs and the LCDC was fully outlined in the context 
chapter. While contributors expressed overall satisfaction with the composition of their 
committees, some maintained that certain sectors of society were under-represented, while 
others felt that those participating should be in a position to represent all sectors of society. 
Examples of possibly under-represented cohorts suggested by one contributor included 
Travellers, new communities, and disadvantaged areas: 
This is where you have to build capacity. This should be through the community and voluntary 
sector, but the things that get through the community and voluntary sector are people that  have 
an interest, or people  that can articulate a vision. And, generally speaking, the very 
disadvantaged communities don’t generally have the capacity to do that.  Then they don’t put 
themselves forward... this was something that the PPN8  was supposed to address, but what you 
found happens with the PPN is the best organised groups came on to the PPN. (Interview 03 - 
public LCDC)  
Other contributors felt that young people should be more directly involved in the committees. 
While they welcomed the Limerick Youth Service is a member of the LCDC, others felt that 
TUSLA or the chair of CYPSE should also be represented: 
I think you would get more of that if there were younger people on it...You could have a youth 
body sitting on it ... I think in the same way that we are looking at gender quotas, we need to 
look at an age balance as well... My experience is that the majority of people you deal with in 
politics in local government are over 50. (Interview 07 - public ED SPC) 
Other organisations suggested as suitable for LCDC membership included business groups, 
trade unions, and An Garda Siochana. The findings revealed that Limerick LCDC, which was 
embedded within the structure of the local authority, invested considerable time and effort in 
the early stages of its establishment to integrate the Local Development Companies into the 
LCDC process.  This had laid the foundation for a collective approach to local and community 
development decision-making. 
 
8  Public Participation Network – established to nominate community voluntary participants to the SPCs and the LCDC (replaced the 
Community and Voluntary Fora) 
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The LCDC were also apparently better-attended than their SPC counterparts, where 
membership seemed to fall off over time. One contributor admitted the T&T SPC occasionally 
struggled to form a quorum: 
The membership was good at the beginning, but that fell down over time. And now you don’t 
have good attendance either from the sectoral or the elected reps, and they are struggling to 
reach quorums at times. (Interview 11-01 - public T&T SPC)  
Several contributors also maintained that PPN representatives enjoyed better attendance at the 
SPC meetings than the civil society representatives coming from the private sector (Interview 
15 - public ED SPC; Interview 11-01 - public T&T SPC). Falling attendance was largely 
attributed to the topics being discussed, with one contributor suggesting that members be 
regularly reminded of the role and focus of the committees that throughout the entire process 
(Interview 15 - public ED SPC; Interview 05 - public T&T SPC). In contrast to the SPCs, all 
LCDC contributors reported active participation by all sectors including civil society, elected 
representatives, and local authority executive. In fact, one contributor praised the LCDC as:  
…the best and most participative committee I have been on in my 25 to 30 years of service.  
(Interview 14 - public LCDC) 
The key insights on the range of actors involved elicited above indicate that: 
 it is essential that all sectors of society are represented on issues which affect them 
 there is a need to build capacity in communities for sectors that are unable to participate 
directly on the committees 
 the LCDC invested the time to persuade local development companies to join the 
committee to generate a collective approach to local and community development 
Availability of Participants 
The literature review on participation demonstrates that the timing, frequency and 
reimbursement for meetings are key issues which impact the legitimate participation of 
stakeholders in these mechanisms. These issues were raised by contributors and discussed in 
this section. 
Much of the literature on participatory processes stresses the importance of facilitating 
participation by ensuring that meetings are scheduled in such a way as to enable rather than 
inhibit participation. These findings suggest that two challenges obtain in this regard: on one 
hand, contributors felt SPCs required more frequent meetings to enable them to become 
properly policy-orientated and allow more time for meaningful contributions to be made 
(Interview 01 - public T&T SPC: Interview 15 - public ED SPC): on the other, contributors 
described their difficulties in meeting obligations to attend multiple meetings.  
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For example, while LCDC contributors largely agreed that monthly LCDC meetings are 
worthwhile, one contributor worried this could give to participant ‘burnout’ (Interview 06 - 
civil society LCDC). A number of non-elected SPC members referred to their difficulties in 
balancing their regular full-time employment with voluntary participation in meetings. While 
they recognised the high level of engagement necessary to develop their understanding and 
knowledge, they occasionally felt the expectations for them to attend in a voluntary capacity in 
tandem with other voluntary commitments, was unrealistic (Interview 06 - civil society 
LCDC). Since volunteers are experts who provide the same level of commitment as many full-
time committee members, it was suggested that some form of financial or other incentive 
should be offered to support  them (Interview 06 - civil society LCDC).  
Others made the point that while many more people would like to commit to volunteering, 
volunteers tend to fall into the 35-50 age bracket unless the committee is age-specific. In fact, 
they are not engaging the community and voluntary sector at any level because the scheduling 
of meetings deters many interested parties (Interview 06 - civil society LCDC; Interview 07 - 
public ED SPC). Indeed, elected representatives also expressed difficulties with attending 
multiple meetings including regular council meetings, Municipal District meetings, two SPCs, 
and meetings of external boards. One contributor reported being available less than fifty 
percent of the time for one SPC for precisely this reason (Interview 09 - public ED SPC). They 
explained that preparation for and attending meetings had to be balanced with their full-time 
employment: and even though the majority of meetings were held during the working day, 
payment was nominal for what was deemed a full-time role (Interview 09 - public ED SPC; 
Interview 07 - public ED SPC). Elected representatives were reimbursed for attending the SPCs 
(Interview 07 - public ED SPC). While getting to meetings clearly presented a challenge for 
some of the members, the frequency of meetings is also an important issue and is discussed 
further in a later section. 
The key insights in this section on the availability of participants indicate that: 
 collaboration in these mechanisms is resource intensive 
 it was particularly challenging for part-time elected representatives and voluntary civil 
society participants to commit sufficient time to participate fully  
 attendance was challenging for senior public service organisations staff who were 




5.3.2 Trust  
The development of mutual trust amongst participants within collaborative mechanisms is a 
key component of collaborative governance. It is also to be expected that the State sector 
respect both the input of civil society and the legitimacy of their involvement. The findings so 
far indicate a greater degree of interaction between the members of the LCDC than the SPCs: 
they meet more frequently; share information and knowledge, and deliberate on issues. Such a 
level of interaction would be expected to foster an ethos of mutual trust. However, this section 
reveals, despite appreciation of expert input of the diverse sectors, the contributors indicated a 
much greater level of trust in the LCDC than the SPCs. 
The SPCs and the LCDC present opportunities for civil society to directly participate in local 
governance alongside the elected representatives, the executive of the local authority, and other 
public service organisations. Several public sector contributors welcomed the participation of 
civil society members, and while elected representatives conceded they would not have 
developed such strong relationships with the civil society representatives on the SPCs, they 
nonetheless respected them and appreciated their input: 
I think this is a good collaboration because you have different voices coming from the different 
sectors on the committee, and it is not only councillors. (Interview 05 - public T&T SPC)  
Councillors come at things from one perspective, but there is value in taking other feedback, I 
think. (Interview 07 - public ED SPC)  
The community and voluntary sector are the people that are closest to the stuff on the ground. 
(Interview 03 - public LCDC) 
Closer scrutiny of these relationships reveal a number of the strengths and weaknesses. It is 
evident that civil society felt particularly disempowered by the SPCs. They felt merely 
‘tolerated’ by the executive and maintained elected representatives used the process to pursue 
their own interests: 
They9 are the people with the power: they are in the system. People like me on the outside; I see 
these SPCs as people [who] are tolerated, outside the public system, rather than something that 
is proactively encouraged or actively engaged with from a private perspective. (Interview 02 -
civil society T&T SPC)  
The impact of this perceived power differential was deeply felt by the civil society contributors. 
Firstly, elected representatives were criticised for dominating the discussion at the SPC 
meetings. As one contributor observed: 
 
9 ‘they’ is referring to the council executive. 
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There are a few people here who haven’t spoken at all... It was the elected representatives who 
seemed to dominate what was said at the SPC meetings. (Interview 12 - civil society T&T SPC)  
While another reflected: 
While you felt very confident expressing your view, my experience was entirely that it was a 
talking shop for councillors to vent their concerns to the assembled media, and that’s all they 
were interested in. (Interview 10 - civil society ED SPC) 
Secondly, civil society representatives did not feel like an equal partner at the meetings and felt 
largely excluded from the process. Contributors had assumed they would have a say in how 
their members would be affected by various issues that arose on the committee (Interview 12 - 
civil society T&T SPC). But, despite public contributors indicating that this perspective was 
welcomed, civil society contributors routinely found themselves unwanted and underutilised:  
I got the distinct impression that the councillors tolerated me and didn’t consider me to be a 
proper partner and I wasn’t an equal. (Interview 10 - civil society ED SPC) 
I had higher expectation of what was going to happen. I thought there would be more 
connectedness between the councillors and our PPN.  But we never got that. Always them and 
us. I was always of that feeling - that there was never an inclusiveness. (Interview 08 - civil 
society T&T SPC) 
The power of civil society seemed to dictate the level of trust in the LCDC. An important 
difference between the LCDC and the SPCs in terms of their mandate, was that the civil society 
representatives on the LCDC had more power than those on the SPC. There is a rule in the 
LCDC that ‘public’ interests10 cannot represent more than 49% of the voting rights11. From a 
national perspective, one elite contributor explained that this ensured the structure complied 
with EU requirements around community-led local development and facilitated a unique Irish 
model, since funding to other EU countries was automatically channelled through local 
government (Interview 17 - elite interview).  One contributor explicitly supported ‘private’ 
interests12 having the majority:  
You can’t have an LCDC where the State sector has a majority, and I believe when decisions 
are being made the private sector13 should have a majority in the room. (Interview 14 - public 
LCDC)  
This contributor elucidated that the Chief Executives of the public sector organisations would 
traditionally have made decisions. However, in the case of the LCDC, the majority civil society 
 
10 ‘public interests’ is a term used in the Guidelines for the Establishment and Operation of LCDCs, DECLG, 2014 to describe the public 
sector. 
11 Guidelines for the Establishment and Operation of LCDCs, DECLG, 2014 
12 ‘private interests’ is a term used in the Guidelines for the Establishment and Operation of LCDCs, DECLG, 2014 to describe the non-
State/civil society sector. 
13 ‘private interests’ is a term used in the Guidelines for the Establishment and Operation of LCDCs, DECLG, 2014 to describe the non-
State/civil society sector. 
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interests must agree. This aligned with the policies outlined in Putting People First 
(Department of the Environment, Community and Local Government, 2012) and the Local 
Government Reform Agenda:  
The likes of the chief executive of the LA, the chief executive of the HSE, the Regional Manager 
of the DEASP, the chief executive of the LCETB, and the elected members - they might want to 
do something. But if the other groups don’t want it they won’t get it past the committee.  There 
is no guarantee that they will get it across the line.  The PPN and the IFA, the chamber might 
say ‘no, we are not doing that’.  So that’s an example of PPF, but hopefully, of course, the 
elected members are voted by their communities as well. (Interview 14 - public LCDC)  
Civil society contributors felt the LCDC was a more level playing field: 
In my time on the LCDC I have never ever seen political party influence, which is unusual for 
me because normally there is. I have to say Limerick LCDC has been thinking collectively.  
They have left party politics at the door, and I think that’s one of the strengths of it. It’s been 
very healthy that way, and I actually think there were some members of the PPN who came in 
thinking the politicians are going to hijack it. And I do believe that each of us from the PPN 
have grown to respect the elected representatives at the table. (Interview 06 - civil society 
LCDC ) 
It also emerged that LCDC members respected each other enough to accept give and take:  
Where we might be diametrically opposed, for example, an agriculture voice and an 
environmental voice, that relationship is one that takes time to develop and evolve.  And it will 
always come down to trust and respect, and a give and take in the practice of the committee, 
without any voice thinking, ‘why am I here? there’s no point in being here.’ So there are times 
when one may have to say,‘ well, I cannot accept this’, or ‘that’s fundamentally against the 
voice I represent’, and that’s literally where you get down to horse-trading. But there has to be 
give and take for that to be successful. (Interview 06 - civil society LCDC)  
Ultimately, the experience of the LCDC members emerged as extremely positive: 
Not everyone would have known each other before the LCDC but they do know each other 
better now, and there is now good advice flowing left, right, and centre on all sorts of things. 
(Interview 04 – public LCDC) 
 So when it comes to the meetings it’s a very level playing pitch.  Everyone has their say, and 
I think that whenever decisions are being made it seems to be very transparent. The people 
are not, in many ways, feeling they are only there as tokenism: they feel very much part of it. 
And I think that very much enhances the collaboration bit. (Interview 14 - public LCDC) 
I’ve noticed that people in the committee are now more trusting of other people’s views and I 
think people are more appreciative of other people’s views. (Interview 03 - public LCDC) 
Key perceptions on the topic of trust indicate: 
 A stark contrasts between the SPCs and the LCDC in terms of the respect shown to 
civil society participants. 
 Civil society contributors felt disempowered in the SPCs since elected representatives 
tended to dominate the discussions. 
 Civil society contributors were treated as an equal partner at the LCDC where they 
enjoyed a majority vote. 
 Trusting relationships apparently developed over time in the LCDC, leading to greater 
collaboration between LCDC members. As such, it grew into a cohesive group within 
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which the individual participants felt they could openly debate and contribute to the 
discussions. 
5.3.3 Decision-Making and Accountability 
The actors nominated to these committees have been authorised to represent civil society and 
the State. Within these collaborative mechanisms, participants have to balance national 
mandates with local expectations, and their personal views with those of the sector they 
represent. This section explains the impact of decision-making on collaboration, participant 
accountability for performance, financial management, and transparency, within such 
mechanisms. 
Decision-making 
The LCDC is a decision-making body whereas SPCs are committees mandated by the local 
authority to advise and assist the wider council in relation to the formulation, development, and 
review of policy. This section examines the different value contributors place on SPCs: these 
are perceived as powerless compared to their mandate to make decisions in the LCDC. 
To reiterate: information is brought before the SPC by the council executive through the 
chairperson and the Director of Service. Civil society representatives consider the information 
jointly with elected representatives but the final decisions are made by the elected council. In 
discussions around whether the committees had given the individual sectors greater power to 
influence policy, SPC contributors were very clear about the strict advisory capacity of their 
role. In short, their recommendations go before the full Council, with whom final policy 
decisions ultimately rest (Interview 05 - public T&T SPC). As one contributor expressed it: 
Our opinion would go forward to the council. Therefore, we always knew what we said was 
not final. (Interview 12 - civil society T&T SPC)  
In terms of actual contribution, two members explained: 
What we are doing is having an open discussion to improve the policy that’s there or policy 
coming down the line, and it allows for that input in a balanced way. (Interview 07 - public 
ED SPC)  
We have an ability to supplement, rather than drive policy. (Interview 09 - public ED SPC) 
The policies are then intended to be implemented by the Directors of Services who have been 
delegated their responsibilities by the Chief Executive (Interview 01 - public T&T SPC). Both 
public and civil society contributors were evidently frustrated by their limited power to 
influence the outcome of discussions: 
With my idea: everybody likes it, but nobody does anything about it. That is frustrating. 
(Interview 05 – public T&T SPC)  
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I think a lot of it is that they14 are interested in their own goals. (Interview 08 - civil society 
T&T SPC)  
Perhaps most frustratingly, several contributors reported that not all views are included in the 
final policies/outcomes (Interview 05 - public T&T SPC; Interview 02 -civil society T&T SPC; 
Interview 08 - civil society T&T SPC). One contributor claimed: 
They are not aware enough of what my sector wants...I would have brought forward a couple 
of items. They were well discussed but I would have got a sense that the executive weren’t 
interested in engaging on it.  I wouldn’t have got the sense that they were interested, and you’d 
kind of get a half answer. (Interview 02 -civil society T&T SPC) 
Unlike the SPCs, the LCDC is a decision-making committee. As such, civil society and elected 
representatives consider and decide on local and community development programmes 
alongside the local authority executive and other public service organisations. One contributor 
maintained this: 
…has given a wider group of people a chance to be brought into the decision making;  e.g., 
the LCETB, not just the Council, the LDCs, or DEASP. (Interview 14 - public LCDC)  
Building on prior CDBs experience which found that they had no direct executive powers and 
had very limited financial and/or other resources (Indecon Report 2008), the LCDC was 
assigned decision-making powers in respect of the management, coordination and 
implementation of local and community development programmes and to operate 
independently of the full Council. Several contributors reflected on this autonomy :  
It is the decision-making that makes the LCDC different; it is not beholden to anyone. 
(Interview 04 - public LCDC) 
 
They are empowered to make decisions, so it’s a very serious business. They are not a matter 
of making recommendations to a higher body. The LCDC make their own decisions so that 
kind of adds a lot of pressure on people in some ways to be participative: they know they have 
a job to do. (Interview 14 - public LCDC) 
It actually has made the committee very powerful because it has an incredible access to grants 
and grant applications, and it has become one envied by other members of the Council. 
(Interview 13 - public LCDC) 
When asked who made the greatest impact at LCDC meetings, the general response can be 
summarised by this contributor:   
So in terms of who has had an impact; obviously the LDCs had to have an impact because of 
the programmes of work; the councillors have to have had an impact because, to be fair to 
them, they are engaged, and they’re quite vociferous without being aggressive. They are 
actively engaged.  The PPN members have quite an impact because they question and they 
don’t let stuff slide. (Interview 11-02 - civil society LCDC) 
 
14 ‘they’ referred to the council executive.  
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The collaborative governance literature indicated that decision-making plays a pivotal part in 
trust building, and notes that with each positive outcome, trust builds on itself incrementally 
over time (Vangen and Huxham 2003). This would explain the greater evidence of trust in the 
LCDC than the SPCs.   
Key insights from this section focus on the power of decision-making and issues which develop 
when trust is absent: 
 There were a broad range of actors in the LCDC involved in successfully deliberating 
on local and community development funding.  
 The perceived powerlessness of SPCs frustrated both civil society and public sector 
contributors because rather than creating policies, they were merely commenting on 
recommendations made by the executive to the elected council. 
Participants are accountable for the outcomes of their membership of these committees as 
addressed in the next section. 
Accountability 
As demonstrated in the literature, a PVM approach assumes an outward accountability towards 
users and citizens as well as upward to departments and inspectorates (Kelly et al. 2002; 
Williams and Shearer 2011). This incorporates accountability to the public for meeting 
objectives and targets around performance and financial management, and matters of  
transparency and providing public information (Gains and Stoker 2009). It also entails 
reporting to government departments and inspectorates who occasionally adopt an oversight 
role. This section first considers feedback from participants who would be expected to be aware 
of accountability arising from their direct involvement in these mechanisms. The section then 
interrogates the arrangements for monitoring, oversight, and issues of transparency. 
 
As previously discussed, the SPCs did not set objectives and targets as their agenda was 
dominated either by national policies in the case of the T&T SPC, or by local policies 
developed outside the EDSPC. Neither was there a proactive system in place for updating SPC 
participants on the progression of those policies: 
I’d like to hear an update on things we have done over the last few years, a quarterly, or bi-
yearly update. (Interview 09 - public ED SPC).  
 
Where such information was available, the public sector seemed more aware of it than the civil 
society members.  As one civil society contributor said:   
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I don’t think anyone is accountable, I haven’t seen any evidence ...We wouldn’t necessarily 
see the results.  Unless you follow them up yourself, you wouldn’t ever be told.  Based on my 
own experience on the couple of things I have brought before the committee, the 
implementation has been very poor. (Interview 02 -civil society T&T SPC) 
 
Public sector contributors referred to the customary hierarchies and protocols involved: 
 
Outcomes are monitored and some policies are brought back for review if they are found to 
be not working one hundred per cent ... the Directors of Services are responsible for 
implementing them. (Interview 01: public T&T SPC)  
 
If a policy is adopted you get a timeframe when the policy would come into effect. It is public 
knowledge then because it is posted on the council website. (Interview 05 - public T&T SPC)  
 
As previously discussed, the objectives and targets for the LCDC were generally set by the 
Department. Accountability for local and community development funding transferred to local 
authorities in 2014. Despite the independent status of the LCDC and its decision-making 
mandate, it remains a statutory committee of the local authority. The LCDC participants 
demonstrated accountability to the public through their direct input into the coordination, 
planning, and oversight, of local and community development funding decisions. According to 
the LCDC guidelines, it was always intended that the democratic mandate of the elected 
members on the LCDC be respected.  Indeed, one contributor emphasised that elected members 
on the LCDC are actually accountable to the full Council for the decisions they make (Interview 
13 - public LCDC), while another elaborated:  
The council officials, the Chief Officer15…I suppose we all are responsible to a certain extent.  
But from the point of view of whose head is on the block if things don’t get done, it’s the Chief 
Officer. But we have to take collective responsibility for that, really. (Interview 14 - public 
LCDC) 
Moreover, as the financial partner, the local authority signs the statutory contracts with 
successful grant applicants, thereby reinforcing local authority accountability (Interview 13 - 
public LCDC). To ensure accountability, processes such as tendering, national monitoring, and 
auditing, were therefore introduced. 
The context chapter delineated how the review of the CDBs confirmed widespread support for 
a mechanism of high-level oversight by central government for such collaborations (Indecon 
 




Report 2008), and indeed, the interviews revealed that despite its decision-making mandate, 
the LCDC was sometimes overruled by the Department16.  
Despite the flexibility of the LCDC to make its own decisions based on the local information 
available to it, they could clearly be overruled by the Department. As one contributor remarked: 
When you make a decision and the Department overrules you, it’s not good. (Interview 04 - 
public LCDC)  
 
From a national perspective, the elite interviews maintained that one reason for national 
monitoring and oversight was financial accountability:  
The reason for monitoring in the LCDC is the accountability of local government for the local 
development budget’ (Interview 18 - elite interview)  
It is to ensure the money all got channelled through one place so there was visibility for people 
on the LCDC of all the elements. That was one of the weakness of the CDB: we could never 
get a full picture of all the resources that were going in to any particular area. Anywhere you 
have money going in you have to have a proper monitoring system, both in terms of how it is 
achieving its objectives.  For me, it’s important to have that monitoring system.  And remember 
the money is coming under LEADER and therefore it has to be audited, minded, and managed, 
because they are going to audit it. (Interview 17 - elite interview) 
The LCDC was also required to prepare the community section of a Local Economic and 
Community Plan (LECP). The LCDC structure and the LECP framework were deemed 
important from an oversight perspective (Interview 13 - public LCDC). However, the LCDC 
seemed to have difficulty aligning the programmes and deadlines imposed on it by government 
(the Department of Rural and Community Development) with the co-ordination and 
implementation of the LECP since:  
…so much time of the business of LCDC is taken with LEADER and SICAP and has to.  But the 
roles and responsibilities of the LCDC are far greater than that. (Interview 06 - civil society 
LCDC)  
 
In that regard, some contributors believed that the LCDC should introduce a monitoring and 
evaluation programme; setting out targets under different headings of the LECP, and indicating 
how it was going to monitor those: 
It’s about outcomes in terms of what are our targets under differing headings. How are we 
going to monitor those? What are we achieving? And more importantly, what we are not 
achieving? ... and to clearly identify roles and responsibilities and consequent actions. 
(Interview 06 - civil society LCDC) 
In terms of its accountability to the wider public, in 2014 the PPN was given the role  of electing 
community and voluntary sector representatives to the LCDC and the SPCs.  
 
16 Department of Rural and Community Development 
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However, contributors indicated an apparent issue with the functioning of the PPN in Limerick 
at the time of interviewing, and while this topic was not discussed, contributors agreed they 
relied on the PPN for support (Interview 08 - civil society T&T SPC; Interview 10 - civil 
society ED SPC): 
I can’t think of a more suitable mechanism for discussing and developing policy than a policy 
committee consisting of both directly elected members of the council and the representatives 
of all the various strands of community and society, I can’t think of a better vehicle, but I do 
believe that the paths into that from the community and societal parts of it could be worked 
on strongly, because they are very weak. (emphasis added) (Interview 10 - civil society ED 
SPC) 
Discussions indicated that the PPN was a crucial source of support to those elected to the 
committees:  
The PPN is very important. It’s the only way we are going to have a voice inside there17. You 
need non-elected people in there to bring the views of the ordinary people. (Interview 08 - 
civil society T&T SPC)  
The PPN was described as an important unit of co-ordination within the community and 
voluntary sector. As a good source of information and support, it enabled better feedback to the 
other organisations, and created a platform for sharing information between a variety of people 
with different outlooks (Interview 08 - civil society T&T SPC; Interview 06 - civil society 
LCDC; Interview 10 - civil society ED SPC). Conversely, contributors felt it was difficult to 
interest volunteers in high-level policy, such as national transport policy, when they might be 
more interested in local operational matters such as cycling solutions or wheelchair accessibility 
(Interview 06 - civil society LCDC; Interview 08 - civil society T&T SPC). From a national 
policy-making perspective the need to give citizens the capacity to interpret policy was raised: 
People are also doing it on a part-time or voluntary basis. Why would we be surprised then 
when people struggle? We need to enable people by giving them the capacity and resources 
to actually plan for themselves, whatever the policy responsibility might be: give them the 
capacity to be able to interpret. (Interview 16 - elite interview) 
The civil society representatives also drew attention to their accountability to other 
organisations: 
What makes it work well for me personally would be the support of our disability group ... We 
have a wide sector of disabilities, and when I bring issues to them they will flood me with 
information on what their obstacles are. (Interview 08 - civil society T&T SPC) 
The CIF have monthly meetings, so there would be an item on the agenda report back from 
SPCs.  So the various people on the SPCs would say, chat.  We would have people on various 
housing SPCs, and whatever. I’d have to say an awful lot had very little progress made was 
the general consensus, but at the same time we did feed back into our members. (Interview 12 
- civil society T&T SPC) 
 
17 Meaning the T&T SPC 
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In terms of accountability to the wider public, the media attended the SPC meetings and the 
minutes were published on the local authority website. In fact this issue of media presence was 
raised by both public and civil society contributors to the SPCs. By and large, they appeared to 
be in favour of the media attending the meetings, but complained that politicians could not 
resist the opportunity to ‘grab headlines’.  For that reason, it may have been more helpful if the 
press did not attend every meeting (Interview 02 -civil society T&T SPC; Interview 12 - civil 
society T&T SPC). Interestingly, another contributor speculated that sectoral representatives 
may have been reluctant to talk freely due to the presence of the media (Interview 15 - public 
ED SPC). In terms of the fair media coverage one contributor reflected: 
The media are there to cover the meeting, so it’s really up to them to do a fair coverage. But 
that doesn’t happen all the time because some people get quoted again and again. And then 
some people don’t get quoted at all, and they might say good things.  And I think with the SPC 
meetings, the sectoral18 representatives should get a better coverage. I feel that the way the 
SPC meetings are being covered, more focus is on the councillors and the public reps.  There 
should be more an equal focus on the sectoral representatives by the media. (Interview 05 - 
public T&T SPC). 
LCDC meetings on the other hand were conducted in private: a feature which was welcomed 
by contributors since:  
…it is a working delegated functional committee of council and therefore requires privacy. 
(Interview 13 - public LCDC) 
Contributors were concerned that public LCDC meetings would invite more ‘grandstanding 
and pontificating’ by elected representatives. Unlike the SPCs, it emerged that the political 
agenda did not tend to dominate the LCDC, which some contributors attributed to the closed 
forum. Contributors agreed that the fact that members “worked as a group of councillors” 
(Interview 13 - public LCDC) nullified “the political need to dominate it” (Interview 11-02 - 
civil society LCDC):  
The elected members have to date not been too parochial; being able to see the bigger picture 
and wanting to make sure they make the right decisions and seeking position papers.  They 
are valuable contributors to the LCDC. (Interview 14 - public LCDC)  
Issues of concern highlighted in this section arise from the fact that collaborative mechanisms 
in local government currently operate in a broad and complex authorising environment: 
 In contrast to the LCDC, which was closely monitored due to its financial autonomy, 
there was no monitoring or oversight of the SPCs, either locally or nationally. 
 There was no monitoring programme in place for the implementation of the LECP. 
 As with SPCs, objectives and targets were not established to monitor its 
implementation. 
 
18 The sectoral representatives are the community and voluntary and the representatives nominated by the professional organisations. 
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 Civil society was reliant on the support of the PPN and other parent bodies, to whom 
they were accountable for their actions. 
 Public meetings, considered important for transparency, may have contributed to the 
attention-seeking behaviour of elected representatives in the SPCs.  
 By contrast, there was little opportunity for elected representatives involved in the 
LCDC to engage in such activities, as these meetings were held in private. 
Two main themes emerged from this section on Legitimacy and Authorisation. The first was 
the legitimacy of civil society in the collaborative mechanisms studied, and the power given to 
civil society in the LCDC as a catalyst for treating civil society as an equal player in the 
partnerships. The second was that committing to a broader authorising environment is resource- 
intensive; particularly in local governance mechanisms which entail cross-sector collaboration. 
5.4 Operational Capacity  
This section applies a collaboration perspective to determine whether the collaborative 
mechanisms under examination have the capacity to steer and motivate (leadership capacity), 
and establish, facilitate, and operate (procedural capacity) arrangements for managing actors 
from across jurisdictional, sectoral and organisational boundaries. As previously outlined,  the 
operational framework envisages evidence of the following elements:  
 leadership: influence, mobilise, and direct state and non-state actors to collectively 
create public value 
 procedural capacity: availability of resources/capability to facilitate collaboration 
5.4.1 Leadership 
The literature described leadership as a critical ingredient for collaborative governance. It is 
important to both facilitate and steer the processes, and to round up the support needed from 
the external environment to deliver public value outcomes. Public leadership does not spring 
solely from within public organisations, but is leadership which impacts on the public, and can 
be displayed by any of the actors in the collaborative process.  As such, it not only about 
personal skills, but involves influence between actors and groups (Morse 2007; Hartley et al. 
2019b). In general, contributors offered their perspectives on leadership as it relates to their 
respective collaborative processes. As one contributor elaborated: 
There’s leadership activity possible at all levels in an organisation …..how something is chaired 
and managed, relationship leadership where people lead by the way they behave, servant 
leadership where you lead by serving the cohort that you are there to serve, and operational 
leadership which is where people take responsibility for different pieces of work. (Interview 11-
02 - civil society LCDC).  
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Another contributor had observed various different types of leadership: organisational 
leadership in terms of setting the agenda and making it happen, which was very much led by 
the Director; public interest leadership, explained as, ‘Do you want members debating 
everything? No, you want them debating the right things on your agenda’; shared leadership 
where the chair can choose to shape the agenda with the executive; and occasional dictatorial 
leadership because ultimately decisions must be made and deadlines met (Interview 15 - public 
ED SPC). 
The interview responses around leadership indicated that the civil society members of these 
committees were capable and competent professionals who occupy positions of leadership 
within their own organisations and sectors. In terms of their demonstrable leadership skills and 
capabilities for example, SPC contributors stated: 
I’m in charge of a company. If we decide we are building 20 houses, we are going to start and 
plan and build them in 3 or 4 months. (Interview 12 - civil society T&T SPC)  
I’ve been chairing meetings in my professional capacity for 40 years in tough environment;, 
managing site meetings where you have all sorts of conflicting view. (Interview 10 - civil 
society ED SPC) 
One contributor represents an organisation with a wide range of participating disabilities 
(Interview 08 - civil society T&T SPC), while another cited poor understanding of civil society 
by the State sector: 
If you take a helicopter view of ‘how can we work better together? ... I think private sector19 
people are well intentioned. They can add value based on their abilities, their experience, their 
education.  They bring a different approach and create a brainstorming-type approach. My 
experience is a dismissiveness of the private sector by the public sector which is a lack of 
confidence by the public sector in what the private sector can bring. And where I have come 
across public sector reps who are confident in their own abilities, its transformative in terms of 
how you can work with them to achieve real progress in a really positive manner. (Interview 02 
-civil society T&T SPC) 
Conversely, LCDC contributors are conscious that its members are leaders, influencers, and 
decision-makers in their own sectors. Several examples of this were given:  
The Limerick Youth Services bring a wisdom we wouldn’t have known. We have Social 
Protection who are people on top of their game. (Interview 04 - public LCDC)  
 
Civil society leadership also coming from within the LCDC was evident across the interviews:  
I think there is good leadership coming from within from the point of view of issues that are 
important. And I think we have some very strong members who actually provide leadership. 
When I think about leadership I think about how much influence they have and how they 
influence the discussion and the thought process. And I do think there are leaders all around 
the table who bring their viewpoint. Probably the leadership is less among the state sector from 
 
19 Private sector here means the civil society representatives who were nominated by private sector organisations. 
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the point of view of trying to influence stuff because of… I would much rather that the community 
and voluntary sector try and influence stuff because they are the people that are closest to the 
stuff on the ground. (Interview 03 - public LCDC)  
The leadership style in the LCDC was described as: 
…collaborative; in that while it’s guiding, it’s not done in a hierarchical manner. (Interview 
06 - civil society LCDC)  
 The efficacy of such motivation was succinctly summarised by one contributor:  
Most of the people sitting at that table come in as leaders from their own sectors and you can 
see the strength of that.  And that would have created its own conflicts and tension.  And the 
consolidation of it has provided a very strong leading LCDC which I think is reflected in terms 
of how they are perceived: but that’s a strength of its coalition and the coalition of its people. 
(Interview 13 - public LCDC) 
The sector appointing key people to the LCDC ...sends a very clear message to people that this 
is serious business. We take it seriously, and the community support is something we value. 
(Interview 14 - public LCDC)  
While the delegation of individuals from a variety of organisations with high level of seniority 
is an indication of commitment to a collaborative process, there are challenges in sustaining 
such participation. Public managers are being asked to do more and more without additional 
resources. Concerns were raised by the public contributors that the level of participation by 
senior paid personnel may be unsustainable and two examples were given where this was 
already becoming an issue:  
The CE of the HSE couldn’t sustain that involvement across all the LCDCs so he divided it 
out and you could understand that...the CE of LCCC has stepped aside and I think that might 
not have been the best move as I thought that he being there as a member sent out a very 
strong message. (Interview 14 - public LCDC) 
All these things are time constraints: you can’t sit on so many committees that you can’t get 
your day job done. (Interview 03 - public LCDC)  
The approach taken to chairing the meetings may also have impacted on developing 
relationships. The T&T SPC approach appeared particularly hierarchical: 
I would say the three-minute rule is a very good because it gives everyone a chance to make 
a contribution and its fair in that sense. These are public meetings ... some people tend to 
speak longer than three minutes ... If there was no rule in place you would end up in a meeting 
for five hours or longer, so from the time management point of view it’s a good rule. (Interview 
05 - public T&T SPC) 
However, while stricter rules may enable the meetings to be managed well, it did little to 
improve ongoing relationships. On the other hand, another contributor said a 
moderator/facilitative approach was taken at the ED SPC: 
I think you’ll get a better outcome if that’s the style you adopt, as opposed to more of an 
authoritative. You need to have that level of strictness at a council meeting purely for time. 
Council meetings could be eight or nine hours long. You don’t need to have that same style at 
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an SPC ... I think if you adopt more of that moderator outlook then you do get a more fruitful 
discussion. (Interview 07 - public ED SPC)  
The local authority, on the other hand, took a more facilitative approach to building 
relationships in the LCDC. Indeed, one contributor praised the Chief Officer 20 and Chief 
Executive as “very capable, excellent people” (Interview 04 – public LCDC), while another 
stated: 
I think the relationship between the chair and the chief executive21 is fundamental to the 
working of the LCDC and that is evident within the LCDC now. (Interview 06 - civil society 
LCDC)  
In fact, contributors generally found local authority staff: 
…quite facilitative.  They didn’t make it particularly difficult...The staff of LCCC have been 
very supportive and committed to it...You model how things should be by the way you direct. 
(Interview 11-02 - civil society LCDC) 
The key insights on leadership elicited above indicate that: 
 Leadership for public value must have the capability mindset to influence, mobilise 
and direct State and non-State actors to collaborate to achieve and sustain effective 
collaboration.  
 The leadership potential among many of the participants of these collaborative 
mechanisms was not realised in all cases. 
 Leadership was fostered by the LCDC collaborative approach. 
 The leadership potential of the SPC contributors was not harnessed and  persisted in a 
more traditional hierarchical approach. 
Public managers must demonstrate the procedural capacity to facilitate the collaboration as 
discussed in the next section.  
5.4.2 Procedural Capacity 
The literature review indicated that, apart from leadership, the process for creating public value 
must be operationally and administratively feasible. Moreover, feasibility should incorporate 
the ability to facilitate and enable the process. Evidence of the availability of internal and 
external resources, and institutional arrangements would be expected.  
Internal Resources  
The literature review of collaborative processes posits that a willingness to invest time and 
resources to facilitate collaboration is a key determinant of the potential to succeed.  
 
20 Chief Officer is a statutory role in the LCDC assigned to a local authority senior staff member. 
21 Chief executive, Limerick City and County Council 
143 
 
Contributors observed that the work required by LCCC to support the LCDC was highly 
demanding and resource-intensive; not least in terms of the community development 
programmes and the tight deadlines mandated by the Department:  
I feel the local authority doesn’t get sufficient support for a lot of what’s thrown at them and 
they have so many balls to juggle at the same time. The LCDC is working, but it’s almost like 
operating with one hand behind one’s back, because in order to prioritise one thing you’re 
having to drop the ball on something else. Because you don’t have sufficient people there. 
(Interview 06 - civil society LCDC)  
From a national perspective, an elite interviewee who had former involvement in a CDB also 
highlighted the need for resourcing collaborative efforts: 
Community engagement takes resourcing.  When we were doing the strategy there were five 
of us dedicated full-time, there were thirty-one members on the CDB. We had a clear work 
programme laid out for us for two years and we worked day and night on it because of the 
community engagement ... It was intensive resourcing and intensive community engagement 
on every item within that document. (Interview 17 - elite interview) 
It was indicated that more funding and resources were being allocated to the local authority to 
manage the LCDC (Interview 14 - public LCDC) than had been available at the start of the 
process or indeed by comparison to the resources provided to the County and City 
Development Boards which preceded them. A social researcher had been appointed by the local 
authority to support the LCDC and to assist in preparing the Local Economic and Community 
Plan22 (Interview 04 - public LCDC). The evaluation committees for LEADER funding were 
not LCDC members, but included people drawn from civil society: for example, from the 
university, former professionals, former senior staff from local development companies, or 
former public servants. None were LCDC members. Other sub-committees were formed which 
were exclusively comprised of LCDC members. Local and community development funding 
was also fully administered through the LCDC; and again this was not the case for the CDBs. 
By comparison, there was no evidence of additional resources being allocated to the SPCs. 
Apart from occasional workshops being held and guest speakers brought in to speak on 
specialist topics, the usual arrangements for preparing for and supporting quarterly meetings 
continue unchanged. 
The key insights, in this section, on internal resources indicate that: 
 the level of collaboration witnessed in the LCDC is resource-intensive 
 
22 LCDCs were given the role of preparing, implementing (or overseeing the implementation of), and reviewing the community 
elements of six-year Local Economic and Community Plans (LECP) 
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 resources, including a social researcher, were provided to the LCDC by the host 
organisation, LCCC, in addition to the dedicated resources provided by central 
government 
 the ED SPC had access to resources through the Local Enterprise Office, but there 
were no dedicated resources assigned to the T&T SPC 
Training, Group Development, and Sub-committees  
Contributors suggested that training and engaging members in research would enable more 
effective participation.  
SPC contributors claimed they were barely introduced to the other members of the committee 
and simply thrown in at the deep-end with no guidelines on committee protocols; particularly 
for members with no public service background (Interview 08 - civil society T&T SPC; 
Interview 12 - civil society T&T SPC; Interview 02 -civil society T&T SPC). Another 
contributor called for disability awareness training for all members (Interview 08 - civil society 
T&T SPC).  
Most of the contributors maintained the committees would benefit from training or group 
development, and in particular, getting to know the sectoral nominees since the elected 
representatives met them far less frequently than their other elected member colleagues 
(Interview 07 - public ED SPC; Interview 10 - civil society ED SPC). One contributor asserted: 
They need to be ‘on-boarded’ much more effectively...one of those group team building days 
... help people to get to know each other a bit better. (Interview 07 - public ED SPC) 
While another enthused: 
We did training with Chris McInerney about two years ago, and it was absolutely brilliant 
because it was all about us having an awareness of the council and their workings.  But the 
council were to do awareness training as well, and that would be brilliant because you always 
see this divide. (Interview 08 - civil society T&T SPC)  
Another contributor agreed: 
Training is minimal enough. There is a half or quarter day training for new members when 
the SPCs are formed. (Interview 01 - public T&T SPC) 
The use of sub-committees to increase the procedural capacity of the participants to carry out 
their functions was highlighted in the research as being particularly important. Sub-committees 
and evaluation committees were established by the LCDC to assist in determining grant 
allocations.  There was no evidence of sub committees in the SPCs. 
There were suggestions that the SPC members could have been tasked to carry out research for 
the SPCs. For example one contributor noted: 
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There could be better engagement if you could be involved in specific projects that are relevant 
to our sector.  That would be a better way of dealing with it. (Interview 02 -civil society T&T 
SPC)  
Another contributor explained: 
There are various elements to this committee and they represent various strands of society 
and community. I never got a sense they were interested in using the talents in the committee 
for researching areas within the committees remit. (Interview 10 - civil society ED SPC) 
Civil society SPC contributors in particular suggested, and indeed had expected, that the 
executive would task the members with establishing sub-committees which would give them a 
greater role: 
We got a presentation on the tourism strategic plan.  It was very good. It was well presented 
and informative…What were we supposed to do with it other than look at it and be 
informed...are we approving this document? There wasn’t any sense that ‘ok, this is a huge issue 
for the council, so let’s set up a small subcommittee of this group to look at it and bring a proper 
response back to the full committee and put it into the process’. That is the way I would have 
thought it would be done. I didn’t get a sense that was what the members of the committee 
wanted to happen. (Interview 10 - civil society ED SPC) 
People around the committee should be challenged more to say, ‘Well, where are you coming 
from in this?’ It should be more interactive between meetings, so people might give more 
feedback on the presentations etc. and on the agenda that is being set. (Interview 02 -civil 
society T&T SPC) 
Particularly with the elected reps or the CEOs or the different interest groups around the table, 
it’s a wonderful opportunity to develop that fuller picture because they come from such a 
myriad, and they are working together.  That’s why I do think the LCDC is good and has great 
potential if we get that right; and particularly in the sub-committees and further down the chain.  
Then the society in which we all live will benefit from that. (Interview 06 - civil society LCDC) 
Key perceptions from this section indicate: 
 a missed opportunity to harness the resources of the SPCs compared to the 
collaborative approach taken in the LCDC 
 a strong sense that investment in training and engaging members in research through 
the establishment of sub-committees, would enable participants to participate more 
effectively in these collaborative mechanisms 
 
External Resources 
The capacity to mobilise the resources of partner organisations from the public, private, 
voluntary, and community sectors to build policy capability and capacity was identified in the 
PVM literature as invaluable for state actors wishing to minimise implementation deficits and 
support them in achieving their purpose (Heffernan 2003; Innes and Boher 2005; Kapucu et al. 
2009; Benington and Moore 2011; Williams and Shearer 2011; Hartley et al. 2019a; Krogh 
2020). It was also highlighted as important by the contributors to this research:  
I’m more interested in the community welfare aspect of it which brings in Healthy Ireland, Age 
Friendly. That, in my view, has a greater impact on people on the ground. And the strategies 
that we have adapted across youth and older people - whether it’s under health and wellbeing, 
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and whatever the appropriate theme is - that’s in the LECP, we would be better actually 
discussing, because that brings in community transport, community health, aspects of disabled 
persons grants, in terms of where we are talking about, hospital discharge: you’re talking about 
a different forum then. Now, that’s the debate I’d love to start seeing emerging there. (Interview 
13 - public LCDC).  
The LCDC appeared to have developed a greater capacity for taking a transformative approach 
than the SPCs and contributors alluded to occasional facets of new or creative approaches 
emerging. For example, one collaborator maintained: 
Absolutely, yes. I think it has the capacity for creative approaches and fresh ways of thinking, 
and what’s more, I think they could relish it. (Interview 06 - civil society LCDC)  
Contributors were particularly enthusiastic about one project managed by the LCDC:  
Healthy Limerick, which is a subcommittee of the LCDC, is very new. It’s doing great stuff 
because it’s bringing different organisations and bodies together within the city and county, 
that what we can’t do, it’s identifying areas where you can tap into, they have a person they 
can help with that. So I think that it’s almost like an octopus, and the legs are feeding out and 
I think that could be a wonderful beast in time, to be frank. (Interview 06 - civil society LCDC).  
The idea for Healthy Limerick emerged from another high-level committee and its coordinator 
post hosted and managed by the local authority. Healthy Limerick has been hailed as: 
…a very good example where collaboration works. (Interview 14 - public LCDC)  
 …there has been a fair bit of innovation in that Healthy Limerick piece. (Interview 
 11-02: Civil Society, LCDC) 
Key insights from this section on external resources indicate that: 
 The capacity to mobilise public, private, and civil society resources, to build policy 
capability and implementation capacity is essential for collaboration. 
 This was demonstrated in the capacity of the LCDC to prepare the community 
elements of the LECP, and deliberate on the local community and development 
programme. While there are traces of cross-sector innovation beginning to emerge 
from the LCDC in terms of the implementation of the Healthy Limerick project, the 
capability of harnessing external resources to implement the LECP had yet to be 
tested. 
Institutional Design 
The literature review described the role of institutions in enabling and supporting PVM and 
guiding behaviour towards public value outcomes. In particular, the institutional base is 
deemed essential for the State to sustain the operational capacity to pro-actively engage with a 
wider authorising environment to decide public priorities and achieve public value (Peters 
2005). Institutions also affect the custom, practice, and behaviour, of both organisations and 
actors (March and Olsen 2011). In terms of procedural capacity, the importance of any 
committee work planning emerged as significantly important.  
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The context chapter reported that CDBs were effective where there was a spirit of goodwill 
and cooperation between the agencies, where objectives were clear, and where work 
programmes were clear (Indecon Report, 2008). By contrast, Section 5.2 delineated how SPCs 
did not appear to have clear strategic approaches to their work compared to the LCDC which 
had consciously fostered a common purpose.  
This section therefore explores the different approaches to strategic planning experienced by 
the contributors and the capacity for strategic planning in the collaborative mechanisms 
studied.  
It is important to be mindful of the impact of centralisation and lack of autonomy on 
collaboration. From a national perspective, for example, one elite interviewee drew attention to 
the local authorities’ lack of autonomy and the consequences for the implementation of work 
programmes decided by collaborative mechanisms: 
There was a clear work programme set out for the CDBs. CDBs ran out of steam for a number 
of reasons; one being that a number of things were brought forward from a local level that were 
not supported nationally. That is my critique of it. We were talking to ourselves at local level; 
we were coming up with really good ideas we wanted to see progressed; but there wasn’t the 
same buy-in from national level. (Interview 17 - elite interview) 
Another contributor observed: 
We are trying to get to a space where we do collective planning, and what does that actually 
mean, and that will be a challenge to some of the statutory partners. We are used to that in 
the LCDC now at this stage, but some of the statutory partners might find that highly 
challenging, because they are used to taking their directive from Dublin and doing what they 
want to do. So having to put themselves through the process that we might have been put 
through for our plan could be highly challenging. And that’s why development work for the 
group is so important. But I think it has the potential for that approach. (11-02: Civil Society, 
LCDC) 
Another contributor who had the experience of participating in a number of collaborative 
mechanisms commented:  
I don’t think the T&T SPC works well.  The LCDC does work very well. Limerick 203023 works 
extremely well. The ones that work well have very defined roles ...the LCDC has a task which 
is to oversee the LEADER funding and SICAP funding ... There would be a lot more work 
involved in the LCDC. So, for example, the LCDC would be seen as almost a standing 
committee in the local authority, whereas the SPCs are just seen as a case of the local elected 
members just having to sign in, you just have to attend ... Also the SPCs don’t have a budget 
whereas the LCDC administers a budget, a role they take very seriously (emphasis added)’ 
(Interview 11-01 - public T&T SPC) 
Secondly, it is stressed that SPC participants had an evident interest in developing new ideas 
and topics: 
 
23 Limerick 2030 is a Special Purpose Vehicle established by LCCC to implement the Limerick 2030 Spatial and Economic Plan 
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New ideas would emerge depending on different research members are doing. Often we would 
make national and international papers available on a topic and they would go off and do their 
own research.  And they would come back with ideas that even may have been implemented in 
other jurisdictions; some of it, legislatively, may not be possible to do in Ireland, but they do 
consider the ideas and ask about them.  And they check what’s viable and not viable. So you 
can see with the harder-working members that they do come in with a lot of good ideas. 
(Interview 01 – public T&T SPC) 
…the tourism strategy: when it started there was little talk about the river- by the time it ended 
about a third of it was about the river and how it could be a tourism benefit... When it started I 
was shocked by the lack of reference to the River Shannon.  So, yes, I think new ideas can 
develop from what is being presented to the committee. (Interview 09 - public ED SPC) 
However, a key issue that emerged from the research was the capacity of the SPCs to plan and 
programme their work. It appeared that the policies to be prepared and the outcomes to be 
achieved were not firmly established from the outset, as illustrated by these observations: 
I’m not aware of the policy enough - that hasn’t really been explained. (Interview 02 -civil 
society T&T SPC) 
If the SPC was genuinely there to develop policy, and at the start of a five-year term the 
executive came to the elected members and said, ‘we want to develop policy on this, this, and 
this, and this is how we would like to do it’, I think it would function. (Interview 11-01 - public 
T&T SPC) 
The outcomes are not named specifically, but we were trying to align them.  We were lucky 
here in Limerick because you had the Limerick 2030 Economic and Spatial Plan and that was 
the bible over the first five years of the amalgamated council ...They24 tell us very quickly when 
they thought we were fudging and having a meeting for the sake of the meeting. (Interview 15 
- public ED SPC) 
Civil society contributors in particular described their experiences of collaborating in other 
multi-agency forums and outlined the importance of formulating and executing a plan to 
achieve successful outcomes (Interview 02 -civil society T&T SPC; Interview 13 - public 
LCDC). Several contributors who were critical of the lack of strategic planning in the SPCs 
explained that, from their experience within other committees, strategic planning would 
normally entail devising a plan and monitoring its progress. As such:  
…you are starting at a and finishing at z...It has focus. It is being monitored. There is some 
overall strategic reason for it being there. And I think that’s very important.’ (Interview 12 - 
civil society T&T SPC)  
However, as one contributor explained, this was not the approach taken in the SPCs: 
It is a policy committee of the local authority.  It should have a huge influence over the policies 
in that area because that’s what it was -,  a strategic policy committee...I got no sense they 
were devising a strategy over time. A strategic plan is between here and there; this is where 
we will go, and these are the steps ... that to me is strategy. (Interview 10 - civil society ED 
SPC) 
 
24 Referring to the ED SPC members 
149 
 
…based on consultation and collaboration with people who have an interest, formulate a plan, 
and find the best way to execute that plan. (Interview 02 -civil society T&T SPC).  
The importance of strategic planning was also raised in an elite interview: 
It’s about having a work programme for the year so they are very clear on what the parameters 
they can influence are from the beginning...We are here to hear, what are your priorities for 
this SPC, what policies do we need to put in place to deliver those....the SPC I have seen to work 
best is the housing SPC. They were dealing with a policy around homelessness. In the first place 
you have experienced people around the table representing the interest groups so they know 
what they are there to do, and there is capacity to bring a bit of influence to bear on it. (Interview 
17 - elite interview) 
In contrast, the LCDC had a much clearer strategic focus; provided in no small part by the 
LECP, which was described as fundamental to giving the LCDC a strategic context, setting out 
potential outcomes, and establishing a shared direction for its members (Interview 13 - public 
LCDC). and “what we are trying to achieve is set out in the LECP” (Interview 04 - public 
LCDC). Despite this, the LCDC did not have the capacity to implement the plan, raising two 
significant issues.  
First, the issue of a local collaborative structure being ‘overtaken’ by national priorities. LCDC 
contributors felt constrained by the Department’s 25 agenda: 
The LCDC has not been in a position in my view to establish its own direction ... as far as I 
can see it has become an administrative committee based on whatever is decided at a national 
level, which is a shame because it is an effective committee. It does the work very well. It 
processes exceptionally well, but it doesn’t debate, in my view, under the LECP, the direction 
we are going or should be going. (Interview 13 - public LCDC) 
Second, a weakening of the strategic focus in favour of operational concerns: 
It has become very operational in terms of deciding on funding streams, monitoring the 
contract for SICAP, doing the LEADER process and the LEADER allocation.  It could almost 
be seen as a grant giving body. And that has taken away and interfered with the focus it should 
have on being more strategic, and having a more oversight role. (Interview 14 - public LCDC) 
We spend all our time approving grants and not doing anything from the point of view of 
strategic objective. So that’s where your participants and your chair have to be very conscious 
of allowing time within an agenda, and a structure for allowing time for discussions, outside 
of what is predefined for us. (Interview 03 - public LCDC) 
Importantly, the LCDC was ready to move on to a more strategic phase in its collaboration and 
an apparent willingness to put the LECP back on the agenda:   
So if we can get into the routine where the LECP is on the agenda, even if it is only 15-20 
minutes, keep a focus on it, members of the LCDC have asked for that to be fair  So I think we 
will embed it into an agenda item: have a section of the meeting where we will discuss the 
higher level LECP, and people will have to manage their business.  It may have to be done a 
little bit quicker.  (Interview 14 - public LCDC) 
 
25 Department of Rural and Community Development 
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Despite the more effective procedural and institutional arrangements which appeared to be in 
place for the LCDC compared with the SPCs, there was a suggestion that the LCDC should 
now put the sub-committee structure, the appraisal processes, and evaluation committees, on a 
more permanent footing in order to deal with the operational work. This would enable the 
LCDC committee members to re-focus on the implementation of the LECP (Interview 13 - 
public LCDC). This contributor also suggested that a similar structure could be instantiated for 
the SPCs:   
If I was to make a change I would see the structure of the LCDC and that thinking applied 
across Strategic Policy Committees ... The structure and the approach of the committee needs 
to be thought about in terms of replacing the other SPCs, so that you would have a series of 
committees which are committees of council, but they would be committees of council with 
delegated functions.  So the workings that we talk about and we bring stuff to council, the 
decision-making, could actually be brought down just a little bit from a political perspective, 
and maybe as a consequence depoliticise it. In other words, you are having serious debates 
around the table about the decision-making. Its participative democracy at its best, but its 
structured participate democracy - not lip- serving to it. (Interview 13 - public LCDC) 
Issues of concern highlighted in this section emphasise the importance of local strategic 
planning, and suggesting that it be supported nationally, and further indicated that: 
 the LCDC had collectively prepared the community elements of a Local Economic 
and Community Plan. However, there was a concern about its capacity to implement 
it due to its work programme being overtaken by national priorities and focus on 
operational concerns 
 despite the clear appetite of the SPC contributors for a strategic approach, many of 
them were critical that they were not operating to a clearly defined  strategic 
programme 
 the structure of SPCs should be reviewed to enable a more strategic approach 
to be taken   
The key theme emerging from this section on Operational Capacity, is that leadership is 
essential to foster collaboration, to harness State and non-State resources to create public value, 
and to embed strategic planning and implementation in these collaborative mechanisms, albeit 
in a context of central government control. 
5.5 Conclusion 
This chapter presented the findings of this unique study. The key source of data was semi-
structured interviews with stakeholders who were participating in the collaborative 
mechanisms studied and three further elite interviews with key informants of national policy 
making and recent reform of local governance. The in-depth interviews which gathered the 
primary data for this study afforded a rich and deeper understanding of the extent and impact 
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of collaboration within the three cases studied. The findings document the benefits and 
challenges of adopting a collaborative public value approach within Ireland’s reformed local 
governance landscape. This study provides an important contribution to understanding the 
nature of local State–civil society/non-State collaboration in a local governance setting, 
informed by the experience and expertise of practicing stakeholders and elite observers. The 
findings were structured in accordance with the three components of the operational framework 
of this study. Chapter Six presents the analysis of the findings in order to identify the nature of 




Chapter Six: Analysis and Discussion of the Research 
Findings 
6.1 Introduction 
This study examines the theory and practice of achieving public value. Earlier chapters 
explored the concepts of Public Value Management (PVM) and collaboration to assess their 
relevance for contemporary local governance. To apply this approach to governance, an 
operational framework was developed and indicators selected. Using those indicators, rich data 
regarding the nature and extent of collaboration in the mechanisms of local government studied 
was collected from a range of stakeholders and the findings presented in the previous chapter. 
This chapter analyses and discusses those findings and is organised around the three 
components of the operational framework as follows: 
 Public Value Outcomes 
 Legitimacy and Authorisation 
 Operational Capacity 
The findings also ringfence a number of important implications for collaboration in Ireland 
which are considered in the broader context.  
6.2 Public Value Outcomes 
In PVM, public priorities are mutually determined by State and non-State actors with the 
ultimate objective of realising public value outcomes. These are outcomes which are valued by 
or valuable to citizens, and/or  address the expressed or revealed priorities of a given population 
(Williams and Shearer 2011; Alford and O’Flynn 2008). Common purpose, informed and 
empowered actors, and dialogue and deliberation, were identified as key indicators of public 
value outcomes. In short; collaboration between the actors is integral to defining the 
constitution and realisation of public value (Alford and O’Flynn 2008; Moore and Khagram 
2004). This section therefore evaluates their relative significance in the cases studied.  
6.2.1 Common Purpose  
One key conclusion of this analysis found that where common purpose exists and/or is 
consciously fostered, collaborative potential increases. This research uncovers significantly 
different levels of common purpose within the mechanisms studied, despite operating within 
the shared organisational context of Limerick City and County Council.  
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One of the determining factors in achieving effective collaboration is the presence or absence 
of rules (Lowndes et al. 2006; March and Olsen 2011; Shaw 2013; Krogh 2020). Mechanisms 
of collaboration often fail to establish a common purpose due of the lack of consistent rules to 
guide and manage the collaborative process. While establishment of these three mechanisms 
brought State and non-State actors together, only one was furnished with rules, and the others 
with guidelines. The literature review signalled that without clear direction, pre-existing 
individual norms are more likely to persist (Peters et al. 2005): such as, for example, 
implementing government policy in the case of public administrators, or advocating for local 
constituents in the case of elected representatives. March and Olsen (2011) underline the 
importance of rules for guiding the behaviour of actors and rendering certain actions more 
likely than others. Since the rules of the LCDC explicitly mandate it to develop, coordinate, 
and implement, a coherent and integrated approach to local and community development26, 
State and non-State actors were obligated to foster this common purpose and collectively 
pursued this shared strategic intent. The SPCs, on the other hand, were issued with loose 
guidelines for general policy development which proved insufficient to establish a common 
purpose or significantly alter the customary practices of individual actors. In fact, there was no 
evidence of time and effort specifically devoted to developing collaborative intent or 
partnership skills. A key difference, therefore, between the LCDC and the SPCs was the 
concentrated effort and time which the LCDC dedicated to advancing shared strategic intent 
and building collaborative potential around the norms and values of the various participants.  
6.2.2 Informed and Empowered Actors  
One major concern in terms of participation is the collation of and control over information 
(Innes and Booher 2005). So much so, that many citizens are discouraged and intimidated from 
participation based on a perceived lack of sufficient information and knowledge to properly 
consider complex policy issues (Roberts 2004). Since empowered and informed actors within 
collaborative spaces emerge when relevant supports are put in place, resources including 
administrative and organisational assistance, skills for analysis, and appropriate expertise, are 
clearly instrumental to successful collaboration (Emerson et al. 2011).   
 
In the case of the SPCs, an overload of poorly-calibrated information resulted in frustration and 
a sense of disempowerment; ultimately damaging belief in the collaborative process.   
 
26 Section 49A of the Local Government Act 2001 
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The ED SPC was slightly better informed than the T&T SPC as it benefitted from the services 
of a Local Enterprise Office: a partially-dedicated resource which updated the ED SPC with 
relevant local economic planning information. This one instance aside, dedicated resources 
were not made available to the SPCs despite being in existence since 2000.  In the case of the 
LCDC, additional support was provided in the form of specialised research capacity and a 
broader team within the host institution charged to provide both information and analysis 
relevant to the local State, to support the overall process. The research confirms that where 
dedicated supports and resources are absent the emergence of empowered participants is 
inhibited and may rather perpetuate pre-existing power asymmetries (Innes and Booher 2005; 
Shaw 2013). From a national perspective, one elite interview highlighted the absence of such 
resources in local government in Ireland and its impact on SPCs:  
People are on the LCDC because they have an inherent knowledge about the subject area, so 
they have the skills and capacity to bear. But despite the intent, not the case in SPCs in my 
experience ... If people on SPCs are going to be genuinely policy-leaders they have to be 
equipped to understand the dynamics behind that policy in terms of current environment, in 
terms of future scenarios, different options, and embedding that back into the policy document 
that is being developed. Local government in Ireland is so resource-constrained, professional 
staff are preparing the documents, are going in with them, and asking elected representatives 
and nominated people from communities and social partners to comment on extraordinarily 
complex policy documents...A lot of investment goes into this in other countries. (Interview 16 
- elite interview)  
 
The findings from the LCDC therefore demonstrate that with greater power comes a greater 
all-round commitment to ensuring all members are properly informed. The evidence also 
suggests that the presence of empowered actors fosters a strengthened disposition towards 
collaboration and enhanced willingness to enter into more trusting and mutually respectful 
relationships. This, in turn, encourages knowledge-sharing and improved understanding of the 
material and social problems which arise in an environment and shape perceptions of public 
value (Alford and O’Flynn, 2008). Specifically, the positional power held by members of the 
LCDC, including senior officials from the other public sector organisations and the local 
development companies, was significant in this regard. As participants become more 
empowered by greater access to information and knowledge, collaboration was also enhanced. 
The lack of power, particularly decision-making power, and the limited and sporadic 
information available, was an on-going source of frustration reported by several SPC members. 
 
6.2.3 Dialogue and Deliberation  
The literature and findings highlight the importance of agenda-setting and quality dialogue and 
deliberation for effective collaboration (Williams and Shearer 2011; Alford and O’Flynn 2008; 
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Benington and Moore 2011). Furthermore, the findings from the Limerick cases highlight an 
overly centralised approach to governing in Ireland which constrained the agenda and the 
subsequent extent and quality of deliberation in the SPCs and the LCDC. The practices of 
agenda-setting and dialogue are analysed here including the external factors that constrain 
them. 
The findings suggest that where the agenda within a collaborative process is excessively 
controlled by externally fixed agenda, the quality of dialogue and deliberation is likely to 
decline. In the cases studied, the LCDC was tasked to develop and implement the community 
elements of a local economic and community plan (LECP). However, much of its agenda was 
dictated by Department priorities27, thereby limiting its agency to set its own priorities. In the 
case of both SPCs, agendas were strictly controlled by the local authority executive as opposed 
committee members. Thus, while the LCDC enjoyed a slightly higher level of agenda 
autonomy, the general capacity to set agendas was constrained across the board. 
In certain cases the capacity of a collaborative mechanism to act may be circumscribed by 
externally imposed rules, constraints, norms, and values, which obstruct collaboration. For this 
reason, agenda-setting, which is a defining feature of PVM, was considered in the context of 
the highly-centralised apparatus of governance in Ireland. Despite the growing trend of 
devolution across Europe, local authorities in Ireland still have very little autonomy: policies 
continue to be imposed, funding decisions made by parent government departments, and data 
managed centrally. This directly impacts local authority scope in terms of responsive public 
services engaging citizens in dialogue to meet the complex challenges. While formal mandates 
from central government are necessary then, they may not be sufficient to achieve the desired 
public value outcomes. In light of this, public policy-making requires a network of partners 
and stakeholders, and a negotiated coalition of different interests and agencies (from across the 
public, private, voluntary and informal community sectors) to support local government chief 
executives in achieving their goals (Benington and Moore 2011). The LCDC and the SPCs 
were specifically devised to bring State and non-State actors together to collectively determine 
public priorities, through planning for local and community development and policy-making, 
respectively. Notably, the LCDC was preceded by City and County Development Boards and 
County/City Strategy Groups who for 13 years followed a national agenda to work together 
towards the drafting and implementation of a local strategy for economic, social and cultural 
 
27 Department of Rural and Community Development 
156 
 
development. Similarly, the agenda for the LCDC, as set by the Department28, centred on the 
co-ordination and management of local and community development programmes 
implementation oversight, including the financial aspects.  
Along with nationally-imposed restrictions on agenda settings, there are also local agenda-
setting hierarchies. For example, in the case of the SPCs, the local authority executive strictly 
manages the SPC agenda; inherently delimiting input from elected representatives and civil 
society. They are also chaired by the elected representatives who hold the majority 
membership. The civil society participants were critical of the limited range of topics on the 
SPC agenda which tended to be dominated by national policies. There was some evidence of 
local policies being discussed in the ED SPC,  but these were communicated to the SPCs and 
not created within the SPCs through dialogue and deliberation. Interest arguably wanes in 
bodies where participants do not share a strategic vision or where deliberation is relatively 
poor. The extent of dialogue and deliberation in these mechanisms is therefore interrogated in 
the next section.  
Central to any effort to create a climate of collaborative behaviour is the need to ensure 
meaningful dialogue and deliberation. Roberts (2004:330) posited dialogue as “enabling 
participants to respect and listen to one another’s opinions”, and deliberation as: 
…enabling competing perspectives to be aired and considered before decisions are made...it 
is not the aggregation of interests, it requires thoughtful examination of issues, listening to 
others’ perspectives, and coming to a public judgement on what represents the common good.  
Despite the constraints of agenda-setting discussed above, LCDC participants were allowed 
plenty of dialogue and deliberation time to air and consider competing perspectives of various 
issues, and thereby enabled to thoughtfully examine the issues and arrive at decisions based on 
consensus. The LCDC also demonstrated reasonableness and tolerance with actors willing to 
put aside pre-determined positions. This aligns with the literature which argued that, despite 
personal misgivings, people often accept the fairness of the decision when they have the 
opportunity to impact the final result (Innes and Booher 2005) through good faith negotiations 
(Ansell and Gash 2007).  
Despite the external constraints described above, the findings found that even in the context of 
limited autonomy, the LCDC demonstrated a capacity for effective dialogue. Importantly, the 
decision-making power it had to allocate local community development funding led to effective 
 
28 Department of Rural and Community Development 
157 
 
dialogue and deliberation. Innes and Boher (2005:428) described the transformative power of 
dialogue in a task-based environment, purporting that:  
…when an inclusive set of citizens can engage in authentic dialogue where all are equally 
empowered and informed and where they listen and are heard respectfully and when they are 
working on a task of interest to all, following their own agenda, everyone is changed. They 
learn new ideas and they often come to recognise that others’ views are legitimate. They can 
work through issues and create shared meanings as well as the possibility of joint action. 
The SPCs, on the other hand, were saturated with extraneous information rather than having 
relevant data presented to them as a basis for discussion and dialogue. On the occasions when 
relevant topics of local interest were brought before the SPCs they responded with sound debate 
and thoughtful insights, but rarely afforded sufficient time for effective deliberation and 
dialogue. Since SPC discussions also tended to be dominated by the executive or the elected 
representatives, civil society participants felt unable to pro-actively contribute to the 
discussions or initiate dialogue themselves. The findings also highlighted that SPC participants 
were not generally involved in the early stages of policy-making and had little interest in 
debating policy priorities which had already been defined at a national level. Furthermore, the 
local authority was criticised for ‘box-ticking’ or ‘window dressing’ instead of developing local 
policies.   
Finally, from a national perspective, one elite interviewee emphasised that: 
The amount of strategic policy that local authorities have to do…that isn’t already dictated 
nationally - is getting more and more limited, and you need the agenda to be very clear on 
what is the policy that you expect participants to have an input into. (Interview 17 - elite 
interview)  
Ultimately, this study concluded that decision-making mechanisms are better informed and 
empowered to deliberate on issues which directly affect their participants. 
6.3 Legitimacy and Authorisation 
The previous section explored the importance of clarity and sharing of purpose, and the 
centrality of agenda-setting in creating public value. This section examines the authorising 
environment within which State and non-State sectors collaborate in order to consider the 
legitimacy of participation in decision-making by a broader range of stakeholders, and 
broadening the base of those who have authority to make decisions.  
The public policies which led to the institutionalisation of these structures envisaged that the 
structures would recognise the legitimacy of the actors involved. However, the findings 
indicate that while this was achieved in the LCDC, arguably little consideration was given to 
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the informal attributes and local implementation in the design of the SPCs: indeed, civil society 
participants particularly question the legitimacy of their involvement. This section analyses the 
collaborative mechanisms which were established to enable broad actor participation and trace 
developments once actors joined these mechanisms with regard to trust, decision-making, and 
accountability. 
6.3.1 Broad Actor Participation  
One of the key aspects of PVM is gaining support for public priorities from political and other 
stakeholders in the authorising environment. It follows that one central challenge of 
collaboration is to make it broadly inclusive of all stakeholders who are affected by or care 
about an issue (Chrislip 1994; Innes and Booher 2005; Stoker 2006a; Ansel and Gash 2007; 
Hartley et al. 2016). Certain stakeholders are explicitly prohibited from participating due to the 
design of the institution (Chrislip 1994; Benington and Moore 2011), while other participating 
actors find collaboration resource-intensive (King et al. 1998; Emerson et al. 2011). This 
section analyses how the authorising environments of the LCDC and the SPCs differ, and the 
challenges to legitimate citizen participation caused by culture and resource issues. 
In terms of a broad authorising environment, the SPCs and the LCDC are democratic processes 
which were established to broaden participation in local government, included State and non-
State actors, and are embedded within the structure of the local authority. The findings 
indicated that Limerick LCDC invested considerable time and effort in the early stages of its 
establishment to integrate the Local Development Companies into the LCDC process which 
led to a collective approach to local and community development in Limerick. Their inclusion 
further enhanced the local and community development capacity of the LCDC, adding to the 
skills and expertise brought by the other public service organisations, citizens, private sector, 
elected representatives, and public managers. As previously discussed, the LCDC also brought 
in a specialist resource: a decision which coincides with Hartley and colleagues’ (2016) 
recommendation that the broader authorising environment include policy analysts and special 
advisers, and aligns with the public value literature which posits the involvement of a broad 
range of stakeholders for effective collaboration and the creation of public value needs to be 
assessed through collective democratic processes and dialogue between citizens, politicians, 
and managers (Gains and Stoker 2009:439-440). The SPC guidelines, conversely, provided for 
a much narrower range of stakeholders, comprising elected representatives, local authority 




Since citizen participation is also essential for PVM and making good decisions, early 
intervention in collaboration by citizens is imperative (King et al. 1998; Kelly et al. 2002; Shaw 
2013; Page et al. 2017). From a national perspective, one elite interviewee emphasised that 
unlike Norway and Germany, Ireland does not have a culture of proactive engagement with its 
citizens: 
It’s down to a cultural perspective, and in mainland Europe people see themselves as having 
a role as a citizen and not a client, and that creates a totally different mindset. People engage 
much more significantly in the decision-making associated with their daily lives, which 
underpins the principles of democracy in these countries. (Interview 16 - elite interview) 
This contributor further elaborated that Irish citizens often object to things being done because 
they are not active participants: this is a multi-generational issue that could take enormous 
cultural change and significant resources to address: 
The evidence from Germany is, if you do operate in a transparent open policy arena, the level 
of objection is much reduced. It’s an issue of process. By having information, by being enabled 
to contribute, citizens can often come up with better ideas at the local level. (Interview 16 - 
elite interview) 
While citizens clearly did participate in the mechanisms studied here, the civil society 
participants were enabled to be more active in the LCDC than the SPCs. The research showed 
that once actors join these collaborative committees, they meet other challenges to 
collaboration. Therefore a key objective for these mechanisms is to support civil society from 
the outset to be an active participant-collaborator as opposed to a passive bystander (Shaw 
2013:487). As previously discussed, citizens are disadvantaged when they have less access to 
information than their public sector counterparts. Civil society is also disadvantaged if it does 
not have the resources to collaborate in terms of finance, skills, education, and technical 
knowledge (Page et al. 2013). In addition, much of the literature on participation reveals timing, 
frequency, and reimbursement for meetings, as key issues which impact on the legitimate 
participation by stakeholders in these mechanisms. Moorhead’s (2020) issues with the quantity, 
duration, and timing of meetings as particular challenges were mirrored in this research. The 
LCDC met monthly, and, while generally participants felt participating in the LCDC was 
valuable, they referred to difficulties with regard to timing and frequency, and the issue of 
reimbursement. Although they met far less frequently, similar matters were raised by SPC 
contributors. Equally, consideration of whether the extensive time given by the existing 
compliment of senior staff from the public sector, unpaid civil society participants, and local 
elected representatives who are reimbursed for a part-time role, can be sustained, is necessary. 
This is important, bearing in mind that the pursuit of public value aims requires the support of 
key internal and external stakeholders including government, interest groups, and donors 
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(Williams and Shearer 2011). Moorehead (2020) also raised the issue of the remuneration of 
elected representatives. However, it is worth noting that the LCDC which was meeting 
frequently during the working day and which has no remuneration for elected representatives, 
has very good levels of participation, while the SPCs which meet infrequently with 
remuneration for elected representatives, experiences greater challenges around member 
participation. Therefore, reimbursement may not be a decisive determinant of the quality of 
participation.  
6.3.2 Trust 
Trust is one of the objectives pursued in PVM to achieve legitimacy and support for policy 
initiatives (O’Flynn 2007; Stoker 2006a) as “the majority of practitioners argue that trust is an 
essential ingredient for successful collaboration” (Vangen and Huxham 2003:8). “Trust means 
a psychological state that enables individuals to accept vulnerability and place their welfare in 
the hands of other parties, expecting positive intentions or behaviours from other parties” 
(Yang 2006:574). In the mechanisms studied, trust was far more evident in the LCDC than the 
SPCs. The findings identified two issues: the impact of power on the respect shown to civil 
society; and the link between decision-making competence and trust-building. 
The first question concerns whether trust flows from the power that is attached to a 
collaborative mechanism, and how that power is distributed. Normally, trust grows over time 
as parties work together, get to know each other, and prove that they are reasonable, 
predictable, and dependable (Ansell and Gash 2007). However, the poor quality of dialogue, 
including the behaviour of elected representatives towards civil society participants in the 
SPCs, left civil society members feeling disempowered and disrespected compared to positive 
dialogue in the LCDC.  
Issues concerned with power relationships hamper trust-building (Vangen and Huxham 2003). 
This raises the question of whether this behaviour was related to issues of power. Civil society 
actors in the SPCs studied felt hindered by the pre-existing procedures and power dynamics of 
the SPC structure established in 1999, which is chaired by the elected representatives and 
within which, elected representatives have the majority membership and, as previously 
discussed, the agenda is controlled by the local authority executive. On the other hand, the 
design of the LCDC established in 2014, affords the power and main catalyst for change to 
civil society in that public interests cannot represent more than 49% of the voting rights.  
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The findings indicated that this dynamic may have driven a behavioural change among the 
public sector towards the civil society participants; commanding respect and treatment as 
legitimate participants. 
The second question is whether trust-building is related to decision-making. The importance 
of decision-making in collaboration is fully examined in the next section, but at this juncture, 
it is important to note that the decision-making mandate of the LCDC acted as another catalyst 
to building trust. Building on the premise that decision-making bodies are better informed, it 
is also worth noting that “ inclusive, constructive and well-informed process builds trust among 
collaborative leaders” (Chrislip, 1994:30). This was certainly how the LCDC emerged in the 
findings. Moreover, decision-making bodies like the LCDC, can deliver small wins, and with 
each positive outcome, build trust incrementally; with the mechanisms becoming more 
ambitious as success breeds a greater level of trust (Vangen and Huxham 2003). Meanwhile, 
powerless non-decision-making bodies with no incremental outcomes, such as the SPCs, can 
foster mistrust and a build-up of frustration among the actors (Vangen and Huxham 2003:15). 
Unfortunately, the findings confirmed that as mistrust in public officials and administrators 
fuels cynicism, citizen interest in participation declines, and attendance at meetings affects the 
collaboration. Incentives to participate partly depend upon stakeholder expectations that the 
collaborative processes will yield meaningful results; particularly against the balance of time 
and energy that collaboration requires. While incentives increase as stakeholders see a direct 
relationship between their participation and concrete, tangible, and effectual policy outcomes, 
they equally decline if stakeholders perceive their own input to be merely advisory or 
ceremonial (Ansell and Gash 2007). The apparent lack of trust in the SPC, caused by their lack 
of power and decision-making autonomy has weakened their potential for collaboration. On 
the other hand, these decision-making structures actually inhere an enormous capacity to foster 
relationships of mutual respect and interdependence (Callanan, 2018) as the LCDC proves.  
The findings highlight the importance of the corollaries between power, decision-making and 
trust-building. As Shaw observed, “what is sought then is a public sector/civil society nexus 
characterised by high level of trust and openness, and a collective willingness to exchange 
intellectual and other resources” (2013:497). The creation and maintenance of trust and 
legitimacy is one of multiple objectives pursued by public managers in addition to the narrower 
service objectives and broader outcomes (O’Flynn 2007).  
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Public managers must disseminate the value in the actual processes of political and social 
interaction with citizens, users and stakeholders to develop trust and legitimacy (Brookes and 
Grint 2010).  
The literature also noted public managers’ role in achieving legitimacy and authority, as is 
further addressed in section 6.4. 
6.3.3 Decision-making and Accountability 
The involvement of civil society in decisions which affect them is one of the fundamental 
aspects of PVM. “For a decision to be legitimate or for a judgement to be made, it is necessary 
to have all the stakeholders involved” (Stoker 2006a:47). However, not all the participative 
mechanisms in local government have decision-making responsibility, and as such, they are 
subjected to different accountability mechanisms. The literature questions the value of 
involvement in powerless, non-decision making bodies (Ansell and Gash 2007). 
In line with the literature, this research confirms that participation in more powerful decision-
making bodies enhances the sense and process of collaboration (Fung and Wright 2001; Krogh 
2020). The decision-making mandate of the LCDC meant it benefited from dedicated 
resources, clarity of shared purpose, good quality information, quality dialogue, constructive 
deliberation, and positive conflict. By contrast, SPC participants felt disempowered by the lack 
of information available, disillusioned by a lack of defined purpose, while civil society 
members felt disrespected by the attitude of elected representatives, and in some instances, the 
executive, who used the process and the information vacuum to pursue their own interests. 
Involvement in powerless, non-decision-making bodies clearly inhibits and undermines efforts 
to develop collaboration and the experiences of the SPCs clearly demonstrate this. The LCDC 
is a successful example of how governments include civil society actors in democratic decision-
making and echo many of the principles of Empowered Deliberative Democracy inscribed by 
Fung (2020). The power of the LCDC process necessitated civil society participation in 
deliberative decision-making and the civil society participants of the LCDC took this role 
seriously. On the other hand, the powerless SPCs are used predominantly for advising and 
consultation. 
The flip side of decision-making, of course, is accountability. In terms of local democracy the 
LCDC and the SPCs were specific mechanisms designed to facilitate citizen involvement in 
local government (Callanan 2018). Whilst SPCs create opportunities for public participation in 
policy-making the final decision-making responsibility rests with the elected council. 
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Moreover, the study found that the views of all the stakeholders were not articulated as intended 
during the policy-making process for the reasons outlined above; which calls the effectiveness 
of the SPCs in accounting to citizens into further question.  
The LCDC is a committee of the local authority which has primary responsibility for 
coordinating, planning, and overseeing local and community development funding. There was 
active deliberation among its stakeholders in the decision-making process and it was 
accountable to the Department29 for the delivery and evaluation of its programme through 
reporting by the local authority executive. From a national perspective, the findings identified 
the benefit of aligning local development and local government through LCDCs for the purpose 
of channelling all the funding through one structure for greater transparency and for monitoring 
the achievement of objectives (Interview 16 - elite interview). The local authority is therefore 
now accountable for all community development funding locally in Limerick.   
There was no evidence of oversight or monitoring of the SPCs, either nationally or locally, 
although two stand-alone reviews involving them were carried out (Boyle at al. 2003, IPA 
2004). In contrast, the LCDC was subject to national oversight and monitoring by the 
Department30. This addressed an issue raised in a previous report that “the effectiveness of 
CDBs is influenced by the on-going priority attached to their role by central government” 
(Indecon, 2008:52). National oversight and monitoring is necessary and positive from an 
accountability perspective, and signals national interest in the process which may, in turn, have 
a positive impact on the functioning of the LCDC as a collaborative process. However, 
excessive micromanaging can undermine the LCDC by overruling their decisions: an issue that 
was highlighted in the findings.  
 
The research also identified the conflict between transparency and good quality collaboration. 
An open media is deemed one of the pillars of transparent and accountable decision-making. 
However, in the case of the SPCs studied, the presence of the media at committee meetings 
often replaced accountability with grandstanding; with elected representatives more focused 
on self-preservation than collaboration. The same issue did not arise in the LCDC whose 
business was conducted in private and where the behaviour of the elected representatives was 
far more collaborative.  
 
29 Department of Rural and Community Development 
30 Department of Rural and Community Development 
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Public meetings may also inhibit intra-committee accountability, with civil society 
representatives reluctant to challenge elected representatives in a public forum. On the other 
hand, from a national perspective, one elite interviewee spoke in favour of an open media 
invitation to SPC meetings, arguing that: 
…good policy-making demands objectivity and if hard decisions have to be taken they have to 
be justified ...  The SPC is allowed to go into committee if a very sensitive discussion is needed, 
but that should only be used on rare occasion. (Interview 18 - elite interview)  
Elected representatives, unlike other members, are necessarily concerned to deliver day-to-day 
accountability and raise their profile via the media in ultimate anticipation of the electorate’s 
decisive accountability judgement on election day. As a result, their pursuit of media exposure 
has the potential to undermine collaborative processes and may weaken trust and respect. 
6.4 Operational Capacity 
The final section of the analysis examines the capacity of a broad range of stakeholders in the 
collaborative mechanisms studied to achieve the legitimate participation outlined in the two 
previous sections. The literature review ringfenced two particular indicators of operational 
capacity; namely, leadership and procedural capacity. As public agencies are normally 
mandated with implementing mechanisms intended for collaborative governance, this section 
assesses the evidence of its capacity to carry out this task. PVM also carries the collaborative 
governance expectation that public agencies take less control over determining public priorities 
and that all the stakeholders demonstrate leadership to that end. The research found that better 
collaboration was achieved in the LCDC than the SPCs.  This section therefore analyses the 
impact of leadership and operational capacity in this context. 
6.4.1 Leadership  
“The research on collaboration, particularly collaboration for public purposes, is very 
consistent in recognizing the significant role of leadership in the success or failure of 
collaborative endeavors” (Morse 2007:3). In fact, leadership capable of fostering collaboration 
is particularly important for constructive engagement with citizens (Chrislip 1994; Krogh 
2020). Importantly, public leadership is not leadership solely within public organisations, but 
leadership which impacts the public and is mediated by any actor in the collaborative process: 
as such, it is merely a matter of personal skill but involves influence between actors and groups 
(Morse 2007; Hartley et al. 2016; Hartley et al. 2019b). This section describes the various 
leadership characteristics emerging from the research which fostered collaboration in the 
LCDC but consolidated a traditional approach to public management in the SPCs.    
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The strong evidence of distributed leadership within the LCDC was described by one 
contributor as “a coalition of its people” (Interview 13 - public LCDC). Contributors generally 
placed a high value on the commitment of the Chief Executive of LCCC to the LCDC; 
observing that his direct participation channelled the leadership expertise of the other 
participants. It also fostered collaboration between State and non-State actors and sustained the 
interest of the actors from the other organisations; many of whom also held positions of 
leadership in their own organisations. Despite the commitment shown by these participants, 
the findings nonetheless revealed the potential challenges to sustaining such participation due 
to the extensive working briefs held by some participants. In contrast, the traditional process 
of public administration which operated in the SPCs did not channel the leadership skills of the 
other participants, despite SPC contributors expressed enthusiasm for results and the 
expectation to influence as factors which had motivated them to participate in the SPCs in the 
first place. This left these participants, many of whom occupied positions of leadership in their 
own organisations, stymied by the process. This correlates with research demonstrating that 
mainstream leadership approaches do not translate well in a context of collaboration (Vangen 
and Huxham 2003; Hartley 2018). 
Elected representatives hold positions of leadership in the communities they represent, and as 
previously outlined, they behaved more strategically and collaboratively in the LCDC than 
their SPCs counterparts. In relation to the role of the elected representative, Moorhead advised:   
If the right balance is not struck between the individual representative role and the policy 
development, implementation and oversight role, it can feed the perception that the councillor 
only acts as a medium between the constituent and the local authority, undermining their 
important policy-making and governance roles. (2020:17). 
Contributors similarly underlined the assumption that the chairs of these mechanisms would 
facilitate collaborative behaviour. In the Limerick site, the elected representatives who chaired 
the three mechanisms studied were commended by LCDC contributors for their collaborative 
approach. Moreover, the tensions around the ‘match-marking’ of earlier meetings were 
managed effectively by the chairs’ application of adaptive leadership. In contrast, SPC 
contributors complained that the chairs of the SPCs perpetuated a more hierarchical approach, 
applying the mechanical leadership associated with traditional meeting activities.   
Two other important leadership characteristics emerged from the LCDC to support 
collaboration. The first is political astuteness wherein political skills are deployed in situations 
involving diverse and sometimes competing interests among stakeholders, in order to achieve 
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sufficient alignment of interests and/or consent in order to achieve outcomes (Hartley 2018). 
The second is the ability to build and sustain trust, as a crucial component of leadership in 
collaborative governance (Morse 2010). 
In PVM the public manager is expected to convene, catalyse, and facilitate the collaboration. 
The LCCC Chief Executive and the Chief Officer31 appointed to the LCDC steered the LCDC 
to enter into a collaborative approach; a skillset described by Morse (2010) as ‘integrative 
leadership’. These public managers also identified with the group and conveyed a shared and 
common understanding of purpose.  This additional key characteristic of integrative leadership 
created a vision for the future through the preparation of the LECP which helped to unite the 
actors. As outlined in Section 1, the SPCs failed to create a common purpose. The next section 
on procedural capacity addresses the different levels of staff engagement and assistance across 
the various committees. 
6.4.2 Procedural Capacity 
It is difficult to create public value without the capacity to facilitate the collaborative process. 
Typically a public agency is mandated to implement mechanisms of collaborative governance; 
placing responsibility on the public manager to manage and lead these mechanisms (Krogh 
2020). At the heart of Moore’s formulation is the environment within which public managers 
operate and which both constrains and facilitates the pursuit of public value (Williams and 
Shearer 2011). In the cases studied, the public manager operates under a shadow of traditional 
public administration, central government control, and political oversight (Krogh, 2020). In 
light of which, this section considers whether the public manager has the operational capacity 
necessary to carry out this collaborative function in terms of resources, institutional design, and 
collaborative mindset. 
Context 
One of the main points made in the public value literature and arising several times throughout 
this analysis, is that public managers are constrained by the boundaries of authoritative action 
(Gains and Stoker 2009:452). Firstly, public managers are faced with the representative-versus-
democratic dilemma of engaging directly with civil society through the democratic processes 
established for that purpose, while at the same time, having to respect political masters who 
 
31 Chief Officer is a statutory role in the LCDC assigned to a local authority senior staff member. 
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have been democratically elected. Secondly, they can be constrained by lack of autonomy seen 
in the SPCs.  
Callanan (2018) argued that a more participative local government begins with an assumption 
of a more empowered local government with at least some element of discretion, and went on 
to question the point of taking part in local decision-making that operates in a strait jacket and 
where all key decisions are previously determined at national level. Bearing this in mind, it is 
important therefore to consider Gains and Stoker’s (2009:450) view that it is easier to apply 
the public value approach in the local governance setting because public managers are closer 
to citizens than central government.  However, they do point out that public managers have 
been “preparing policies and consultations with civil society and there has been a history of 
partnership working”. The former CDBs are an example where collaboration was achieved 
without autonomy. 
The first challenge is the hierarchical approach to public management. The need for networked 
collaboration did not arise historically because local government personnel were used to 
operating in a system of traditional public administration which was constrained by nationally 
set policies. A shift to a more collaborative approach is not a straightforward transition; 
particularly as new approaches often clash with embedded bureaucratic norms and practices 
(Brown and Head 2019). From a national perspective, an elite interviewee noted, however, that 
it does make public managers more accountable to a broader authorising environment and 
encourages them to value local policy knowledge rather than relying solely on the expert 
evidence normally available (Interview 16 - elite interview). 
Secondly, lack of autonomy can inhibit the creativity and entrepreneurialism that collaboration 
seeks to foster. Indeed, and also from a national perspective, one of the elite interviews 
referenced the lack of buy-in from central government to implement some of the visionary 
ideas proposed by a former CDB following a comprehensive collaborative process to prepare 
a CDB strategy (Interview 17 - elite interview). Such seemingly futile exercises are clearly 
detrimental to collaborative innovation. 
Thirdly the challenges presented by a broader authorising environment support the increasing 
contention that public managers develop the capability to work collaboratively across 
professional, organisational, and sectoral boundaries (Williams 2013; Brown and Head 2019). 
This research confirms the challenges that face all the stakeholders in such collaborative 
spaces: public managers who have to engage with civil society; civil society that has to engage 
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with officials and public representatives; and the latter who now see their traditional monopoly 
on the attention of officials potentially undermined by a vociferous civil society. Traversing 
such boundaries rests on a fundamental adjustment in institutional norms, values, and actor 
mindsets which enable boundary-spanning roles to be valued, recognised, and legitimised. 
Resources 
The second issue that impacts on procedural capacity is the availability of resources inside and 
outside the organisation. Emerson et al. (2011:9) highlighted the high transactional costs of 
initiating a collaborative effort. Specifically, the literature and findings identified structure, 
finances, staffing and information management (Shaw, 2013;483), time, administrative and 
organisational assistance, and skills for analysis and expertise (Emerson et al. 2011:16) as 
essential ingredients for collaboration and maximising understanding and participation. 
Moreover, the collaborative process is a continuous cycle and requires dedicated resources on 
an on-going basis. For instance, from a national perspective, an elite interviewee noted that 
when one of the former CDBs was collaborating effectively it had five dedicated staff.  
However, as soon as the resources were dispersed across other functions of the local authority 
its efficacy was reduced (Interview 17 - elite interview). Similarly, the resources allocated to 
the LCDC were identified in the findings as crucial to supporting collaboration.  
Furthermore, from a national perspective, two elite interviewees addressed the need for civil 
society to be supported so as to effectively collaborate on complex issues such as housing 
policy or economic development (Interview 16 - elite interview; Interview 17 - elite interview):  
There can be a mismatch between the skillset of the people around the table and the job you 
are asking them to do. It’s not a critique of the individuals but the complexity of the job...If we 
are serious about using citizens to participate we need to support them more in terms of their 
own training and perhaps in terms of having some sort of a focus group to support them. 
(Interview 17 - elite interview)  
LCDC and SPC contributors also highlighted the importance of training, group development, 
and sub-committees to support collaboration.  
PVM intended that resources external to the host organisation would be used to both create and 
implement public priorities. An effective collaboration for PVM gathers together different 
stakeholders, governmental organizations, and non-State and non-profit organizations, to 
maximise objectivity in solving complex societal problems (Innes and Boher 2005; Kapucu et 
al. 2009). From a national perspective, one elite interviewee noted this is typical of the type of 
planning taking place in comparable European countries: 
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In Scotland, people are engaging in the strategic planning of an area and they are applying 
that thinking across a range of public services. (Interview 16 - elite interview)  
Similarly, in the cases studied, issues and strategies that cross functions, specialties, and 
professional disciplines were considered in the preparation of the LECP by the LCDC and the 
ED SPC, along with resources which could be drawn from the organisations participating in 
the LCDC to implement it. For example, the LCDC developed an initiative called Healthy 
Limerick which brought different organisations and bodies together to design and roll-out a 
local breastfeeding initiative across the city and county. This highly successful and innovative 
type of planning across a range of public services and organisations was not evident in the 
SPCs. 
Institutional Design 
The third issue found to impact on procedural capacity was how institutional design was 
variously adapted by public managers to local conditions across the three mechanisms studied.  
The starting conditions to the LCDC support of collaboration described throughout this chapter 
include allocation of funding and dedicated support, empowered civil society, a clear mandate, 
and decision-making powers. The public manager used his discretion to adapt the institutional 
design by broadening the authorising environment to include the local development companies, 
and maximised resources by appointing a dedicated social researcher and establishing and 
resourcing sub-committees. The resulting framework has proven to be effective for 
collaboration. Unfortunately, from a PVM perspective, external control over the agenda is a 
delimiting factor and the need to re-focus the attention of the committee members on its 
strategic objectives was highlighted. In any structure it would be expected that there would 
eventually be a shift into operational mode. However, in this case the operational focus is 
nationally directed and dictates the LCDC agenda. One solution proposed by a contributor was 
to utilise the sub-committee structure to continue the operational work mandated by the 
Department and shift the focus of the committee members to the implementation of the LECP. 
This latter point is particularly important to sustain collaboration.  
The design of the SPCs is considerably different. They have no autonomy over funding, there 
are fewer stakeholders involved, their brief is very broad, and they are effectively powerless. 
Some slight differences were apparent between the two SPCs studied despite operating in the 
same site. The local focus of the ED SPC was an important starting condition. It was established 
in 2014 to promote local economic development, enterprise, and job creation.   
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The Limerick ED SPC was expected to be a leader in progressing the enhanced economic 
development role due to the merging local authorities at that site. Indeed, public managers did 
bring local policies and local expertise to the SPC meetings and held some workshops to 
discuss local policies in more detail. However, the committee did not demonstrate evidence of 
deliberative collaboration as policies brought before the committee were already drafted, which 
once again frustrated some of the contributors to this study. 
The T&T SPC, on the other hand, which is now nearly 30 years in existence, had greater 
constraints on collaboration. Its policies and funding were mainly decided nationally by various 
parent government departments and agencies. Moreover, there was little evidence of adapting 
the mechanism locally to make it more collaborative; merely underscoring the persistence of 
norms and values in that instance.  
A key issue raised here is why the SPCs do not have clearly defined approaches to strategic 
planning. In that regard, the research found that an essential element of building operational 
capacity for collaboration is the creation and support of a collaborative mindset. Seeking out 
additional resources and adapting institutional design to local needs demands a certain type of 
mindset which was evident in the case of the LCDC. Morse (2007) and Krogh (2020) 
distinguish between the mindset of public managers engaging externally for collective 
accomplishment and the positional authority the same individuals would have in their own 
organisation; seeing connections and possibilities where others might see barriers or 
limitations. A collaborative mindset is more evident among the participants of the LCDC than 
in the SPCs. One national perspective from an elite interviewee observed: 
A good SPC backed up with a Director of Service who has an interest in policy development, 
with a real good topic like transportation;, with a good chair;, and with a good work 
programme; there is absolutely no reason why there shouldn’t be collaboration there. 
(Interview 18 - elite interview). 
To embed a more collaborative approach in the SPCs would require the Department32 to revise 
their design or local authorities to take a different approach. For example, one suggestion 
proposed in the research was that an LCDC type structure could be applied to the SPCs. Rules 
are intended to guide behaviour and make some actions more likely than others. They do not 
ordinarily determine political behaviour or policy outcomes precisely, but provide parameters 
 
32 Department of Housing, Local Government and Heritage 
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for action rather than dictate a specific action (March and Olsen 2011). Therefore, there should 
be scope to take local initiative to adapt the SPC to local needs.  
Alternatively, because the SPC guidelines are so vague, the Department may need to signal a 
national change to encourage innovation and/or give local authorities the freedom and mandate 
to adapt them to suit local needs. From a national perspective, one elite interviewee indicated 
that perhaps there is a lack of vision around the SPCs, and that elected representatives and/or 
the executive need clarity on their role in the SPC. The same contributor noted a huge 
improvement in local government cross agency collaboration, and collaboration with 
community groups, over the last 30 years.  Giving examples of heritage planning and urban 
and village renewal, this contributor suggested that perhaps a different structure for public 
consultation involving a broader range of focus groups could be established, rather than experts 
presenting to an SPC meeting once a quarter (Interview 17 - elite interview). Another elite 
interviewee argued that the fundamental purpose of a strategic policy committee is to develop 
policy for a range of local authority functions for ultimate approved by the elected council. 
This contributor emphasised the importance of having the correct policy; recalling problems 
relating to poor housing policy and “the dreadful mistakes of the past” (Interview 18 - elite 
interview). Consideration could also be given nationally to giving SPCs greater autonomy or 
some system of recognition or incentives to stimulate a more collaborative approach.  
Management in collaboration is different from management in single organisations and 
hierarchies and requires a particular set of competencies. If public managers are expected to 
carry out this function it should be mainstreamed into their professional, leadership, and 
management practice (Williams 2013). 
6.5 Conclusion 
This analysis presents the nature and extent of collaboration in the mechanisms of local 
governance studied. It demonstrates evidence of improved collaboration in the mechanisms 
established in more recent local governance reform.  
With regard to public value outcomes, a common purpose is deliberately fostered in the LCDC; 
the participants are empowered with information and time which are critical components of the 
collaborative process. Effective dialogue and deliberation in the local and community 




However, the agenda has been overtaken by central government priorities which constrain the 
LCDC from pursuing its own local priorities. In contrast, there is little effort to consciously 
foster a collaborative intent in the SPCs since they are not equally empowered: this has an 
adverse impact on their capacity to collaborate. While the ED SPC was slightly more informed 
as a result of the additional economic development role devolved to local government, it did 
not substantially improve its capacity for collaboration.  
From the perspective of legitimacy and authorisation, the LCDC has enabled local governance 
to embrace a broader authorising environment. The decision-making mandate of the LCDC, 
combined with majority voting rights, significantly enhanced the legitimacy of civil society 
participation. The SPCs have also afforded civil society the opportunity to participate in 
collaborative mechanisms embedded in local government. However their legitimacy has been 
undermined by a lack of decision-making autonomy and power, and, in contrast to the LCDC, 
they are not subject to any form of monitoring or oversight, either locally or nationally.  
In terms of operational capacity the LCDC has demonstrated that collaborative leadership can 
be fostered across all the sectors where a collaborative mindset exists. It also highlights the 
potential for collaboration when the necessary staffing and research resources are dedicated to 
support the deliberative and collaborative process. Apart from ED SPC access to the resources 
of the LEO office, the SPCs need to be better resourced both in terms of process and leadership, 





Chapter Seven: Conclusion 
7.1 Introduction 
Set against a backdrop of local governance reform indicating a shift towards public service 
organisations and citizens jointly creating public value through collaboration, this research 
examined the relevance and applicability of a Public Value Management (PVM) approach in a 
local government setting since the merger of Limerick City Council and Limerick County 
Council under the Local Government Reform Act, 2014. Having been employed in public 
service for almost twenty-nine years at a senior management level and whose own experiences 
of public management evolved over time, the evolving approaches to public management gave 
rise to the researcher’s interest in studying public management. The research was conducted 
through the lens of PVM combined with the collaboration and institutionalism concepts which 
formed the operational framework for the study. The purpose of the research was to test the 
relevance and applicability of a PVM approach in an empirical setting in light of a pre-existing 
institutional configuration. 
Commencing with an overview of the thesis, this chapter concludes the study by providing a 
short summary of its main component parts. It also addresses the two research questions,  
outlines its contribution to original knowledge, and identifies areas for future research. 
7.2 Summary of Thesis 
Chapter One provided an introduction and outlined the purpose, significance, and rationale, of 
the research. It delineated the background and context for the study and the interest and 
relevance of the study from an insider researcher perspective. It also presented the two research 
questions. 
Chapter Two reviewed the theoretical literature on which the overall research was based, and  
identified the key themes and characteristics which emerged from the literature review of PVM,  
institutionalism, and collaboration, and their links to the study.  
Chapter Three offered an historical context, traced the evolution of local government since the 
foundation of the State, and reviewed the two most recent waves of local government reform. 
It concluded with an analysis of how participative/collaborative structures and processes 
evolved in the local governance landscape and the structures and processes which emerged and 
evolved to promote collaboration. 
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Chapter Four operationalised the theoretical framework to guide the empirical research into 
PVM in the local context and linked the three PVM components of public value, legitimacy 
and authorisation, and operational capacity to elements drawn from the literature on 
institutionalism and collaboration. This chapter also outlined the research design in terms of 
relevant ontology and epistemology, and presented the justification for conducting the three 
case studies in a single site to obtain a rich and deep understanding of the effectiveness of 
collaboration at the local level. The steps undertaken to collect and analyse the data and the 
limitations of the overall methodological approach were also outlined in detail. 
Chapter Five presented a comprehensive overview of the research findings from the 
anonymised data collected from 19 semi-structured interviews: 16 from State and non-State 
participants in the local site, and three elite. The given operational framework was applied to 
frame the presentation of findings.   
Chapter Six presented a full analysis and discussion of the research findings. The operational 
framework was applied to frame the presentation of the analysis which evaluated the nature 
and extent of collaboration in the mechanisms of local governance under scrutiny. It 
demonstrated evidence of improved collaboration in the collaborative mechanisms established 
by more recent local governance reform. 
7.3 Addressing the Research Questions 
The research set out to address two research questions which are answered in this section. 
Research Question 1: Does the nature of local state-civil society/non-State collaboration 
indicate a shift towards a broader authorising environment within which public policy 
priorities are determined? 
This research found that in certain circumstances a shift in the broader authorising environment 
capable of generating collaboratively established public value outcomes is observable. 
However, this shift was not discerned across all the local governance mechanisms studied. 
Where the shift has taken place, most noticeably within the LCDC, a number of features stand 
out. 
In the first instance, there is a more visible and embedded sense of common purpose. Critical 
for any collaborative process intent on creating public value is the involvement of people who 
are affected by the issues. Participants in the LCDC evidently maintain sharper focus on the 
objectives they wish to achieve. By comparison with both SPCs, the LCDC has clearly 
delineated functions but, along with that, it enjoys some level of devolved decision-making 
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power, despite the constraints of institutional rules established at national level.  This in itself 
strengthens the sense of common purpose shared by its members. What can be learnt from the 
study is that when a governance mechanism and all actors within it are empowered to pursue a 
set of policy objectives, the very process of empowerment itself further strengthens the 
cohesion and focus of the mechanism.   
However, LCDC members were not only functionally empowered: there is evidence that 
participants were empowered by a visible commitment to quality dialogue and deliberation 
which, in turn, fostered higher levels of trust and mutual respect.  The importance of this cannot 
be overstated. When a process enables all participants to speak and be heard in a meaningful 
and respectful way, collaboration and common purpose follow. Added to this, the LCDC 
process was supported and enabled by bespoke information and supports, specifically designed 
to resource their deliberations. Equally, the information inputs provided by the different 
members were seen not just as valid, but as valuable. As trust and mutual respect became more 
entrenched, trust in the role of all actors as reservoirs of information, perspective, and 
knowledge, was visibly increased. 
The consequence of a well-established common purpose, good quality dialogue, bespoke 
information supports, and perspective sharing, is a reportedly high level of actor participation 
and a willingness to assume and share responsibility. Essentially, what is visible within the 
LCDC process is a genuinely broadened authorising environment, wherein all members hold 
themselves as empowered and legitimised actors with some role and authority in the decision-
making process. This is indebted to an institutional design which endows them decision-
making capacity, and because the LCDC is a different type of governance structure from 
previous arrangements in which all of the elements described above were more consciously 
considered and enabled. 
Neither of the SPCs explored in this research displayed any comparable level of shared power 
and common purpose, although that the Economic Development SPC comes slightly closer to 
achieving this. Instead, the SPCs reinforced the dominant hierarchy of officials and, to a lesser 
extent, elected representatives. By virtue of their original institutional design, the SPCs have 
no decision-making capacity and noticeably struggled to establish any unifying sense of 
common purpose. Again, the learning is clear and coincides with much of the literature on 
collaborative governance. When collaborative mechanisms are established without a clear 
purpose and without some level of actual or proxy decision-making capacity, they invariably 
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struggle to generate any sense of collaborative endeavour. In this instance, the authorising 
environment has simply failed to adjust to meet the demands of a collaborative space. 
Moreover, when weak practices of dialogue and deliberation are added to the mix, trust and 
mutual respect are inevitably slow to embed. Equally, when little value is placed on meaningful 
and manageable information exchange, trust and respect actually erodes and the collaborative 
disposition weakens rather than strengthens. In short, the SPCs are not prototypes of 
collaborative governance wherein the authorising environment has been expanded. This 
conclusion echoes comparable research in the literature review. Instead, and largely due to an 
original institutional design which was perhaps intended to maintain the control of officials and 
elected representatives, SPCs make little impact on the authorising environment and ultimately 
limit the potential for collaboratively designed public value outcomes.  
In order to support a shift towards a broader authorising environment within which public 
policy priorities are determined and public value is fostered, the study found that the following 
elements/actions need to be put in place: 
 involve all affected stakeholders  
 empower state and non-state actors 
 establish a common purpose 
 foster quality dialogue and deliberation 
 provide information and research supports  
 
Research Question 2: Has the local state enabled the appropriate operational capacity to 
imagine and realise a public value informed strategy and practice of collaboration? 
The research has shown that in certain circumstances the governance mechanisms studied have 
been enabled to realise a public value informed practice of collaboration. However it is not 
evident in all circumstances. Where it is enabled, most noticeably in the LCDC, a number of 
characteristics stand out. 
The data found that the decision-making mandate of the LCDC ensured it was adequately 
resourced to carry out its functions. As collaborating to create public value is a resource-
intensive and continuous process it is frequently necessary to convene organisations from 
across different boundaries and sectors. The capacity of the LCDC to prepare for, convene, 
facilitate, and record, such meetings was essential for collaboration and to adhere to the tight 
deadlines set by the Department. It also demonstrated the capacity to process an extensive 
programme of work through the establishment of sub-committees which enabled its 
177 
 
participants to collectively make well-informed and evaluated decisions. The allocation of a 
dedicated support worker with high-level strategic, collaborative, and administrative skills 
contributed to the committee’s achievements. The learning from this is that where governance 
mechanisms handed down to public institutions are appropriately designed and resourced, the 
local state is better enabled to collaborate. 
The interview data found that public managers in the LCDC demonstrated integrative 
leadership in the way they convened, catalysed, and facilitated collaboration. There was also 
clear evidence of distributed leadership between the managers of public service organisations, 
elected representatives, and civil society actors. The study found that they forged a shared 
purpose and a public value informed vision for the future which is also characteristic of 
integrative leadership and which fosters collaboration. Moreover, many of the participants 
commented on the leadership shown by the chairpersons, in both instances elected 
representatives, in the way they balanced the tensions arising from the norms and values of the 
individual actors and guided their behaviour to support the shared intent of the group. This was 
crucial as it encouraged participants to engage in open and frank discussion and debate on the 
decisions they were collectively mandated to make in meetings that were closed to the media 
or members of the public. Therefore, it is concluded that an integrated leadership approach 
should be taken by all the actors to build the capacity of these publicly mandated governance 
mechanisms in order to steer and foster collaboration. 
Operational capacity ultimately arises from the conditions that allow these mechanisms to 
operate. Firstly, they will not have the capacity to operate if they are not given the autonomy 
to do so. There was no catalyst or incentive in the original design of SPCs to enable public 
agencies to support citizen participation against established bureaucratic norms and practices.  
Consequently, unlike the LCDC, the SPCs were not resourced to prepare a meaningful 
programme of work and the capability of the civil society actors was unharnessed; leading to a 
perception they were not valued. The ED SPC enjoyed some degree of autonomy which 
enabled people to engage more on locally prepared plans and strategies, although they were 
not prepared by that mechanism. The learning is clear that without an incentive, such as task 
or power, the procedural capacity for SPCs to imagine and realise a practice of collaboration 
is seriously limited. 
Leadership did not evolve in the SPCs as it did in the LCDC. Despite their location in the same 
institution, the analysis found that traditional forms of public management and leadership 
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persisted. The research found that a statutory requirement and entitlement to participate was 
insufficient to replace the hierarchical approach to managing and chairing the SPCs; thereby 
enabling the elected representatives to use the space to raise their own profile via the media, 
and undermining trust in the process. Evidently, where a mindset to engage across professional, 
organisational, and sectoral boundaries is not fostered/mainstreamed, the operational capacity 
to lead a continuous process of engagement and buy-in is not manifested.  
In order to ensure that mechanisms such as the SPCs and LCDCs have the operational capacity 
to enable collaboration, the study found that the following elements need to be put in place: 
 assign autonomy to overcome bureaucratic norms and practices 
 forge the mindset to engage across professional, organisational and sectoral 
boundaries 
 promote integrative leadership to convene, catalyse, and foster collaboration 
 devise a structure to harness the resources of all actors 
 allocate sufficient resources to facilitate and support the process 
Implementing the actions identified through answering the research questions would greatly 
enhance the potential of the SPCs and LCDC to achieve public value. 
7.4 Contribution of the Study 
This research makes an original contribution to the literature from both conceptual and 
empirical perspectives as follows.  
Conceptual contributions: 
1. This researcher responded to the PVM literature call for more empirical study and to 
explore the relevance of PVM to real world settings.  Local government in Ireland 
was ideally placed to test the relevance of a PVM approach since it is at the local level 
that local State and non-State actors should exchange knowledge and information to 
determine local priorities in the public interest.  
It is also at the local level where non-State sectors should be able to legitimately 
participate in deliberating on issues that affect them. Since mechanisms of 
collaboration have been embedded in local government, this research was an 
appropriate way of testing whether local government has the capacity to lead and 
facilitate a PVM approach.  
2. This study integrates literatures on PVM, institutionalism, and collaborative 
governance. The PVM literature indicated that PVM should take institutionalist 
dimensions into account to embed a PVM approach.  
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As such, the research afforded an opportunity to derive a deep and rich understanding 
of how institutions constrain or enable change. While the literature on collaborative 
governance resonates strongly with the PVM literature, this study undertook a closer 
interrogation of the concept which PVM alone cannot deliver. 
Empirical contributions: 
1. This research adds further to the body of knowledge about local governance in 
Ireland.  It outlines the starting conditions necessary to support collaborative 
mechanisms to embed a collaborative approach which aims to embrace the legitimacy 
of all the sectors in the process of determining and implementing public priorities. 
2. The research further elucidates the importance of operational capacity in enabling 
local governance in Ireland; not least the leadership and facilitative role of the public 
manager to steer the process of collaboration. It underscores the potential for creating 
public value when local government is supported with the procedural capacity for 
collaboration by means of proper resources and institutional design. 
3. The research availed of a unique insider research perspective which enabled access to 
key actors and their insights, and subsequently underpinned the analysis which was 
informed by the researcher’s extensive experience. 
4. The researcher remains currently active in this field, and has the potential to translate 
this research into the world of policy-making and institutional design through 
practical application. 
7.5 Areas for Future Research 
This research concludes with a set of 10 actions to be put in place in order to strengthen the 
collaboration in governance mechanisms which public agencies are mandated to implement: 
 involve all affected stakeholders  
 empower state and non-state actors 
 establish a common purpose 
 foster quality dialogue and deliberation 
 provide information and research supports  
 assign autonomy to overcome bureaucratic norms and practices 
 forge the mindset to engage across professional, organisational and sectoral 
boundaries 
 promote integrative leadership to convene, catalyse, and foster collaboration 
 devise a structure to harness the resources of all actors 
 allocate sufficient resources to facilitate and support the process 
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Further research would be valuable to examine how these actions could be addressed.  
Given the expanding authorising environment in the local governance setting, there is a need 
to conduct research into the disposition of various actors towards PVM and collaborative 
approaches. Based on this future research, training could be designed to promote and support 
a more integrative leadership approach to local governance. This would help to foster a mindset 
of engagement across professional, organisational, and sectoral boundaries, which would also 
be fundamental to progress the other actions. 
From an insider researcher perspective, another area of future research might examine the 
linkages between the structures for strategic planning within local authorities. This study drew 
attention to the apparent lack of connection between the LCDC, the SPCs, and the Corporate 
Policy Group (CPG), and the capacity for joined-up planning that may be lost as a result. While 
the LCDC is a standalone committee of the local authority, this research has proven its efficacy. 
As such, the strategic actions arising from the LCDC as described in the Local Economic and 
Community Plan need to be further developed. An emerging programme could be coordinated 
between the LCDC and the CPG to address the much-needed strategic focus of the SPCs, as 
identified by this research, and promote a sense of common purpose in the local government 
setting. There is also a need for further research on the how the potential contribution of the 
various actors could be maximised. Additional enquiry is also advocated into how individual 
mind-sets and organisational cultures might be refocused so as to achieve greater collaboration.  
Finally, going beyond the local case, there is potential for comparative research for 
collaborating for public value in other countries, especially those identified in the elite 
interviews.  For example, local government in Denmark and Germany seem to be taking an 
approach resembling PVM. It would also be interesting to compare the Irish case to local 
government in the US since the concept of PVM originated in the Harvard Business School.  
7.6 Summative Conclusions 
During the course of this research, I grew in my conviction that a public value approach has 
much to offer in the Irish local governance context. This study provides unique evidence which 
captures both the potential and the complexity of implementing a PVM approach in that 
context. The study served to identify gaps in the systemic and democratic dimensions of PVM 
as currently applied.  
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It suggests key actions with regard to the functions, processes, and range of actors involved in 
collaborative structures, such as SPCs and LCDCs. It also highlights the resource, 
organisational, and democratic, implications of collaborative structures. 
Moreover, it confirms that deliberate and targeted action is essential to foster an openness to 
collaboration and makes clear that attention must be paid to building the collaboration capacity,  
actor capabilities, and the communication, influence, and leadership skills necessary if entities 
such as those examined in this study are to achieve the public value of which they are capable. 
Implementing those actions would assist local government to play its key role in leading 
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LIST OF SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW QUESTIONS FOR LOCAL STAKEHOLDERS 
Introduce the topic:  
I am interested in collaborative working in multi-agency or partnership-based committees 
attached to the local authority and want to discuss with you your experience of collaborative 
working.  
Which committee are you involved with?  
What sector or interests do you represent?  
Tell me how you got involved?  
How long have you been involved?   
Drawing on your experience in this committee, what is your understanding of collaborative 
working. 
Public value outcomes – common purpose 
Q1 Would you say there is a shared understanding of the intended outcomes of the 
committee? i.e. do people on the committee know what the committee is expected to 
achieve 
Probing 
Would you say the committee is focussed on the right issues/policies? 
By that I mean issues that affect you/your sector most, things that matter to your sector? 
Have you/your sector had opportunities for identifying particular policy areas or issues for 
special consideration? Elaborate 
Are the intended outcomes named/clearly specified? Example 
PV Outcomes – informed and empowered actors 
Q2. What is your view on the flow of information within the committee and into your 
sector? i.e. is knowledge freely shared among the group? 
Probing 
Is the committee well informed? 
Is the committee providing you with information on the challenges facing your sector? to 
inform your views? 
Is knowledge and information exchanged/shared between the committee members? 
Do you feedback to your sector/party?  - explain how you do that and what kind of response 
do you get when you give feedback to the sector? 
Are there certain actors who have greater access to information than others? – is that an 
issue? 
Public value outcomes – improved deliberation 





Is there an opportunity for a good depth of discussion? 
Is there an opportunity for in-depth examination and reporting on the issues? 
Is there enough time given for discussion? 
Are there genuine opportunities given to you to influence the discussion? 
Do the members agree on matters to be brought forward? 
Is there ever disagreement, if so how does the committee deal with it?  
Do some members tend to dominate the discussion? Elaborate 
Is there a culture of shared decision-making/power sharing? Equality among the actors 
Would you say the members respect each other’s viewpoints? 
Are you listened to, do you believe the members care about what you have to say? 
Is your viewpoint given fair consideration? 
Legitimacy & Authorisation – broad actor participation 
Q4. Is the composition of the committee appropriate? 
Probing 
Would you say ‘the right people’ are around the table?  
Is there a broad range of inputs, expertise and advice in the membership to inform/guide the 
work of the committee? 
Are people with the right level of authority within their own organisations around the table? 
What stakeholders tend to have the greatest impact on the discussions  
Should other stakeholders be included? Elaborate 
Legitimacy & authorisation – trust  
Q5. Do you have confidence in the committee? Are you motivated through your 
involvement in the committee? 
Probing 
Do you trust that the committee will make good decisions/policy? Why/why not? 
Do you trust that consultation is linked to decision-making, or is it just going through the 
motions? Why/why not? 
Have you noticed changes in the relationships between the committee members? 
Are you/is your organisation/sector sharing more information and resources as a result of 
your participation in this committee? Is there a better use of information and resources now 
as a result of the collaboration?  
Do you engage in informal discussion of issues with other members of the committee – i.e., 
arrange to talk about these issues at times outside of formal meetings? Elaborate 
Do you have a better relationship with some partners/sector representatives compared with 
others? Elaborate – e.g., with whom, why do you think there are differences in the quality of 
the working relationships? 
Where/if you have mistrust did you have it before joining the committee or did it arise from 
your participation in the committee – was there a history of cooperation/or conflict? Explain 
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Legitimacy and Authorisation - Accountability  
Q.6 Has the committee given your sector greater power to influence policy?  
Probing 
Can you justify the positions/policies of the committee i.e. Do you feel you share ownership 
over the positions taken/policies made? 
Do the outcomes help to address the needs of your sector? Example? 
Are you/your sector able to participate without unrealistic demands on your time? 
Does the committee have the power to balance government priorities and local priorities – 
does it do that? 
Is there a balance between meeting local citizen/stakeholder needs and political party needs? 
Examples? 
Are outcomes monitored i.e. we recommended – was it done? Example? 
Who is accountable for implementation?  
Does the committee have the power to act on the recommendations made? Does it do that? 
Drawing on your experience, would you say the outcomes/recommendations of the work of 
the committee is reflected in local government policy? Example? 
Operational Capacity - Leadership  
Q. 7 What kind of leadership would you have observed in the committee? 
Probing 
Who/what provides the leadership?  Is it the council, the politicians, the community? The 
issues? 
What stands out for you in the leadership style? Explain 
Have new leaders emerged within the committee over time? Example 
Op Capacity – innovation & transformation 
Q8. In terms of innovation (outcome)/transformation (process), I want to talk to you 
about new ways of thinking - is this happening in the committee?  
Probing 
Do new ideas emerge from the working of the committee? Or as a result of relationships 
developed in the committee? - Elaborate – give examples, if not, why not?  
Would you say there are new or creative approaches and fresh ways of thinking emerging? - 
Elaborate – give examples, if not, why not?  
Has the committee come up with new ways to solve problems? - Elaborate – give examples, 
if not, why not? 
Does the committee think in creative ways - What was transformed? 
Op Capacity – procedural facilitation 
Q9. In terms of the structures and processes around the operation of this committee, do 




Do the member organisations have the capacity to participate? Explain 
Are there procedures in place to build the capacity of all the actors e.g. is training provided? 
Is there sufficient emphasis given to participation in this committee e.g. Is there a dedicated 
resource provided from the member organisations? Example 
Does the hosting organisation have the operational capacity to manage the committee 
responsibly and effectively? Explain 
How do you get your information? 
Is the time and location of meetings suitable? 
Who chairs the meeting? What is your view on how the chair is selected and approved and 
are you happy with this? Explain 
Who sets the agenda and are you happy with how this is arranged? 
Are you able to contribute items to the agenda? Elaborate 
Would you say everyone is treated equally? Elaborate on why you think this. 
 
















LIST OF SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW QUESTIONS FOR ELITE 
INTERVIEWS 
Introduce the topic:  
I am interested in collaborative working within multi-agency or partnership-based 
committees attached to the local authority and want to discuss with you your experience and 
background in the design and implementation of collaborative working.  
Can you describe your background? 
What sector or interests do you represent?  
Tell me how you got involved in the design/reform of local government structures and 
processes, particularly committees which bring together governmental and non-governmental 
actors? 
How long have you been involved?  In what capacity? (these questions may be answered in 
the previous response) 
Drawing on your experience of partnership working what is your understanding of 
collaboration? 
Q.1 There seems to be a difference in the quality of collaboration between the SPCs and 
the LCDC why do you think that is the case? 
 
Probing 
How could the SPCs adopt a more collaborative approach to their work? 
The former CDBs also had a role also in economic development, what was the extent of 
collaboration in their operation? 
 
Q.2 Can you describe the origins of these committees (SPCs and LCDC)? Why were 
they set up in these particular formats?  
 
Probing 
Can you comment on the institutional design aspects of these structures? 
Why was there no change to the design for the SPCs during the more recent reforms of local 
government? 
The design and operating rules for the committees emanated from central government.  Might 
such control from the centre restrict local collaboration? 
The LCDC structures and processes seem more conducive to collaboration, how might the 
SPC process be incentivised towards collaboration? 
 
Q.3 Can you comment on the monitoring and oversight aspects? 
 
Probing 
Monitoring seems to be stronger in the LCDC and CDBs, than SPCs. Do you agree? 
Why was this monitoring system put in place for LCDCs? 
Why is it not in place in the SPCs, how could SPCs be more effectively monitored? Were any 
lessons drawn from reviews of early cycles of SPCs? 
Does monitoring from the centre impact on local level collaboration? 
Local government was intended to be more empowered under 2014 Act, PPF etc. is there a 




Q.4 Can you comment on the leadership aspects of these collaborative entities?  
Probing 
Do you think the mindset of (a) CEOs+ LA staff (b) elected members and (c)Non-
government actors is supportive of collaboration ? 
SPCs have been in place now since the late 1990s, why is collaborative leadership/mindset 
not more prominent after 30 years? 
Officials in local authorities are moved around all the time, any beliefs they have in 
collaboration might be more evident in one department than another, why is this the case? 
Does the local authority organisational culture foster or inhibit collaboration? 
In the LCDC the Chief Executives of the organisations participated directly, is the positional 
role of the LCDC members significant? 
How can the SPCs be made to work better? Has it something to do with national policy, 
national guidance, or being bound by department circulars and reporting requirements? 
Or is it local authorities unwilling to innovate? (Why won’t they innovate?) 
Or are the non-local authority members too disparate? 
Why is there not a clear programme of policy making? 
 
Q.5 My research shows a different level of engagement in the SPCs compared to the 
LCDC, why might this be the case? 
 
Probing 
How could the role of elected reps be more collaborative in SPCs? 
 
Q.6 Reviews of SPCs gave more hope and expectation but collaboration did not 
improve, should they continue in their current format? 
 
Q.7 The LCDC is more collaborative than the SPCs. Can you think of ways the SPCs 




Increase the power of civil society? 
Give SPCs a decision-making mandate? 
Give them dedicated resources? 
Could the local authority corporate planning system be used in SPCs for more effective 
monitoring? 
Training in collaborative leadership? 
Bring in new staff or assign staff with an interest in the community dimension of local 
authority work and try and ensure continuity of support staff? 
Could the SPCs be replaced with an LCDC type structure – empowered with delegated 
functions and decision making? 
 
Q.8 Have you any other comments or ideas on how the skills/experience and resources 
of the three sectors could be better channelled to ensure local authority activity provides 












Interview 01 Public T&T SPC 19/07/2018 
Interview 02 Civil Society T&T SPC 16/08/2018 
Interview 03 Public LCDC 30/08/2018 
Interview 04 Public LCDC 26/10/2018 
Interview 05 Public T&T SPC 01/11/2018 
Interview 06 Civil Society LCDC 12/12/2018 
Interview 07 Public ED SPC 20/12/2018 
Interview 08 Civil Society T&T SPC 09/01/2019 
Interview 09 Public ED SPC 20/03/2019 
Interview 10 Civil Society ED SPC 24/05/2019 
Interview 11-01 Public T&T SPC 02/04/2019 
Interview 11-02 Civil Society LCDC 04/04/2019 
Interview 12 Civil Society T&T SPC 28/05/2019 
Interview 13 Public LCDC 03/07/2019 
Interview 14 Public LCDC 12/08/2019 
Interview 15 Public ED SPC 13/08/2019 
Interview 16 Elite interview  24/11/2020 
Interview 17 Elite interview  25/11/2020 
Interview 18 Elite interview  26/11/2020 
 
Note 
In this study, 
Public sector includes public officials and elected representatives. 



































FACULTY OF ARTS, HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES 
RESEARCH ETHICS COMMITTEE 
25th June, 2019 
Dear, 
My name is Carmel Kirby and I am currently undertaking post graduate research at the University of 
Limerick.  The purpose of my research is to explore whether the reformed local government system 
brings about effective collaboration between public representatives, civil society and local 
government officials. The research will offer insights on whether and how collaboration could be 
enhanced.  
For the research, I am requesting the participation of committee members of the Travel & 
Transportation SPC, the Economic Development, Enterprise and Planning SPC and the Local 
Community Development Committee of Limerick City and County Council as well as some key 
national policy makers and other relevant key informants. I would be grateful if you would agree to 
participate in the research by allowing me to interview you to ascertain your views on involvement in 
one of these committees. Participation would involve a 30-45 minute audio-recorded, semi-structured 
interview at a time and location chosen by you. Participation does not involve any risks to you. You 
would have the right not to answer questions or to withdraw from the interview at any time.  
At all times during the research process your anonymity and confidentiality will be protected. No 
participant will be identified by name or by other identifying affiliation. All data will be stored and 
retained in accordance with the requirements of the University’s Ethics Committee. If you have any 
queries or would like more information about the project, please contact me, or my supervisors Dr. 
Brid Quinn (Brid.quinn@ul.ie 086/8386633) and Dr. Chris McInerney (Chris.mcinerney@ul.ie 
087/9831600). 
Your participation would enhance the research significantly, so I hope you are willing to be involved. 
If you require further information or have any questions, please contact me at 




This research study has received Ethics approval from the Arts, Humanities and Social Sciences 
Research Ethics Committee (2017-09-18-AHSS). If you have any concerns about this study or your 
participation, and wish to contact an independent authority, you may contact: Chairperson Arts, 
Humanities and Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee, 




FACULTY OF ARTS, HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES 
RESEARCH ETHICS COMMITTEE 
CONSENT FORM 
I, the undersigned, declare that I am willing to take part in research for the project entitled: 
“Collaboration as a catalyst for public value management” 
I declare that I have been fully briefed on the nature of this study and my role in it and have been given 
the opportunity to ask questions before agreeing to participate.  
 The nature of my participation has been explained to me, and I have full knowledge of how the 
information collected will be used. 
 I am aware that my participation in this study will be audio recorded and I agree to this. 
However, should I feel uncomfortable at any time I can request that the recording software be 
switched off. I am entitled to copies of all recordings made and am fully informed as to what 
will happen to these recordings once the study is completed. 
 I am aware that all conversations undertaken in the course of the research, recorded or 
otherwise, will be confidential. 
 I am also aware that the information collected will be securely stored, in accordance with the 
University of Limerick’s Data Protection guidelines and destroyed after seven years. 
 I am aware that such information may also be used in future academic presentations and 
publications about this study. 
 I fully understand that there is no obligation on me to participate in this study. 
 I fully understand that I am free to withdraw my participation at any time without having to 
explain or give a reason. 
 I am entitled to full anonymity.   
 I am entitled to full confidentiality in terms of my participation and personal details. 
_____________________________________  _________________________ 
Name of participant (PLEASE PRINT):   Date 
______________________________________    __________________________ 
Signature of participant                                                Date 
______________________________________  ___________________________ 
Signature of Researcher     Date 
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Name Files References 
Capacity to participate 10 146 
Chairperson 10 59 
Creativity 9 23 
depth of discussion 9 44 
Engagement 10 90 
Formulating outcomes 10 152 
Information and learning 10 123 
Language 3 8 
Leadership 9 27 
Managing the committee 10 130 
Monitoring and evaluation 10 52 
Planning and Objectives 8 29 
Process 5 96 
Representation and feedback 10 133 
Supports for the Committee 8 80 
Training 9 22 
Trust 10 73 
Voice 5 21 
 
Table 3 NVivo Codebook, first round of coding of the local case semi-structured interviews 
 
Name Files References 
Capacity to participate 10 150 
depth of discussion 9 44 
Engagement 10 109 
Formulating outcomes 10 175 
Information and learning 10 132 
Leadership 9 30 
Managing the committee 10 198 
Monitoring and evaluation 10 52 
Representation and feedback 10 138 
Trust 10 74 
 
Table 4 NVivo Codebook, second round of coding of the local case semi-structured 
interviews 
